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Abstract
This thesis investigates empirically three important aspects in the context of
climate change: regulatory responsibility, the measurement of observed environ-
mental policy stringency as well as the impact of the latter on anthropogenic
CO2 emissions. Although distinct, all three aspects are inherently interrelated,
and a proper understanding is crucial in order to eﬀectively combat climate
change. Part 1 contains two introductory descriptive analyses on the distribu-
tion of greenhouse gas emissions on the world surface. This provides a detailed
quantitative basis, allowing to shed light on the responsibility debate in the
context of human induced climate change. The results clearly indicate the his-
torical responsibility of the West, but suggest that the responsibility of countries
in terms of applied regulations is converging, while the one of speciﬁc sectors
and zones is rapidly diverging. Part 2 outlines a coherent methodological frame-
work allowing to measure environmental policy stringency and implements the
latter for several pollutant speciﬁc policies. Part 3 investigates empirically the
relationship between greenhouse gas policy stringency and anthropogenic CO2
emissions. Results indicate that increased greenhouse gas policy stringency low-
ers national CO2 emissions, although by a rather small extent. Moreover, results
show that increased policy stringency improves CO2 eﬃciency of sectors and al-
ters the sectoral composition of economies by increasing the share of relatively
clean sectors.
Keywords: environmental policy stringency, regulatory responsibility, emission
inequality, CO2, CH4, SO2, composition eﬀect, scale eﬀect, technique eﬀect,
center of gravity
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General Introduction
1 Motivation and Structure
An accelerated warming of the climate system increases the likelihood of “severe,
pervasive and irreversible” impacts. Those risks can be mitigated by limiting the
rate and magnitude of climate change (IPCC, 2014a). To do so, anthropogenic
greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions have to be reduced as they are “extremely
likely” to be the dominant cause of the observed global warming (IPCC, 2013).
This calls for a tightening of GHG policy regimes and raises a set of questions.
First, the question of regulatory responsibility emerges, i.e. who has to imple-
ment those stricter policies? Directly linked to this ﬁrst question, is the question
of how strict actual GHG policy regimes of diﬀerent countries are. Third, what
are the actual eﬀects of existing GHG policies? This thesis - consisting of four
chapters - attempts to contribute to the existing literature, by ﬁlling multiple
knowledge gaps regarding those three sets of questions.
The thematic structure of this thesis is divided in three parts.1 Part one
consists of chapter 1 and chapter 2. Those two chapters contain two comple-
mentary descriptive analyses, which provide together a detailed quantitative
basis, allowing to shed light on the responsibility debate in the context of hu-
man induced climate change. Part two, consisting of chapter 3, develops and
implements a methodological framework, allowing to measure environmental
policy stringency. Part three, consisting of chapter 4, uses one of the developed
indexes from chapter 3, and provides an in-depth statistical analysis of the ef-
fects of environmental policy stringency on anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
1Please note, that the thematic structure does not correspond to the temporal structure
of this thesis. Chapter 3 has been written ﬁrst, followed by chapter 2, chapter 4 and ﬁnally
chapter 1.
1
2 General Introduction
2 Overview
Chapter 1 provides a descriptive analysis allowing to describe historical respon-
sibilities of climate change. A better understanding of global issues, such as
Climate Change, requires indicators that are both global in scope and synthetic
in nature. In this chapter, we construct the world’s center of gravity for human
population, GDP and CO2 emissions, which collapses into a single point the
distribution of each of the three variable upon the Earth’s surface. To do so, we
take the best out of ﬁve recognized data sources covering the last two centuries.
This allows to compare the distribution of both economic activity and the ma-
jor source of greenhouse gases since the ﬁrst stages of the industrial revolution.
As such, it provides a concise description of the dynamics of world imbalances
during the last two centuries, illustrating the historic responsibility of the West,
which is a cornerstone of present negotiations to tackle Climate Change. We
also propose a more appropriate two-map representation of the location of the
center of gravity, which allows for a more accurate interpretation of the under-
lying trends. We ﬁnd a radical Western shift of GDP and CO2 emissions centers
during the 19th century, in sharp contrast with the stability of the demographic
center of gravity. Both GDP and emissions trends are reversed in the ﬁrst half
of the 20th century, after World War I for CO2 emissions, and after World War
II for GDP. Since then, both centers are moving eastward at an accelerating
speed. These patterns are consistent with the initial lead of Western countries
starting the industrial revolution and the adoption of fossil fuels as its main
energy source, the impact of world conﬂicts, the gradual replacement of coal by
oil and gas, and the progressive catch up of Asian countries, leading to a con-
vergence in terms of both GDP and CO2 emissions per capita in the recent past.
Chapter 2 complements the historical analysis from Chapter 1, by providing
a detailed analysis of spatial CO2 and CH4 emission inequality over the 1970-
2008 period, using Theil index decompositions. The major greenhouse gases,
CO2 and CH4, are uniformly mixing, but spatial inequalities in emissions do
matter in terms of both eﬃciency and equity of environmental policy formation
and implementation. As the recent evidence has mainly focused on convergence
issues between countries, this chapter extends the empirical analysis by taking
into account within-country inequalities in CO2 and CH4 emissions. We show
that within-country inequalities account for the bulk of global inequality, and
tend to increase over the sample period, in contrast with diminishing between-
country inequalities. An original extension to include diﬀerences across sectors
reveals that between-sector inequality matters more than between-country in-
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equality, and becomes the dominant source of global inequality at the end of
the sample period in the CO2 case. Thus, on the one hand, the decreasing im-
portance of between country and between region inequalities suggests that the
regulatory responsibility of countries is converging. On the other hand, the in-
creasing importance of within country and between sector inequalities suggests
that the contribution to inequality, and therefore the regulatory responsibility,
of speciﬁc geographical zones and speciﬁc sectors is growing. A ﬁnal exercise
suggests that social tensions arising from the disconnection between emissions
and future damages are easing for CO2 but are rather stable for CH4. These
orders of magnitude should be kept in mind while discussing the eﬃciency and
fairness of alternative paths in combating global warming.
Chapter 3 attempts to systematically tackle one of the biggest obstacles in
cross-country empirical research in the area of environmental economics: the
absence of a sound indicator quantifying environmental policy stringency. A
variety of indicators have been proposed and are currently used. Almost none
of them rely on an explicitly stated methodology, violating thereby one of the
most fundamental rules of index construction. To overcome this problem, this
chapter develops a new general methodological framework for the measurement
of environmental policy stringency. The solution I propose allows to separately
quantify the input, process and output dimension of various speciﬁc - hence
well deﬁnable - types of environmental policies. I proposes a ﬁrst implemen-
tation using the example of CO2, CH4 and SO2 policy stringency. In addition
a general greenhouse gas policy stringency indicator is developed. To do so I
combine originally extensive databases on anthropogenic emissions as well as
legal databases. Comparisons with available benchmark indicators suggest that
the obtained indexes measure what they are supposed to. A ﬁrst application
using one of the developed indexes is proposed in chapter 4.
Chapter 4 investigates how greenhouse gas (GHG) policy stringency aﬀects
anthropogenic CO2 emissions using the GHG policy stringency indicator, de-
veloped in Chapter 3, and a structural spatial VAR approach. We estimate
an average country-speciﬁc elasticity of CO2 emissions to GHG policy strin-
gency, and assess the role of channels over which policy stringency aﬀects CO2
emissions. We then ascertain how GHG policy stringency aﬀects sectoral CO2
eﬃciency and the sectoral composition of economies. Results indicate that a
country can signiﬁcantly decrease its anthropogenic CO2 emissions by increas-
ing the stringency of its GHG policy regime. In addition, increasing GHG policy
stringency improves sectoral CO2 eﬃciency, and decreases production in CO2
4 General Introduction
intensive sectors thereby altering the sectoral composition. At last, policy in-
duced CO2 reduction costs in terms of GDP are relatively large, but 4 times
lower for developing compared to developed countries. In short, the results in-
dicate that by increasing the stringency of GHG policy regimes, policy eﬀorts
can reduce national CO2 emissions up to a certain extent. Prospects are there-
fore encouraging that one can limit the rate and magnitude of climate change
and thereby reduce climate change induced risks. However, the presence of a
policy induced composition eﬀect might limit the extent to which global emis-
sions are reduced by national policies. This would be especially true if emission
outsourcing is found to be the main driver of this composition eﬀect.
Chapter 1
Back to 1820? Spatial
distribution of GDP and
CO2 Emissions ∗
1 Introduction
A better understanding of global issues, such as Climate Change or the adoption
of Sustainable Development Goals, requires indicators that are both global in
scope and synthetic in nature. In this chapter, we propose to revisit the concept
of the world center of gravity, which collapses into a single point the distribu-
tion of any variable upon the Earth’s surface. This allows to identify non-trivial
trends and structural shifts at the global level. To illustrate the relevance of this
indicator, we apply it to an original combination of historical data sources, in
order to compare the evolution of both GDP and CO2 emissions on the Earth’s
surface since 1820.
The ﬁrst applications of the center of gravity, by Grether and Mathys (2010)
and Quah (2011), were limited to global production and recent decades. Al-
though using diﬀerent projection methods to represent the center of gravity,
they relied on the same database for GDP (World Bank indicators) and its ap-
∗This paper is co-authored by Jean-Marie Grether (University of Neuchâtel, Faculty of
Economics and Business) and Nicole Mathys (Federal Oﬃce for Spatial Development and
University of Neuchâtel, Faculty of Economics and Business).
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proximate within-country spread (using city population data), and conﬁrmed a
clear Eastern shift since 1980. These early applications toppled with two major
problems namely how to spread more accurately GDP within countries and how
to go further backward in time. These issues were addressed in two subsequent
papers.
Instead of using cities, Grether and Mathys (2011) rely on gridded data
provided by the G-Econ database (Nordhaus et al., 2006a), which provide a
more accurate measure of the spatial distribution of population and produc-
tion. They also use the Maddison (2010) database for older values of GDP but
stop in 1950 due to missing data prior to that year. This latter obstacle is
lifted by Grether et al. (2012b) who provide a thorough discussion of the orig-
inal Maddison database and the additional assumptions that are necessary to
extend it before 1950. Although pre-industrial data must be taken with a grain
of salt, their results are clearly suggestive of a strong Western shift along with
the Big Divergence, with a trend reversal in 1920 for the demographic center,
and in 1950 for the economic center. This suggests that the former debate of
the sixties, whether the unprecedented growth that followed the industrial revo-
lution in Western countries could also be experienced by other countries as well
(e.g. Bairoch (1971)), could have been clariﬁed much earlier if better data and
more accurate indicators had been made available.
One important drawback of these last two historical papers is that, for all
years for which gridded data are still not available, the assumption is simply
that grid shares at the country level are kept unchanged with respect to the
closest available year (i.e. 1990 for G-Econ). This is of particular concern for
countries like the US or China, which cover large areas, represent a signiﬁcant
share of world totals, and where the distribution of people and economic activity
has suﬀered structural changes over the last two centuries. The present chapter
oﬀers a welcome improvement with respect to that shortcoming, by exploiting
the Hyde 3.1 database (Klein Goldewijk et al., 2011), which provides gridded
population data at a very disaggregated level. This database goes back as far
as 1750, and has already been exploited by long run studies of land-use by hu-
man populations (Ellis et al., 2013) and its relationship with global warming
(Matthews et al., 2014). This allows to spread national totals regarding GDP
(or CO2 emissions) according to varying population shares back in the past
rather than by applying ﬁxed shares.
Apart from this unprecedented accuracy, the present chapter extends the
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literature in two other directions. First, it adds an environmental dimension to
the analysis, namely CO2 emissions, relying on gridded data provided by the
EDGAR database since 1970, and on the CDIAC database for earlier years.
This allows to compare the distribution of both economic activity and the ma-
jor source of greenhouse gases since the ﬁrst stages of the industrial revolution.
As such, it provides a concise description of the dynamics of world imbalances
during the last two centuries, illustrating the historic responsibility of the West,
which is a cornerstone of present negotiations to tackle Climate Change (e.g.
Barrett and Stavins (2003) or Mattoo and Subramanian (2012)). It turns out
that the emission center of gravity mimics the Western shift of the economic
center during the 19th century, but shifts back towards Asia thirty years earlier,
at the beginning of the 20th century.
Finally, we provide a thorough discussion on how best to represent a world
center of gravity onto a map. This is not evident, as the usual distortions of
distances by latitude and longitude are compounded by the fact that the center
of gravity locates underground, not on the Earth’s surface. We propose here
an original two-map approach, which is both visually telling and distortion-
free in representing the Cartesian coordinates of the center of gravity. This is
important as the alternative projection methods used until now tend to magnify
errors in measurement when the center of gravity is close to the center of the
Earth, which happens to be the case in recent decades.
2 Methodology
2.1 Cartesian coordinates of world centers of gravity
Assume the surface of the Earth is covered by a regular grid of N cells. Each cell
i, i = 1, ..., N , is identiﬁed by the latitude (ϕ) and longitude (λ) of its lower-left
corner. For each cell, there is an estimate of the underlying variable V , i.e. CO2
emissions (E) for the world emission center of gravity, GDP (G) for the world
economic center of gravity, or population (P ) for the world demographic center
of gravity.
The Cartesian coordinates of each center of gravity are determined according
to the three-step methodology previously introduced by Grether and Mathys
(2010). First, the share of each cell in the world total is calculated, i.e. siV =
Vi∑N
i=1
Vi
. Second, the Polar coordinates of each grid cell are converted into
their corresponding Cartesian coordinates, denoted by x, y and z. For that
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purpose, the Earth is assumed to be a perfect sphere, a reasonable assumption
given the approximations aﬀecting the measurement of the underlying variables.
Cartesian coordinates may be expressed in kilometers, or as a fraction of the
Earth’s radius, R (6371km).1 Third, the coordinates of the world center of
gravity are obtained as weighted averages of the Cartesian coordinates of each
grid cell, using grid cell shares as weights:
xv =
N∑
i=1
siV xi yv =
N∑
i=1
siV yi, zV =
N∑
i=1
siV zi (1)
The obtained point, P ∗V (xV , yV , zV ), where V = E,G, P , locates within the
sphere. The length of the associated vector, with its origin in the Earth’s center,
is obtained as: ∥∥∥−−−→OP ∗V ∥∥∥ =√x2V + y2V + z2V (2)
This length can be used as a rough indicator of the concentration of the
underlying variable on the Earth’s surface. An extreme concentration in a single
point would lead to a gravity center right on the Earth’s surface, and a length
just equal to the Earth’s radius.
2.2 Existing conventions to represent the location of world
centers of gravity
The literature on how to map the Earth’s surface on a two-dimensional plane
dates back to more than two thousand years (see Snyder (1987) for a detailed
survey including both technical and historical references). There is no univer-
sally accepted technique, as every method (cylindrical, conic or azimuthal, and
their sub-cases) presents its shortcomings regarding speciﬁc distortions (e.g. on
distances, areas or angles). The problem is further compounded here by the
fact that the points we are interested in, i.e. the centers of gravity, are located
within the sphere, not on its surface.
To the best of our knowledge, two projection techniques have been proposed
till now for the world centers of gravity, as illustrated by Figure 1. The ﬁrst one,
1In a 3-dimensional space where the origin is at the center of the Earth, axis x (projection
of the Greenwich meridian) and y (projection of the 90◦E meridian) deﬁne the equatorial
plane, and axis z is the North-South polar axis, the corresponding formulas are : xi =
Rcos(ϕi)cos(λi), yi = Rcos(ϕi)sin(λi), zi = Rsin(ϕi), where R is the Earth’s radius. See
the technical Appendix to Grether and Mathys (2011) for a detailed description.
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proposed by Grether and Mathys (2010), consists of projecting orthogonally the
center of gravity, P ∗, upon the Earth’s surface (Figure 1a). It leaves unspeci-
ﬁed the technique used to represent the projection point, P1, with latitude ϕ1.
The second technique, proposed by Quah (2011), directly projects the center of
gravity on a cylinder wrapping the globe along the Equator (Figure 1b), which
leads to a lower latitude for the projection point, ϕ2 <ϕ1.
Figure 1: Alternative projections of the world’s center of gravity
(a) Grether and Mathys (2010) (b) Quah (2011)
Both techniques may be criticized on the ground that they are insensitive
to speciﬁc directional movements of the center of gravity, depending on the
distribution of the underlying variable over time. The convention by Grether
and Mathys (2011) does not capture changes of P ∗ along the OP1 axis. The
convention by Quah (2011) is insensitive to changes of P ∗ along the QP2 line.
Which type of changes matters more in practice is an empirical question, which
could guide the choice between these two projection techniques, or any other
alternative deemed more relevant depending on the speciﬁc variable or time
period considered. However, any convention relying on a single two-dimensional
map will remain aﬀected by some kind of distortion. That is why we privilege
here Cartesian over Geographic coordinates, and use two maps instead of a
single one. We argue in the next subsection that this is the most accurate and
tractable way to represent a point located deeply underground.
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2.3 A new, distortion-free convention
The ﬁrst map, on the left of Figure 2, is consistent with the technique of Quah
(2011) that is, a cylindrical projection. It provides, on the vertical axis, a
distortion-free representation of the z Cartesian coordinate described in subsec-
tion 2.1. The horizontal axis represents longitude, which is subject to distor-
tions, because there is an inﬁnity of (x, y) combinations within the sphere cor-
responding to the same longitude. The second diagram on the right of Figure
2, provides an explicit representation of x and y, with the x(y) axis represent-
ing the projection of the Greenwich (90 degree) meridian. All three Cartesian
coordinates are expressed as a fraction of the Earth’s radius.2
Figure 2: Cartesian coordinates of the gravity center in two maps
(a) cylindrical projection (b) azimuthal projection
The combination of these two maps allows describing without distortion
any underground movement of the center of gravity, including those above-
mentioned peculiar cases for which previously used conventions are insensitive
to. Two stylized examples will help to illustrate the complementarity of both
maps. In each case, one of the two maps gives a confusing vision of the evolution
of the center of gravity, while the other map unveils what actually happens. We
2Countries’ contours correspond to a Lambert equal-area cylindrical projection in the
left map, and to an azimuthal projection in the right map. Figures 2-4 limit the number
of meridians and parallels to streamline presentation. Consecutive ﬁgures with actual results
report meridians and parallels every 10◦, along with ticks to indicate half of the Earth’s radius
on the x,y,z axis.
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dub the ﬁrst case the “wiper eﬀect”. It is represented in Figure 3, where the
left map suggests that the center of gravity shifts from point A to point B, then
back again, and so forth, as a pendulum covering apparently the same horizontal
distance period after period. However, what happens in reality, as shown by
the right map, is that the center of gravity gets ever closer to the center of the
Earth, along a zigzag trajectory analogous to the one of a bug crawling from the
extremity of a car wiper to its rotating base. Again, this illusion is due to the
fact that an inﬁnity of within-sphere (x, y) combinations are compatible with
the same longitude.
Figure 3: The “wiper” eﬀect
(a) (b)
The right map is not exempt from optical illusion either. In the second case,
illustrated in Figure 4, the center of gravity appears to be going round a regular
ellipse on the right map. However, the left map shows that its height above
the equatorial plane is regularly decreasing. We call that movement along a
downward spiral a “staircase” eﬀect.
Other optical illusions could still be considered but are not reported here
for the sake of conciseness, and as we limit the presentation to the two cases
which do aﬀect our own results. The key point is that, although we keep on
using latitudes and longitudes to characterize locations on maps, the center of
gravity is an underground point which is best identiﬁed in space by using three
Cartesian coordinates rather than two Geographic coordinates.
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Figure 4: The “staircase” eﬀect
(a) (b)
3 Data sources
Data needed for calculations are obtained by combining ﬁve distinct data sources.
On the one hand, three data bases provide information at the grid level. The
HYDE 3.1 database (Klein Goldewijk et al., 2011) provides historical gridded
population data from 10000 B.C. to 2005 A.D. Since 1820, the data are avail-
able in 10 year intervals, and has a grid resolution of 5 by 5 arc minutes. The
G-Econ research project (see G-Econ (2011)) provides gridded GDP data at a
60 arc minutes level of resolution for the years 1990, 1995, 2000 and 2005. The
Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research (EDGAR, see European
Commission and Joint Research Centre (JRC)/Netherlands Environmental As-
sessment Agency (PBL) (2011)) reports yearly data on CO2 emissions from fuel
combustion and non-metallic mineral processes (including cement production)3
, excluding short-cycle organic carbon from biomass burning at a 0.1◦ level of
resolution. This data covers the period of 1970 to 2008. On the other hand,
two other data bases cover larger periods but at the national level only, i.e. the
The Maddison Project (2013), which contains estimates of GDP and popula-
tion from 1 to 2010 A.D., and CDIAC (see Boden et al. (2013)), which provides
CO2 estimates from fossil-fuel consumption and cement production over the
3Note that Edgar covers more carbon dioxide sources, but to correctly match Edgar with
CDIAC (which covers only CO2 emissions from fossil-fuel consumption and cement produc-
tion), we retain from EDGAR only CO2 emissions from IPCC source category 1A (fuel com-
bustion) and 2A (non-metallic mineral processes).
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1751-2010 period.
3.1 Population
The only modiﬁcation of the HYDE database is to extend it from 2005 to 2010.
To do so, we apply to each cell’s population in 2005 the population growth rate
2005-2010 of the corresponding country as obtained from the national ﬁgures of
the Maddison database. Country attribution of each cell is obtained by merging
HYDE with the global database on administrative boundaries GADM (2012).
As explained below, this HYDE gridded population database at a very high
degree of resolution provides the basis to extend the GDP and emission gridded
data backward in time.
3.2 GDP
First, the G-Econ 2005 gridded GDP data are extended to 2010, using Mad-
dison country GDP data for growth rates and by relying on the same method
as described above for population. Second, we extend the gridded GDP series
backward to 1820 in the following way. We combine the HYDE and the Mad-
dison databases by assuming that within-country GDP is uniformly distributed
per capita. This allows to spread national GDP ﬁgures from the Maddison
database according to the gridded population shares obtained from the HYDE
database. The obtained Maddison/HYDE gridded GDP ﬁgures are of course an
approximation, but given data availability, it is the best way to capture within-
country spatial variations backward in time. We then aggregate the so-obtained
5 arc minutes cells to cells with a 60 arc minutes resolution in order to match
them with the G-Econ data. Finally, we merge the Maddison/HYDE data, cov-
ering the decades 1820 to 2000, with the G-Econ database, which covers the
years 1990 to 2010.4 Whenever possible, we construct 5 year averages around
decimal years to minimize the inﬂuence of potential extreme events.
3.3 CO2 emissions
The procedure is similar to the one followed for GDP. First, gridded EDGAR
emission data for 2008 are extended to 2012 by using 2008-2010 and 2010-2012
4To avoid potential jumps in the ﬁnal series, we smooth the transition from one database
to the other by using a mix of both cell GDP datasets for overlapping decades 1990 and 2000.
For the year 1990, we calculate ﬁnal cell GDP as 70% of Maddison/HYDE cell GDP and 30%
of G-Econ cell GDP, while for the year 2000 we calculate it as 30% Maddison/HYDE cell
GDP and 70% G-Econ cell GDP.
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national growth rates obtained from the EDGAR FT2012 database (an ex-
tended version of Edgar v4.2, containing country data). Second, to extend data
backward in time, the HYDE and CDIAC databases are combined assuming
emissions per capita are uniformly spread within countries. Then the obtained
CDIAC/HYDE data are aggregated to a 60 arc minutes resolution to harmonize
with the GDP aggregation level. Finally, we merge the CDIAC/HYDE data,
covering the years 1820 to 1990 with the EDGAR database which covers the
years 1970 to 2010.5 Whenever possible, we construct 5 year averages around
decimal years to minimize the inﬂuence of potential extreme events.
4 Results
Figures 5, 6 and 7 report the two-map diagrams for the three centers of gravity,
i.e. for population, GDP and CO2 emissions. We remind the reader that the
country frontiers are only reported here for graphical convenience. Normally
the center of gravity itself always locates well below the Earth’s surface. Its
height (coordinates along orthogonal meridians) above (within) the equatorial
plane is (are) given in the left (right) map.
Figure 8a compares the length of the gravity vectors, as the distance between
the gravity center and the Earth’s center. It is a rough measure of the concen-
tration of the underlying variable on the Earth’s surface. It also helps ﬁguring
out the radius of the inner-Earth imaginary concentric sphere upon which the
center of gravity locates. Figure 8b compares the speed of the gravity centers,
i.e. the distance they cover per decade.
Regarding interpretation of trends, the coordinates of the world center of
gravity being a weighted average of individual cell’s coordinates, it is intuitive
that changes over time are mostly driven by variations in (large) country shares.6
To condense presentation, we will only refer to the most important changes in
the text below. The interested reader can also refer to the Appendix for the
evolution of the share of the largest countries during the 1820-2010 period.
5To avoid potential jumps in the ﬁnal series, we smooth the transition from one database
to the other by using a mix of both cell CO2 datasets for the years 1970, 1980 and 1990, as
we did for GDP. For 1970 (1980, 1990), we calculate ﬁnal cell CO2 emissions as 75% (50%,
25%) of CDIAC/HYDE cell emissions and 25% (50%, 75%) of EDGAR cell emissions.
6In theory, within-country variation should also be addressed, but in practice, most of
the variation comes from between-country changes. See also Grether et al. (2012b) for a
decomposition of changes of the economic center of gravity into between-continent and within-
continent eﬀects.
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4.1 Population
As could be expected, the population center of gravity is basically located under
Asia (Northern India in the left maps and along the Russian-Kazak frontier in
the right maps). At the beginning of the period, its length is close to 5000 km,
i.e. around 0.75R, where R is the Earth’s radius (6371 km). This is the result of
0.5R elevation over the equatorial plane (corresponding to a Northern latitude
of 30◦) and approximately 0.6R rightward orientation on the projection of the
90◦ meridian (the coordinate along the projection of the Greenwich meridian is
almost negligible). In short, human population is initially quite concentrated in
the Asian part of the Northern hemisphere.
Figure 5: Center of gravity for population
The bottom maps reveal a small but steady shift during the sample period,
in two distinct phases. During the ﬁrst phase, which lasts until 1910, the center
of gravity shifts westward, with no latitudinal change. This is consistent with
the gradual decline of China and India, whose combined share in world popula-
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tion drops from 55% to 40% along that sub-period. It is also concomitant with
a leftward shift of the horizontal component of the left maps, and a correspond-
ing decline in the length of the gravity vector by around 15%. That is, human
population becomes more homogeneously spread, with a decline in Eastern and
a rise in Western locations, in particular the USA.
During the second phase, starting in 1920, there is a clear Southern shift,
slightly eastward until 1980, and westward since then. This is consistent with
Western countries plateauing in terms of population, the combined share of
China and India remaining roughly constant, and a relative increase of South-
ern countries in East Asia ﬁrst, and in Africa second. Overall, there is again
an increase in the dispersion of human population, although the decline of the
length of the gravity vector is more moderate than in the ﬁrst phase.
These shifts in the demographic gravity center are consistent with historical
trends, but of modest magnitude, with an average speed of less than 200km per
decade. The trends exhibited by the other two variables reveal more profound
changes.
4.2 GDP
The trajectory of the economic center of gravity is also in two phases, but the
striking features are that apparent distances covered are far larger than for the
demographic center, whereas the elevation upon the equatorial plane is almost
unchanged, with most points locating along the 30◦N parallel on left-hand side
maps. Starting 1820, the location is almost identical to the demographic center
of gravity, reﬂecting the small diﬀerences in GDP per capita across countries
prior to the industrial revolution. Then the Big Divergence leads to a strong
western shift of the economic gravity center, with a speed two to three times
larger than for the demographic center of gravity, and during a longer period.
Although the 1930s and 1940s slow down the process, the immediate after-
maths of World War II brings it its last big western push, with a 1950 location
close to the middle of the Atlantic. During that same sub-period, the combined
share of China and India in world GDP has dropped from 45% to less than 10%,
while that of the USA has risen from a few percentage points to more than 25%.
Since 1950, the eastward shift has been steady, driven by European recon-
struction ﬁrst, and then by the Asian comeback. It seems to accelerate a lot
Chapter One: Emission, GDP and Population Centers of Gravity 17
Figure 6: Center of gravity for GDP
between 2000 and 2010, when the center of gravity jumps by more than 40◦
of longitude. However, while interpreting left maps, one has to remember that
longitudes are not a precise concept in terms of distances. It does not only
depend on latitude (which is here roughly constant), but also on the distance
from the North-South axis, i.e. the inward location of the gravity center within
the sphere, which is indicated on the right map. And, precisely between 2000
and 2010, it happens that the center of gravity gets quite close to the Earth
center, ending a continuous decrease in the length of the vector since 1950. As
a result, the eﬀective speed in 2010 remains smaller than in 1950 that is, it is
indeed large but not extraordinarily so. This explains the apparent jump and
illustrates again how relying on a unique map to represent a three dimensional
movement is misleading.
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4.3 CO2 emissions
The trajectory of the center of gravity for emissions is even more remarkable
than for GDP. It is initially an almost purely British phenomenon, with a center
of gravity locating just underneath the UK, with a length corresponding to 98%
of the Earth’s radius. As the industrial revolution spreads, and the use of coal as
the main energy source with it, this center begins its descent towards the South-
West and the Earth’s center. Its most westward location is in 1920, when its
projection gets close to the US coast and its length has decreased to 81% of the
Earth’s radius. During that ﬁrst period, the speed is similar to the one recorded
for the economic center of gravity, although larger for the last two decades of the
sub-period (1910 and 1920). Overall, the 19th century is a period during which
GDP and CO2 emissions tend to evolve synchronically and westward. This is
due to the progressive replacement of the UK by the US as the major source
of world emissions. US dominance peaks in 1920, with a share of 50% of world
emissions.
Comparative dynamics of GDP and emissions are altered after World War
I. While economic expansion pursues its westward trend, the center of gravity
of CO2 emissions shifts towards the East in 1930 and 1940. This suggests a
decoupling between economic activity and pollution, which is probably linked
with the early adoption of oil as an alternative, less emission-intensive, source of
energy by the US (i.e. the major polluter), while other major polluters remain
more coal-dependent. Indeed, according to Smil (2010), the share of coal in US
energy supply peaks in 1910, while it does so only 40 years later in the UK and
the USSR. As a result, the share of the US in world emissions declines strongly
in 1930-1940, whereas its GDP share remains stable. This explains the earlier
reversal of the emission center of gravity with respect to the economic one. Eco-
nomic trends remain powerful however, and the US growth spurt following the
end of World War II temporarily interrupts the eastern trend in 1950, when
both centers of gravity shift westward again, albeit more modestly for the emis-
sion center.
From 1950 onward, the emission center of gravity is heading East, as the
economic one. This is in line with a decline in US dominance in terms of both
GDP and emissions, although the decline is a lot larger for emissions, with a
US share in world emissions dropping from above 40% in 1950 to 20% in 1980.
This coincides with very large distances covered by the emission center of grav-
ity, close to 1000 km per decade, as reported by ﬁgure 8. This suggests again
that the transition towards non-coal energy sources such as oil and gas has been
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Figure 7: Center of gravity for CO2 emissions
quicker in the US compared to other large emitters (the share of coal falls below
50% as early as 1940 for the US, but only in 1960 for the UK or Japan, and
1970 for Russia, see Smil (2010).
During the ﬁrst two decades following the end of the cold war, 1990 and 2000,
the eastern shift is slowed down, as the US share in world totals either stabilizes
for emissions or even increases slightly for GDP. This is in line with a pause in
the erosion of US dominance and the demise of the USSR.7 But the movement
accelerates again in the last decade, 2010, for both GDP and emissions. This
corresponds to the rise of Asian countries, in particular China, which remains
7We warn again the reader against using the left map only to estimate distances covered
by the emission center of gravity in 1990 and 2000. They appear large, in particular in contrast
with 1960. However, as shown by the right map, it is a typical “wiper” eﬀect due to the fact
that the center of gravity locates closer and closer to the Earth’s center from 1950 onward. In
reality distances covered are considerably smaller in 1990 or 2000 than in 1960 (see ﬁgure 8).
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Figure 8: Length and speed for the centers of gravity
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heavily dependent on coal as an energy source. By the end of the sample period,
the emission center of gravity locates quite close to the demographic center of
gravity.
In a nutshell, the evolution of the emission center of gravity suggests radical
changes in the spatial distribution of CO2 emissions on the Earth’s surface. In
two centuries, it shifts from an extremely concentrated location to one which
is strikingly similar to the distribution of world population. This calls for a
complementary analysis in the last subsection.
5 Spatial imbalances: measurement and discus-
sion
People are unequally spread across the planet’s surface, i.e. mainly in the
Northern Hemisphere, and mostly in Asia. This encapsulates into a location
of the demographic center of gravity which is roughly stable over time, at 0.5R
(R=6371km) above the equatorial plane and 0.5R to the right of the Greenwich
meridian. If GDP and emissions were equally shared among people, the corre-
sponding centers of gravity would locate at the same place, i.e. below Northern
India, at roughly 70% from the center of the Earth. This is not what happened
during the last two centuries. From there the idea of using the distance between
the demographic center of gravity and the comparison one as a proxy for the
spatial imbalances characterizing the per capita distribution of the underlying
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variable (either GDP or emissions).
More speciﬁcally, following Zhao et al. (2003), we deﬁne the index of spatial
imbalances as the ratio between the actual distance between the demographic
center of gravity and the one it is compared to, and the potential maximum for
that distance, i.e. the length of the demographic center of gravity vector plus
the Earth’s radius.8 Applied to GDP and emissions, this leads to the values
reported in Figure 9.
What happens for GDP conﬁrms the trend reversal pattern already identi-
ﬁed in ﬁgure 6. Spatial imbalances start below 10%, and then increase during
the Big Divergence, as economic growth takes oﬀ in Western countries and their
oﬀshoots. The peak is reached in 1950, with an index slightly over 50%. After
that, European and then most importantly Asian catch-up decrease spatial im-
balances back to 20% at the end of the period.
Figure 9: Indices of spatial imbalances
8For example, if the demographic center of gravity is denoted by D, the economic center
of gravity by G, and the Earth’s center by O, then the index of spatial imbalances for GDP
is given by
∥∥−−→DG∥∥[∥∥−−→DO∥∥+R] , where R is the Earth’s radius.
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The temporal pattern for emissions is distinct in that it starts from a large
level of close to 50% in 1820. The rest of the trajectory is qualitatively similar
to GDP, i.e. also an inverted-u shape, but with three diﬀerences. First, the
rising phase is less steep, with a peak at 60%. This is due to the fact that, apart
from going West, which increases the index, the center of gravity of emissions
is also going down (Southward), which decreases the index. Second, as already
noticed in ﬁgure 7, the peak is reached in 1920, not 1950. Third, the decreasing
phase is steeper, with a ﬁnal index of spatial imbalances for emissions around
10% in 2010.
Intuitively, if data had been available for earlier centuries, it is quite prob-
able that the pattern of spatial imbalances for emissions would have looked
even more similar to the one for GDP. After all, before any country started its
industrial revolution, diﬀerences in emissions per capita across countries were
probably not large, implying a low level of spatial imbalances. This suggests a
kind of leading role of emissions with respect to GDP over a long time span.
Although no formal analysis has been performed, the interpretation would
be as follows. Start from a pre-industrial world where production and emissions
are roughly homogeneous across people. Then technological innovation and the
use of fossil fuels give an early boost to Western countries. The impact on
emissions is immediate, while the eﬀect on production takes several decades to
materialize. During the rest of the 19th century and the early 20th century, as
the West industrializes alone, emissions and production go hand in hand. Then
the rapid adoption of less emission-intensive energy sources (oil and gas rather
than coal) by the US sends back the emission center of gravity towards the East
as early as the 1930s. Economic activity is characterized by more inertia, but
when it starts to shift back as well after 1950, this accelerates further the eastern
movement in emissions, also enhanced by the shift of more emission-intensive
manufacturing activities towards Asia. As it happens, after a long period of
divergence, both the economic and the emission centers of gravity seem to be
dragged back to their initial 1820 location determined by demography.9
The above trends are conﬁrmed when using alternative conventions regard-
ing the smoothing shift from CDIAC to EDGAR data for emissions, or from
9The extreme spatial concentration of emissions at the beginning of the sample period is
due to the narrow deﬁnition of CDIAC historical data, limited to fossil fuel consumption and
cement production only. However, to our knowledge, it is the best historical data on CO2
emissions available at present.
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Maddison to GEcon data for GDP. Moreover, temporal patterns for the de-
mographic and economic centers of gravity are similar to those identiﬁed by
Grether et al. (2012b), even though they did not rely on the Hyde database to
capture within-country changes in spatial distributions. Therefore, given data
limitations, our results can be considered as reasonably robust.
6 Conclusions
During the two centuries that followed the industrial revolution, economic activ-
ity has become more intense, complex and widespread upon the Earth’s surface.
This has coincided with a redistribution of people, power and pollution across
regions. Capturing the major trends underpinning these spatial changes is not
straightforward. By synthesizing the spatial distribution of any variable into a
single point, the world center of gravity approach allows to reveal interesting
dynamics. We have applied that approach to three variables i.e. human pop-
ulation, GDP and CO2 emissions, for which gridded data were made available
along the 1820-2010 period. We have also reﬁned the presentation of results in
order to avoid distortions and identify more accurately critical reversals.
Two major results emerge. First, the world demographic center of gravity
is very stable over time, and clearly located under Asia. Second, the other
two variables present a strong divergence with respect to demography during
the 19th century, and a progressive return towards Asia during the 20th cen-
tury, with a reversal in 1920 for emissions, and 1950 for GDP. Technological
innovation, energy transition, structural change and wars are the main factors
underlying these trends and turning points. In a nutshell, it is as if demography
acts like a long run anchor, while emissions and GDP are two outcome variables
of a technological diﬀusion process which increases spatial inequalities during
the 19th century and progressively decreases them during the 20th century.
Two caveats to conclude. First, results could be reﬁned with better quality
data, in particular for the years before 1950. Second, and perhaps more fun-
damentally, this type of analysis may be discarded as being merely descriptive.
We perfectly acknowledge that it is not a causal analysis. However, we believe it
clariﬁes the presentation of trends and the identiﬁcation of turning points that
matter at the global level. As such, it may be applied to the many other cases
where the relevant question is how do socio-economic phenomena spread across
the Earth’s surface.
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Appendix A
Figure A1 reports, for each variable of interest, the evolution of the share of the
largest six countries in world totals over the sample period.
Figure A1: Shares of major countries in world totals 1820-2010
(a) Population (b) GDP
(c) CO2 emissions
Chapter 2
Geographical Spread of
Global Emissions:
Within-country Inequalities
Are Increasing ∗
1 Introduction
The diﬀerent emission sources of gases contributing to global warming are un-
evenly spread across the Earth surface. For a climate analyst, this may seem
relatively benign given that the major greenhouse gases (GHG), carbon diox-
ide and methane, are uniformly mixing and thus deploy their eﬀects worldwide.
However, from a politico-economic perspective, the attribution of polluting emis-
sions to speciﬁc locations is crucial for a variety of reasons. First of all, the main
bulk of policies regulate emissions at the production source (command and con-
trol instruments, taxes, tradable allowances) and thus the emission distribution
matters because policy stringency varies depending on spatial location. On
top of that, everything else equal especially monitoring possibilities ﬁxed, the
more widespread pollution sources are, the larger the costs of implementing and
∗This paper is co-authored by Jean-Marie Grether (University of Neuchâtel, Faculty of
Economics and Business) and Nicole Mathys (Federal Oﬃce for Spatial Development and
University of Neuchâtel, Faculty of Economics and Business).
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monitoring reductions in emissions. This eﬃciency argument must be reﬁned
to include marginal abatement costs, which do diﬀer strongly across locations.
Moreover, and even more importantly, even though one additional ton of CO2
equivalent has the same warming eﬀect whatever its origin, its long lasting im-
pact varies widely across locations. This has generated heated debates about
who should be made accountable for these damages. While consumption-based
accounting focuses on the responsibility of the ﬁnal consumer, independently of
the production site, the location of emission sources determines the responsibil-
ity in terms of the applied regulation. It is largely acknowledged that diﬀerences
in responsibilities should be taken into account in policy negotiations such that
the ﬁnal outcome can be considered as fair.1 Finally, asymmetries in both expo-
sition to damages and historical responsibilities are crucial in shaping not only
the national stance in terms of climate policy, but also lobbying activities within
each nation. In short, spatial diﬀerences in emissions are critical in shaping the
eﬃciency and fairness of international and national environmental policies and
need to be better understood.
Recognizing the importance of patterns of spatial distributions of GHG emis-
sions for environmental policy making, the literature started to analyze them
in the late 20th century, using various inequality measures (see for instance
Grunewald et al. (2014), Arora (2014), Duro et al. (2013), Duro (2012), Or-
das and Grether (2011), Clarke-Sather et al. (2011), Groot (2010), Cantore and
Padilla (2010), Coondoo and Dinda (2008), Duro and Padilla (2006), Padilla
and Serrano (2006), Heil and Wodon (2000), Heil and Wodon (1997)). Most of
the work dealing with emission inequalities focused so far solely on inequalities
between countries and on only one particular gas, carbon dioxide. This is prob-
ably due to data availability, the importance of carbon dioxide in the context
of climate change and to the perception that negotiating units are countries
or groups of countries. The contribution of Arora (2014) and Clarke-Sather
et al. (2011) which analyze inequality patterns at the sub-national level in India
and China constitute a notable exception, with a focus on only one particular
country and gas. To our best knowledge, no study exists which analyzes global
1The theoretical and empirical literature on climate change policy negotiations emphasizes
clearly the importance of fairness as a criteria for successful international and national negoti-
ations (see for instance Cantore (2011), Rübbelke (2011), Kverndokk and Rose (2008), Lange
et al. (2007), Paavola and Adger (2006), Barrett and Stavins (2003) Ringius et al. (2002) and
Rose et al. (1998)). Using the words of Barrett and Stavins (2003), p.358: "Concerns for
fairness are not merely abstract notions. They are important for negotiations. People often
refuse oﬀers they perceive to be unfair, even when doing so comes at signiﬁcant personal cost.
In principle, it should be possible to negotiate a treaty that is both eﬃcient and fair."
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emission inequality using sub-national disaggregated data.
Accounting for within-country spatial inequality of emissions may improve
our understanding for at least three reasons. First, from an analytical point of
view, using national instead of sub-national basic units will result in an impor-
tant underestimation of global geographic inequality. After all, within country
inequalities may even be stronger than between country inequalities. Second,
the literature on the political economy of environmental policies emphasizes the
important role of lobbying groups in the formation of environmental policies (see
for instance Oates and Portney (2003) or Aidt (1998)). Hence spatial within
country inequalities are important because they might shape national environ-
mental policies via the interaction of diﬀerent sub-national interest groups. As
Clarke-Sather et al. (2011) put it: “internal dynamics of carbon inequality have
the potential to shape future energy policies”. Finally, we observe today an
emerging trend towards sub-national and or sectoral policies regarding green-
house gases. Scott Barrett for instance proposed to break the problem up and
to rely on separate agreements addressing diﬀerent gases and sectors (Barrett,
2008). Another example would be the World Bank which recently launched its
idea of a global network of carbon markets (see World Bank (2013)).
This chapter proposes an in-depth analysis of spatial inequalities in global
warming related emissions for two GHGs, carbon dioxide (CO2) and methane
(CH4). To measure inequality, while being able to incorporate within country
inequalities, we need a decomposable inequality index. We thus use a spatial
Theil index, which captures how polluting emissions per square kilometer are
unevenly spread across the Earth’s surface. This index allows to analyze struc-
tural determinants of inequalities, as it can be decomposed into the contribution
of geographical groups on diﬀerent hierarchical levels (e.g continents, countries)
and emission sources (e.g. sectors). It thereby attempts to provide answers
to the following questions: By how much do we underestimate global emission
inequality by choosing countries as basic units of analysis? How do the con-
tributions of between and within country inequality evolve over time? Which
speciﬁc sector/country combinations contribute more than proportionally to
global emission inequality? And ﬁnally, as an illustration of the importance of
these measures in the policy debate, what is the degree of overlapping between
the geographical distribution of current emissions and the geographical distri-
bution of future damages?
This chapter contributes in several ways to the existing literature. It esti-
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mates for the ﬁrst time global emission inequality using a sub-national basic
unit of analysis. Moreover, instead of limiting ourselves to the carbon dioxide
case, we extend the analysis by including methane as an additional gas. On top
of that we extend existing Theil index decomposition methods in two directions.
The ﬁrst enables us to determine which part of total inequality is due to diﬀer-
ences between countries and between sectors and which part is due to diﬀerences
within countries and sectors. The second extension allows us to evaluate how far
the geographical distribution of damages is disconnected from the distribution
of emissions. In order to implement these estimations, we use a unique database
on spatial emissions that we combine with several other databases.
2 Data
The selected source of emissions is the Emission Database for Global Atmo-
spheric Research (EDGAR, see European Commission (2011)), which provides
sectoral grid emission data (in tons) covering the years 1970 to 2008. To the
best of our knowledge, this is the most comprehensive source of disaggregated
emissions, as data is available for each bottom left centered 0.1 degree latitude
longitude grid on the surface of the planet. In this chapter we take two direct
greenhouse gases into account: carbon dioxide (excluding short-cycle organic
carbon from biomass burning) and methane. Using the IPCC sector classiﬁ-
cation, EDGAR also provides the emissions for each grid-cell by sector. Note
that the sectors might diﬀer for diﬀerent gases, as reported in table (A2) in the
Appendix, which also displays shares in total world emissions of each sector by
gas in 1970 and 2008.
We merged the EDGAR database with the GADM Global Administrative
Area database (see Global Administrative Areas (2012)) to attribute each grid-
cell to a given country and UN-region2. In the case where a grid-cell corresponds
to more than one country we attributed the cell to the country in which the
majority of the cell is located.
Note that the large majority of the literature used either GDP or population
data as weights. We however use area in square kilometers as a weight. This
choice is conceptual: we aim to analyze the spatial distribution of emissions,
hence emissions per square kilometer are the appropriate measure.3 We calcu-
2For an overview of the diﬀerent UN regions and their share in world emissions refer to
table (A1)
3Our goal is to describe and subsequently decompose the spatial distribution of emissions.
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lated the planimetric area A of each grid cell by treating the planet as a sphere:
A = Π180R2
∣∣sin(lat Π180 ) − sin((lat + 0.1) Π180 )∣∣ |lon − (lon + 0.1)|. R = 6371 km is
the radius of the Earth while lat and lon correspond to the bottom left grid-cell
corner latitude and longitude in decimal degrees. Given that economic activity
also takes place on non-land covered areas (transport, ﬁshing, etc.) the surface
variable which is used is the total area of the grid-cell, whether partially covered
by water or not.
For our proposed extension to compare between-sector with between-country
inequalities, we need a sector area variable. We don’t directly observe sector
production area but we know how many sectors produce in a given year-cell
combination. So we ﬁrst made the most straightforward hypothesis that all sec-
tors present in a cell share the area equally. As a second way to go we attribute
the cell area proportionally to cell sector emissions. The implications of those
two hypotheses will be discussed in the result section.
To measure geographical inequalities in damages, we rely on the results from
the Global Circulation Models made available by the World Bank on its Cli-
mate Change Portal (see World Bank (2014a)). This choice is dictated by our
objective to capture geographical distribution at the highest degree of disag-
gregation. As data on damages is only available for grid-cells at the 1 degree
level, emissions had to be aggregated to that level for comparison purposes. The
selected proxy for damages is the average estimated share of very warm days
over the 2046-2065 period (a very warm day is deﬁned as having a temperature
exceeding the 90th percentile bound over the 1961-1990 reference period) times
the estimated human population of the cell in 2050 (obtained by multiplying
the population ﬁgures at the country level for 2050, which come from the World
Bank (see World Bank (2014b)), by the 2005 grid-level population shares de-
rived from the G-Econ database (Nordhaus et al. (2006b)). The representative
scenario is the A2 scenario of the list elaborated by the IPCC (Randall et al.
(2007)), which describes a heterogeneous world with slow rates of convergence
and technological change.
For each grid-cell we aggregate all sectoral emissions of a particular gas and
An interesting related topic would be to analyze the causes of this spatial inequality (e.g.
diﬀerences in the distribution of GDP or population), but this task is out of the scope of the
chapter. See Padilla and Duro (2013) for a recent analysis of causes of between EU country
emission inequality.
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obtain the total emissions of the gas for the given grid-cell4. Finally we drop
all grid-cells which are not located within country borders (i.e. we drop all
cells which are in international waters). This choice is necessary because we
are interested in the between and within contribution of diﬀerent countries to
total emission inequality. The coverage of the ﬁnal sample in 2008 is larger than
96.4% of world emissions for CH4 and 93.5% for CO2 emissions. We end up with
roughly 1.5 million observations per year and gas for a total of 38 years, two
gases (CO2 and CH4), more than ten sectors and 228 countries. Due to space
constraints we cannot present all detailed results in the result section. They are
however available upon request to the authors.
3 Methods
3.1 The basic spatial Theil index of emission inequality
Assume the world is composed of a total of I cells indexed by i. Variable y is
used to denote total world emissions (y =
∑I
i=1 yi) and variable n to denote
total world area (n =
∑I
i=1 ni).
Our main objective is to analyze inequality of emissions per square kilometer
hence our basic units are geographic cells.5 The overall Theil index can then be
deﬁned as follows:
T =
I∑
i=1
yi
y
ln
(
yi
y
ni
n
)
(1)
Where equation (1) is a reformulation of the originally proposed index by
(Theil, 1967). Note that a cell is contributing positively to overall inequality
when its emission share in total emissions (yiy ) is larger than its area share in
total area (nin ). The bigger the positive contribution to overall inequality is, the
dirtier is the cell and hence the higher is the cell’s responsibility in polluting
the globe. Analogically, a cell which has a negative contribution to the overall
4EDGAR provides a variable capturing total emissions of a given grid-cell. We do not use
this variable because the computation of sectoral emissions and total emissions has been done
using slightly diﬀerent methodologies. This leads to a few cases where the sum of sectoral
emissions does not correspond to the total emission variable provided by EDGAR.
5A basic unit of analysis corresponds to the smallest unit for which data is available and
which is used to compute the inequality index. The income inequality literature commonly
refers to this as the basic social unit of analysis which might be for instance an individual, a
household, a nuclear family or an extended family (Cowell, 2011).
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index is a relatively clean cell.6 By deﬁning the Theil index in this way we also
underestimate inequality - because we assume perfect equality within a given
0.1 degree cell - but to a considerably lower extent compared to the case where
the basic unit is the country.
3.2 Geographical decomposition of the basic Theil index
We now start decomposing equation (1). First we use the two-stage decom-
position proposed by Akita (2003). This approach allows to decompose total
emission inequality into:
- between UN-region inequality;
- between country inequality within a given UN-region;
- within country inequality within a given UN-region.
The globe is composed of R UN-regions indexed by r. Each UN-region
r can itself be divided into Cr countries indexed by c. Each country c in
region r contains Ir,c cells. Where y =
∑I
i yi =
∑R
r=1
∑Cr
c=1
∑Ir,c
i=1 y
r,c
i and
n =
∑I
i ni =
∑R
r=1
∑Cr
c=1
∑Ir,c
i=1 n
r,c
i .
Having this notation in mind, we can rewrite (1) as follows:
T =
R∑
r=1
yr
y
ln
(
yr
y
nr
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between UN-region inequality
≡BR
+
R∑
r=1
yr
y
Cr∑
c=1
yr,c
yr
ln
(
yr,c
yr
nr,c
nr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between countries inequality,
within UN-regions≡BCwr
+
R∑
r=1
yr
y
Cr∑
c=1
yr,c
yr
Ir,c∑
i=1
yr,ci
yr,c
ln
⎛
⎝ yr,ciyr,c
nr,c
i
nr,c
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within country inequality,
within UN-regions≡WCwr
= BR + BCwr + WCwr
(2)
Where yr (nr) denotes total emissions (total area) of UN-region r and yr,c
(nr,c) denotes total emissions (total area) of country c in UN-region r. Equation
6For an excellent intuitive interpretation of the Theil index and its various decompositions
refer to Conceicao and Ferreira (2000).
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(2) allows to analyze the contribution of each UN-region to the between region,
between country and within country inequality terms. As an example, if a re-
gion has a positive contribution to the between-region term its emission share
in total emissions is higher than its area share in total area and the region can
be considered to be relatively dirty. At the same time this region’s contribution
to the between country term might be zero, indicating that all countries within
this region are equally dirty. Finally, the contribution of this region to the
within country term might be highly positive, indicating that there are impor-
tant diﬀerences between clean and dirty cells within the region’s countries. This
two-stage decomposition method provides also a ﬁrst insight on the magnitude
of importance of between country and within country inequalities.
3.3 Integration of sectoral contributions in the geographic
decomposition
Equation (2) allows to analyze the contributions of diﬀerent geographical entities
to total inequality. As a next step we reﬁne this analysis by applying the
methodology proposed by Giammatteo (2007) to equation (2). Giammatteo
(2007) took the classical between country and within country decomposition and
extended it by his pseudo Theil approach, allowing to analyze the contribution
of each sector to the between and the within country term. We have a total
of S sectors, indexed by s. So for a given cell i in UN-region r and country c
we have yr,ci =
∑S
s=1 y
r,c,s
i . Hence by combining the approach of Akita (2003)
(equation (2)) with the one by Giammatteo (2007) we obtain:
T =
S∑
s=1
R∑
r=1
yr,s
y
ln
(
yr
y
nr
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sth source contribution to BR
≡Tbr(s)
+
S∑
s=1
R∑
r=1
yr
y
Cr∑
c=1
yr,c,s
yr
ln
(
yr,c
yr
nr,c
nr
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sth source contribution to BCwr
≡Tbc(s)
+
S∑
s=1
R∑
r=1
yr
y
Cr∑
c=1
yr,c
yr
Ir,c∑
i=1
yr,c,si
yr,c
ln
⎛
⎝ yr,ciyr,c
nr,c
i
nr,c
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sth source contribution to WCwr
≡Twc(s)
=
S∑
s=1
Tbr(s) +
S∑
s=1
Tbc(s) +
S∑
s=1
Twc(s)
(3)
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The interpretation of the terms in equation (3) is identical to the one in
equation (2). But we are now also able to analyze the contribution of each
sector to each of the three terms. The sectoral contributions can be positive
(relatively dirty sectors) or negative (relatively clean sector).
3.4 Analyzing the sectoral dimension in more details
As a last step we analyze the sectoral dimension in more detail by proposing
an original extension. Instead of analyzing the contributions of each sector to
the geographical components (as we do in (3)) we want to be able to not only
separate between and within geographical group contributions but also between
and within sector contributions. In order to do so we need to change our basic
unit replacing emissions per square kilometer in country c (yci ) by emissions per
sectoral production area (ys,ci ), assuming this latter information is available.7
Instead of analyzing T , the inequality of emissions per square kilometers as we
do with (1)-(3), we now analyze inequality of sectoral emissions per sectoral
production area, T ′:
T ′ =
S∑
s=1
ys
y
I∑
i=1
ysi
ys
ln
( ysi
y
ns
i
n
)
= T +
S∑
s=1
ys
y
I∑
i=1
ysi
ys
ln
( ysi
yi
ns
i
ni
)
(4)
Note that T ′ equals T plus the inequality between sectors within a given 0.1
degree cell. Given that we ignore UN-regions in this speciﬁcation, the world is
composed of a total of C countries, and each country c is composed of Ic cells.
Where yci =
∑S
s=1 y
s,c
i . Using the standard properties of the Theil index, we
can rewrite T ′ as follows:
7For more information refer to the discussion on the impossibility of simultaneously de-
composing T into source and group contributions in Giammatteo (2007)
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T ′ =
C∑
c=1
yc
y
ln
(
yc
y
nc
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between country inequality
≡BC
+
C∑
c=1
yc
y
S∑
s=1
yc,s
yc
ln
(
yc,s
yc
nc,s
nc
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between sector inequality within a country
≡BSwc
+
C∑
c=1
yc
y
S∑
s=1
yc,s
yc
Ic∑
i=1
yc,si
yc,s
ln
⎛
⎝ yc,siyc,s
nc,s
i
nc,s
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within sector inequality within a country
≡WSwc
= BC + BSwc + WSwc
(5)
Analogically, we can also express T ′ as follows:
T ′ =
S∑
s=1
ys
y
ln
(
ys
y
ns
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between sector inequality
≡BS
+
S∑
s=1
ys
y
C∑
c=1
ys,c
ys
ln
(
ys,c
ys
ns,c
ns
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Between country inequality,
within sectors ≡BCws
+
S∑
s=1
ys
y
C∑
c=1
ys,c
ys
Ic∑
i=1
ys,ci
ys,c
ln
⎛
⎝ ys,ciys,c
ns,c
i
ns,c
⎞
⎠
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Within country inequality,
within sectors ≡WCws
= BS + BCws + WCws
(6)
Equation (5) and (6) are two equivalent decompositions. An appealing solution
to the existence of such equivalent decompositions is to take the average of the
expressions as advocated by Dietzenbacher and Los (1998). Taking the average
of equations (5) and (6), we obtain the following decomposition:
T ′ = W + BC + BS (7)
Equation (7) - our newly proposed decomposition - has a unique interpreta-
tion: Given that WSwc = WCws we can interpret W = WCws = WSwc =
1
2 (WCws + WSwc) as an overall within country/sector component represent-
ing inequalities which are due to the diﬀerences in emission intensities across
cells of a given country and a given sector. BC = 12 (BC + BCws) can be
interpreted as an average between country eﬀect capturing the part of inequal-
ity due to diﬀerences in average emissions intensities among countries. And
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BS = 12 (BS + BSwc) can be interpreted as an average between sector eﬀect,
representing inequalities which are due to the diﬀerences in average emissions
intensities among sectors.
3.5 Linking emissions with damages
Part of the political tensions aﬀecting the climate change debate is due to the
fact that damages fall in locations which are not necessarily the major sources
of emissions. This subsection establishes and discusses the formal links between
emissions and damages inequalities from a spatial perspective. We ﬁrst re-note
the Theil index of spatial inequalities in emissions (equation (1)) by T y, in order
to tell the diﬀerence with the Theil index of spatial inequalities in damages, T d.
If d denotes world damages (d =
∑I
i=1 di), we have:
T d =
I∑
i=1
di
d
ln
(
di
d
ni
n
)
(8)
Let us deﬁne the damage gap as Δi ≡ (di/d) − (yi/y). Rewriting di/d as
(yi/y)+Δi, and replacing ln[(di/d)/(ni/n)] by ln[(di/d)/(yi/y)]+ln[(yi/y)/(ni/n)],
it is straightforward to obtain, from equations (1) and (8):
T d = T y −
I∑
i=1
yi
y
ln
(
yi
y
di
d
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Disparity index,DSP
+
I∑
i=1
Δi ln
(
di
d
ni
n
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Overdamage index,OV D
= T y − DSP + OVD
(9)
The ﬁrst term on the RHS of equation (9) is the Theil index of spatial in-
equality in emissions. It may be considered as an initial benchmark assumption
which is bound to be incorrect (and thus in need of corrections) because in the
majority of cases damages are not spread spatially the same way as emissions.
So the next two elements on the RHS are correction terms. The ﬁrst one is
also a Theil index of inequality in emissions, but not with respect to geographic
area, but with respect to damages. In other words, while T y picks up by how
much emission shares are diﬀerent from area shares, the ﬁrst correction term
indicates by how much emission shares are diﬀerent from damage shares, so we
will call that term the disparity index (DSP ). Note that a given value of DSP
may be obtained from an array of totally diﬀerent distributions of damages
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on the Earth’s surface. So we need an additional correction to make the link
between damages and geography. This is the intuition behind the second cor-
rection term, a covariance which indicates by which extent over-damaged cells,
i.e. those where Δi is large, also tend to be those where damages are intense,
i.e. those where the logarithmic term is positive. Therefore, we will refer to
that second correction term as an index of over-damage (OVD).8
Both indices matter in terms of social tensions, but to illustrate why the
DSP (OVD) index enters negatively (positively) into the equation, let us con-
sider a simpliﬁed stylized world where emissions and damages are spread over
equalized cells, ranked by decreasing order of emission density. In the three pan-
els of Figure 1, the solid decreasing line represents the emission share of each
cell. Damages shares are represented by the dashed line, which diﬀers across
panels. Damages and emissions have identical distributions in the top panel,
damages are equally spread across all cells in the medium panel, and damages
and emissions have opposite distributions in the bottom panel. We consider
below each panel to unveil the interpretation of the two correction terms.
Figure 1: Stylized worlds
(i) victims=polluters i.e. damages and emissions shares are equal across all
8Formally, OV D is I times the covariance between Δi and ln[(di/d)/(ni/n)], due to the
fact that
∑I
i=1 Δi = 0
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countries (top panel). In this obvious case T y = T d. The two correction terms
are zero, both because damages and emissions are evenly spread.
(ii) damages evenly spread across all cells (medium panel). In that case
T d = 0. How do we obtain that? The overdamage index is zero because even
if some countries emit and others do not, damages per square kilometer are
constant. So the compensation comes 100% from the disparity index, which is
both nonzero, as emissions and damages are unequally spread across countries,
and necessarily equal to T y, as damage shares and spatial shares are identical
for each country in that particular case.
(iii) perfect opposition between victims and polluters (bottom panel). In
this case damages occur precisely in cells which do not emit pollution. With
respect to the previous case, disparity has increased, so that the addition of the
ﬁrst two terms on the RHS leads to a negative value. However, overdamage is
large, with damages biased towards those areas which do not emit to such an
extent that spatial inequality in damages (captured by T d) just mimics spatial
inequality in emissions (captured by T y = T d), although on a completely dif-
ferent subset of cells.
Every element of equation (9) can be decomposed into the sum of a between-
region (BR), between-country (BCwr) and within-country (WCwr) term. For
T d and DSP , the corresponding terms are direct extensions of those appear-
ing in equation (2). For OVD, it is straightforward to show that BR =∑R
r=1 Δrln
(
dr/d
nr/n
)
, BCwr =
∑R
r=1
∑Cr
c=1 Δr,cln
(
dr,c/dr
nr,c/nr
)
, and
WCwr =
∑R
r=1
∑Cr
c=1
∑Ir,c
i=1 Δ
r,c
i ln
(
dr,c
i
/dr,c
nr,c
i
/nr,c
)
, where Δr = (dr/d) − (yr/y),
Δr,c = (dr,c/d) − (yr,c/y) and Δr,ci = (dr,ci /d) − (yr,ci /y).
4 Results and Discussion
Results are reported on the basis of ﬁgures and summary tables, starting from
the description of global patterns, and then focusing on the identiﬁcation of
the major inequality drivers between countries or between sectors. Comments
mainly refer to the CO2 case, but CH4 is also discussed in case of important
diﬀerences.
Beforehand, based on the aﬃnity between polluting emissions and speciﬁc
sectors, let us mention two roughly expectable outcomes. First, as illustrated
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by the world shares reported in table A2, carbon dioxide emissions are mainly
released by fuel consumption for power generation and manufacturing, while
methane is more linked to agriculture. As agriculture is more evenly spread,
we may expect a lower spatial inequality index for methane. Second, whether
based on factor endowments or economies of scale, trade between diﬀerent loca-
tions allows for specialization and industrial clustering, which tends to increase
spatial inequalities. As barriers to trade are typically less important within
countries, everything else equal, we may expect more trade intensity, and thus
larger spatial inequalities within countries than between them.
However, sectoral aﬃnity is far from being the unique contributor to spatial
inequalities. Diﬀerences in technology and environmental policies also matter.
As we may expect more homogeneity along those dimensions within a given
country, these eﬀects work oppositely to trade forces, leading to less spatial
inequalities within countries, not more. Further complications appear when
considering the evolution over time, in particular economic growth during the
last four decades. This phenomenon has been accompanied by both increased
specialization and trade on the one hand, and by more technological, economic
and policy convergence on the other hand. The net impact of these diﬀerent
forces on spatial inequalities in emissions is unclear, which increases the interest
in the empirical analysis below.
4.1 Global patterns
Theil indices decomposed according to equation (2) are reported in Figure (2).
Our two major expectations are conﬁrmed. First, of the two gases, methane
turns out to be more evenly spread, with an overall index slightly above 2,
versus 3 for CO2. This is consistent with the view that CH4 anthropogenic
emissions are mainly due to rural activities. Second, there is a striking similar-
ity among the two gases regarding the dominance of within-country inequalities,
which represent for both gases roughly 75% of the total. According to the above-
mentioned arguments, this suggests that the agglomeration and specialization
forces generated by freer trade within countries tend to overcome the inﬂuence
of a unique regulatory framework.
Regarding changes over time, there is again a strong similarity across gases.
Between-region and between-country inequalities are on average declining over
the period, while within-country inequalities tend to increase, in particular at
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the end of the time interval. Again, this appears consistent with a period of
globalization and growth during which, on the one hand, countries tend to con-
verge in income per capita, which is positively correlated with environmental
consciousness and policies, and on the other hand with increased specialization
through trade, which leads to larger spatial inequalities within countries. For
CO2 and CH4, two peaks can be identiﬁed in the years 1997/1998. Those peaks
are the results of the enormous forest ﬁres in those two years in Indonesia (prob-
ably the largest forest ﬁres ever recorded in history).
Figure (2) is also illustrating the importance of the basic unit used to com-
pute global emission inequality. By choosing countries as basic units, i.e. by
making the assumption of perfect equality within countries, one underestimates
global spatial emission inequality by a large amount. The dominant approach
in the literature underestimates global spatial emission inequality for CO2 and
CH4 on average by roughly 34 . Taking countries as basic units not only results
in an important underestimation of global emission inequality, but impacts also
on the observed overall trends. While previous studies ﬁnd a decrease of global
(carbon dioxide) inequality since the 70s (see for instance Grunewald et al.
(2014) or Duro and Padilla (2006)), we show that global emission inequality is
either roughly constant (CO2) or even slightly increasing (CH4).
4.2 Which regions/sectors contribute more to inequality?
The above-mentioned global patterns may hide important diﬀerences across re-
gions and sectors. This calls for a more detailed analysis at the disaggregated
level. Two reminders are in order to avoid misunderstandings while interpreting
the results.
First, some contributions are negative, as every element of the Theil index
is reported for the between-region part of the index (column “BR” of table (1)).
In that case, a negative (positive) ﬁgure just indicates that this particular region
has an emission density which is smaller (larger) than average.
Second, what we measure here are spatial inequalities of emissions, not emis-
sion shares. That is, if the results below suggest a particular region or sector
does not contribute much to overall inequality, it does not mean that its share
in global emission is commensurate. It just means that emissions in that par-
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Figure 2: Geographic Decomposition of the Theil index T
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ticular region or sector are rather evenly spread geographically.
Table (1) provides absolute contributions to inequality by regions for 1970
and 2008. Based on column “Theil”, the major contributors for CO2 turn out
to be the four most industrialized regions i.e. Europe, North America, Former
Soviet Union and East Asia, which represent together on average a rough 85% of
total inequality. This common average contribution to inequality drops to 70%
for CH4, as South Asia and South East Asia are more important, a diﬀerence
which could have been expected on the basis of the sectoral aﬃnity argument.
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For a given region, a large contribution may be due to three diﬀerent factors:
(i) because this region has a larger density of emissions per square kilometer
than the average (column “BR”) or (ii) because the countries in this region are
strongly dissimilar between them (column “BCwr”) or still (iii) because there are
large spatial inequalities within the countries of this region (column “WCwr”).
On average, for the four major industrialized regions, and whatever the gas, the
most important factor is always the within-country component, while the less
important factor is either the between-country component for the two smaller
and more homogeneous regions (Europe and East Asia) or the between-region
component for the other larger regions (North America and the Former Soviet
Union).
Regarding changes over time, reported in the last columns of Table (1),
there again, and whatever the gas, the larger changes are experienced by the
four major industrialized regions, with an increase for East Asia and a decrease
for the other three regions. The only exception is methane in the case of the
Former Soviet Union, for which there is practically no change over the 1970-
2008 period. Moreover, the major components of these temporal changes are
the between-region component and the within-country component. The impor-
tant change of the between-region component suggests a strong redistribution of
world emission shares among three of theses large industrialized regions, while
the important change of the within-country component reﬂects increased spe-
cialization and clustering within the countries of the regions.
The contributions of each sector to global spatial inequality (equation (3))
are reported in Table (2). Energy production and use is the major contribu-
tor but with important diﬀerences across gases (see “Theil” column). Carbon
dioxide emissions are basically linked to fuel consumption, which accounts on
average for more than 80% of spatial CO2 inequality. Within that broad cat-
egory, public electricity and heat production is the most important subsector,
representing on average close to 50% of spatial inequalities sources for CO2.
In the case of methane, the contributions are more equally spread across three
broad categories: fugitive emissions (related to coal, gas and oil production,
by decreasing order), agriculture (due to enteric fermentation and soil man-
agement) and waste management. Whatever the gas, for each major sector,
the most important average contribution comes from the within-country com-
ponent, which is always at least twice as large as the other two components.
The only exception is agriculture in the case of methane, where the average
between-country (between-region) component is less than 30% smaller than the
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average within-country component for enteric fermentation (agricultural soils).
Temporal changes are reported in the last columns of Table (2). For the
gas related to fuel consumption, CO2, electricity and heat production becomes
more important, while residential and manufacturing are losing ground. This
probably reﬂects both growth in energy demand (scale eﬀect) and abatement
activities (technical eﬀect). Note that the relative change of the between-region
component is the larger one in those subsectors with decreasing importance,
suggesting abatement eﬀorts have been biased towards the “old” industrialized
regions, which exhibit declining shares in global emissions. For methane, the
evolution is more complex, with an increase in the contribution of gas pro-
duction and a decrease in agriculture soil of similar magnitude, and a similar
compensation pattern between coal (increase) and oil (decrease) production.
4.3 Which source of inequality matters most: between
countries, between sectors or within them?
Although the analysis above reported contributions for speciﬁc sectors, the de-
composition of the inequality index itself remained spatially-oriented, i.e. ac-
cording to the between-region or within-region components. In fact, when emis-
sions on a speciﬁc spot of the Earth’s surface are particularly large, this may be
because they arise from a highly polluting country, or a highly polluting sector,
or still a highly polluting spot within that particular country-sector combina-
tion. The last decomposition exercise provides an estimate of which of these
three sources of inequality matters more for each gas.
To perform that decomposition, based on equation (7), in the absence of
additional information, we need to make assumptions regarding the spatial dis-
tribution of sectoral emissions within each cell. We consider two extreme sce-
narios: under hypothesis 1, cell area is split equally between sectors (nsi = 1Sni),
whereas under hypothesis 2, cell area is split in proportion to reported emis-
sions (nsi =
ysi
yi
ni ). Hypothesis 2 may appear more intuitive at ﬁrst, but has
the important drawback of assuming away any within-cell inequalities across
sectors (the second term of equation (4) becomes zero and hence T ′=T ). Unfor-
tunately, we do not have any empirical evidence which could guide us towards
the best assumption. Hypothesis 1 seems however more realistic. Therefore,
we will focus on results under hypothesis 1 and only consider hypothesis 2 as a
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robustness check.
The patterns reported in Figure (3) are reminiscent of the above-commented
results. First, for both gases, the between-country component is the smallest
one, and is declining over time. Second, CO2 exhibits a clear trend, with a
growing between-sector component which becomes the dominant source of spa-
tial inequalities at the end of the period. Third, for methane emissions, which
are more evenly spread across sectors, it is the within-country-within-sector ele-
ment which is the growing and dominant component. Results under hypothesis
2 conﬁrm these broad trends and are reported in Appendix Figure (A1). Overall,
these results conﬁrm those from section 4.2, suggesting that recent decades have
been characterized by more specialization across sectors than across countries,
particularly for carbon dioxide. Moreover, even after controlling for diﬀerences
across sectors, within-country inequalities remain important.
4.4 Where does the damage fall?
As a ﬁnal exercise, we want to compare produced emissions with potential future
damages from climate change, relying on the decomposition provided by equa-
tion (9). Local damages from emissions, such as local air pollution take place
around the emission source and therefore inequalities of these local damages are
the same as our reported inequalities of emission sources. In this section we
extend the inequality analysis to damages from climate change. This allows us
to investigate the discrepancy between emitters of greenhouse gases and places
suﬀering most from negative eﬀects from climate change.
Three introductory comments are in order. First, generally speaking, dam-
ages may come from a variety of phenomena, and are characterized by huge
uncertainties. A detailed analysis being out of scope for this chapter, we simply
focus on a single and very rough proxy for damages: the product between hot
days and estimated human population in 2050. The combination of these two
elements in the proxy for damages means that most damages happen in densely
populated regions of emerging economies in low latitudes (in particular South
Asia and Sub-saharan Africa, see table A1 in the Appendix) rather than in
the temperate zones where developed countries locate. This will be important
regarding interpretations. Second, as both damages and emissions are linked
to demography, we might expect a certain degree of similarity between the two
spatial distributions. However, this similarity is far from perfect, because the
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Figure 3: Average decomposition of the Theil index T’, H1
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intensity of the demographic link is conditioned by climate regarding damages,
and by economics regarding emissions, the latter eﬀect depending on the type
of gas considered (CO2 or CH4). Third, due to data availability, we have to re-
aggregate emissions at the 1-degree latitude and longitude grid cells (see above
data section). This leads to smaller estimates of spatial inequalities in emis-
sions than in the rest of the chapter. In other words, to compare emissions
with damages, we have to relax one of our main objectives, which is to capture
within-country inequalities with the largest possible details. Still, the obtained
results suggest this avenue of research may be promising.
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The main results are reported in Figure (4). Note ﬁrst that emission in-
equalities are not rising any more, but rather decreasing for CO2 and stable for
CH4. This is due to the fact that by working at the 1-degree grid cell level, an
important part of within-country inequalities has vanished. Second, the Theil
index of spatial inequalities in damages, constant as it refers to the assumed
situation in 2050, is in between the emission Theil index for the two greenhouse
gases considered. As already mentioned above, this is due to the fact that CO2
emissions are essentially related to fuel combustion, and therefore income lev-
els, while CH4 emissions are more related to agriculture and fuel extraction,
the latter activities being more widespread at the Earth’s surface. According to
equation (9), this also means that the disparity index (DSP ) is larger (smaller)
than the overdamage index (OVD) for CO2 (CH4).
Figure 4: Decomposing the emission-damage link
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For CO2, we observe a decreasing trend of all time-varying indices. This is
essentially due to the economic catch-up of large emerging economies, in par-
ticular in Asia, which makes emissions more equally spread around the globe.
In the case of the DSP index, for which the between-region share is larger than
50%, most of the change is due to the decreasing inﬂuence of Europe and the
Former Soviet Union, and the increasing inﬂuence of East Asia.9 Although
the evolution of the OVD index is similar, there are two important diﬀerences.
9Results at the regional level are not reported due to space constraints. They are available
from the authors upon request.
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First, the major contributors are South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, two pop-
ulous regions which are strongly exposed to heat waves and emit relatively few
emissions. Second, for that index, within-country inequalities matter as much
as between-region ones, and the major source of change happens within China,
where large portions of its territory switch from over-damaged to under-damaged
areas vis-à-vis their emission shares.
Emissions of CH4 being less connected to income levels, they are both more
equally spread across the Earth’s surface and less sensitive to the structural
changes that followed the economic convergence of emerging economies in recent
decades.
5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This chapter estimates for the ﬁrst time spatial inequalities in emissions, using
the Theil index at the world wide level and decomposes overall inequalities into
between region, between country and within country inequalities. We take full
advantage of disaggregated grid-level emission data to identify a number of in-
teresting stylized facts, of which three at least deserve a particular mention.
First, although the political stalemate on climate change has much to do
with opposition between large regions, in particular between the old industri-
alized world and emerging economies, we show that inequality across regions is
the least important component of global spatial inequalities. Inequalities within
countries matter much more, as they account for roughly three-quarter of to-
tal inequality, and they are on the rise. After all, this could be expected in a
period of globalization that exacerbates both specialization and agglomeration
forces. However, and quite surprisingly, this aspect has been fairly neglected by
the literature over the last decades, which implies that additional empirical and
theoretical work is needed.
Second, we have shown that an important part of within-country inequality
is due to diﬀerences across sectors. Although the major sectors are generally
all related to energy, there are important contrasts between gases. On the one
hand, carbon dioxide is strongly linked with fuel consumption, in particular
with the electricity and heat production subsector. This particular subsector is
a growing source of spatial inequalities in recent decades, contrarily to emissions
from manufacturing and residential, which are more evenly spread geographi-
cally, and where abatement activities may have been more prevalent. On the
Chapter Two: Geographical Spread of Global Emissions 49
other hand, methane is not linked to fuel consumption, but to fugitive emis-
sions from fuel production and to two other sectors unrelated to energy i.e.
agriculture and waste management. In that case, the growing sources of spatial
inequalities over the period are coal and gas production, whereas oil production
and agricultural soils exhibit a downward trend.
Third, although sectoral diﬀerences do account for a substantial part of
within-country spatial inequalities, they also leave unexplained an important
share of those, in particular in the case of methane. This may be due to a num-
ber of reasons, from topography to sectoral disaggregation, and calls for further
investigation.
To illustrate the link between these stylized facts and the (regulatory) re-
sponsibility debate, we compared the Theil indices of spatial inequalities of con-
temporaneous emissions with the corresponding Theil index of future damages,
using very warm days estimated for 2050 as a crude proxy for these damages.
It turned out that results depend a lot on the type of gas. For CO2, damages
are more widespread than emissions, and the social tensions arising from the
emission-damage gap tend to soften over time. For CH4, damages are more
concentrated than emissions, and social tensions remain roughly stable over the
last four decades.
These novel results should be kept in mind when discussing the eﬃciency
and fairness of pollution controls. Moreover they provide an empirical bench-
mark for the evaluation of alternative regulatory strategies. On the one hand,
the decreasing importance of between country and between region inequalities
suggests that the regulatory responsibility of countries is converging. On the
other hand, the increasing importance of within country and between sector
inequalities suggests that the contribution to inequality, and thus the regula-
tory responsibility, of speciﬁc geographical zones and speciﬁc sectors is growing.
Moreover, depending on the gas, diﬀerent zones and diﬀerent sectors account
for this increase. Combined, those two results provide empirical support for
suggestions like the one made by Barrett (2008) who is proposing to break the
climate change regulation problem up, by relying upon gas-speciﬁc, sub-national
and sectoral policies.
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Appendix A
Figure A1: Average decomposition of the Theil index T’, H2
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Chapter 3
How Should We Measure
Environmental Policy
Stringency ?
A New Approach
1 Introduction
The absence of a broadly accepted indicator of environmental policy stringency
is currently limiting applied research in several ﬁelds of economics. Words of
caution mentioning limits of existing indicators can be found in a majority
of papers. But surprisingly few papers have been exclusively devoted to the
construction of such indexes. In one of those, Knill et al. (2012) conclude that
the choice of indicators of environmental policy stringency is rarely theoretically
motivated but rather driven by data availability. This chapter proposes and
implements a new methodology attempting to overcome those problems.
2 An overview on existing indicators
A variety of indicators have been proposed so far. Focusing on indicators avail-
able for several countries and at least one common year, one can distinguish
four groups: survey indicators, monetary indicators, policy speciﬁc indicators,
53
54 Chapter Three: Measuring environmental policy stringency
performance indicators and composite indicators. The following overview is not
exhaustive. Selected examples are presented for each group of indicators.
2.1 Survey indicators
Dasgupta et al. (2001) develop an index of environmental policy stringency
based on reports prepared for the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED). Those reports contain self-reported information
from country oﬃcials on a variety of questions. They are complemented by
responses from several NGO’s, attempting to make the data less exposed to bi-
ases from self-reporting. Using the methodology of Dasgupta et al., Eliste and
Fredriksson (2002) extended the database for another 31 countries but only for
the agricultural sector. Recent papers (see for instance Kalamova and Johnstone
(2011) or Timmins and Wagner (2009)) frequently use the indicator of environ-
mental regulatory stringency developed by the World Economic Forum (WEF).
The WEF obtains the data by asking “business leaders” the survey question:
“How would you assess the stringency of your countries’ environmental policy?
(scale: 1=very lax − 7=among the world’s most stringent).” A question asked
each year in the World Executive Opinion Survey (Browne et al., 2012). This
indicator is available for more than 100 countries on a yearly base since 2004.
Those survey based indicators depend by construction solely on the perceptions
of the survey respondents. They are not based on hard data on environmental
policy.
2.2 Monetary indicators
Magnani (2000) and Pearce and Palmer (2001) use public expenditures for en-
vironmental protection as a measure of environmental policy stringency. Their
data covers OECD countries during the nineties and has been collected by the
OECD Environmental Program. Those indicators capture expenditure based
policy instruments only, excluding the wide variety of other instruments. On
top of that, due to the existence of potential eﬃciency diﬀerences among coun-
tries it is also unclear whether higher per capita expenditures imply stricter
environmental policies. It is possible that a country with high per capita ex-
penditures uses those expenditures in a highly ineﬃcient way such that another
country with lower per capita expenditures does a better job. Another mon-
etary indicator which is frequently used is pollution abatement costs. Some
authors, as for instance Friedman et al. (1992), Crandall (1993), Co and List
(2000) use total statewide pollution abatement costs as an indicator. Others
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like Keller and Levinson (2002) adjust them for each state’s industrial compo-
sition. A third group of researchers use sectoral rather then state wide data on
abatement costs (see Brunnermeier and Cohen, 2003). A fourth group uses an
indicator based on capital expenditures and operating costs in environmental
protection activities (see Jug and Mirza (2005)). Important disadvantages of
those types of indicators have been pointed out by Copeland (2008). For ﬁrms
it is diﬃcult to correctly disentangle abatement cost from other cost. More-
over ﬁrms might have an incentive to strategically under or over report their
abatement cost. Finally, reported abatement cost may be endogenous and thus
induce biases in the analysis. Illustrating this argument, Copeland advances
an example in which ﬁrms have heterogeneous costs of responding to environ-
mental regulations. Assuming that the competitiveness hypothesis is correct,
stringent pollution policies might drive ﬁrms with the highest abatement costs
out of business. This opens the possibility that even in regions with relatively
strict environmental policies, observed abatement costs may be low.
2.3 Policy speciﬁc indicators
Nakada (2006) assesses environmental policy stringency using the timing of the
ratiﬁcation of the Kyoto protocol. He generates a dummy variable, taking the
value of zero if a country hasn’t ratiﬁed the Kyoto protocol by the year 2003
and the value of 1 if a country has ratiﬁed the Kyoto protocol by the year
2003. Smarzynska and Wei (2004) use an indicator based on the ratiﬁcation of
four international treaties in environmental politics. They adjust their initial
measure by multiplying it with the ratio of environmental NGO’s per million
of people in a given country, claiming that this adjustment reﬂects the degree
of enforcement of those treaties. Those treaty based indicators remain highly
speciﬁc, excluding all other instruments of environmental policy. Knill et al.
(2012) develop an indicator of clean air policy, capturing national statutory
laws on the book. Their index is available for 24 OECD countries covering the
time span from 1976 to 2003. Their indicator codiﬁes the diﬀerent clean air
laws of countries either as “policy expansion” or as “policy dismantling”. The
data has been taken from their own database (compiled by the CONSENSUS
project). Their indicator has the advantage that it relies on a well deﬁned
methodology, resulting in two indicators, one called “policy density” the other
“policy intensity”.
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2.4 Performance indicators
Several researcher as Hilton and Levinson (1998), Deacon (1999), Damania
(2001), Broner and Bustos (2012) or Grether et al. (2012a) use the lead content
in gasoline as an indicator. The data is taken from the Octel Worldwide Gaso-
line Survey. According to some of those authors, given the absence of a sound
index of environmental policy stringency, their index covers at least one of the
most important environmental issues of the late 20th century. A second group
of performance indicators are based on emission or energy consumption data.
Some researchers simply take emitted emission as a measure for environmental
policy stringency. As an example, Kostad and Xing (2002) use total SO2 emis-
sions on a country level and Smarzynska and Wei (2004) overall CO2 emission
reduction data. Again others base their index on energy intensity data (see
for instance Cole and Elliot (2003)). Harris et al. (2003) use energy consump-
tion data as their measure. A third group uses the Environmental Performance
Index (EPI) published by The Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy
(YCELP) (Emerson et al., 2012). Although the YCELP does not claim that
their index is a measure of environmental policy stringency, some researchers
use it as such. All those diﬀerent approaches have one point in common: they
are performance indicators. By construction, performance indicators quantify
the problem environmental policies try to solve and not the stringency of the
policies themselves. After all, variations in emitted emissions or in the lead con-
tent of gasoline can be due to a wide variety of factors which might be unrelated
to policies.
2.5 Composite indicators
Only one composite indicator quantifying environmental policy stringency is
currently available and has been proposed very recently1 by Botta and Kozluk
(2014). Botta and Kozluk (2014) deﬁne environmental policy stringency as a
higher explicit or implicit cost of polluting or environmentally harmful behav-
ior. They construct two composite indicators - one for the energy sector and
an extension oﬀ the latter which should proxy economy-wide stringency - for 24
OECD countries covering the years 1990 to 2012. The economy-wide composite
indicator is the result of the equal weighted sum of two scores, the market-
based score and the non market-based score. To construct the market-based
1This index has been proposed more than a year after the main bulk of work on the present
chapter had been ﬁnished and the corresponding working paper submitted. For the sake of
completeness, I added this section in the ﬁnal manuscript.
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score, they construct four sub-scores (taxes, feed in tarifs, deposit and refund
schemes and trading schemes), containing selected instruments. Each sub-score
consists of a categorical score (ranking from 0 to 6), where higher scores re-
ﬂect higher stringency, e.g. the higher a de-jure NOX tax rate, the higher the
corresponding score. They proceed identically for the non-market based score
and construct two sub-scores (standards and R&D subsidies). While their index
has the advantage to rely on a well deﬁned methodological framework, several
disadvantages can be identiﬁed. First, the index is only available for selected
developed countries. Second, they exclude a variety of instruments (voluntary
approaches, land use regulations and other “soft” policies (see Botta and Kozluk
(2014)), and thus introduce a potential bias as some countries rely heavily on
such instruments. Third, their index is a mix of an input and a process indi-
cator of environmental policy (see Section 3.2). And fourth, while they state
that they apply equal weights in order to construct the market-based and non-
market based group reﬂecting the “lack of priors” Botta and Kozluk (2014) then
arbitrarily weight both main groups equally, resulting in diﬀerent weights for
the sub-scores, depending whether they are in the market-based or non-market
based group.
3 Methodological framework for environmental
policy indexes
3.1 What is badly deﬁned is likely to be badly measured
Besides the speciﬁc shortcomings of the indicators discussed in section 2, a
general problem is common to almost all of them. They are not constructed
upon an explicitly stated methodological framework, the contributions of Knill
et al. (2012) and Botta and Kozluk (2014) constituting a notable exception. This
shortcoming ignores one of the most fundamental rules found in the literature
on index construction. As Nardo et al. (2008) put it:
A sound theoretical framework is the starting point in construct-
ing (...) indicators. The framework should clearly deﬁne the phe-
nomenon to be measured and its sub-components, selecting individ-
ual indicators and weights that reﬂect their relative importance and
the dimensions of the overall composite. This process should ideally
be based on what is desirable to measure and not on which indicators
are available. Nardo et al. (2008), p. 22.
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A good index has to be based on a theoretical description of the phenomenon
it tries to measure, making it possible to identify relevant sub-components of
the main concept. Only once identiﬁed, selection criteria can be applied in order
to select the underlying indicators. Good selection criteria allow you to clearly
distinguish input, process and output measures of the phenomenon. According
to Nardo et al. (2008) this is a task which is neglected too often.
The problems due to the absence of a theoretical framework are reinforced
by that what Brunel and Levinson (2013) identify as the “multidimensionality”
problem. Without deﬁning what environmental policy is, it remains ambiguous
what those indicators actually intend to quantify. Environmental policy and
environmental policy stringency are rather vague concepts which could cover a
wide range of policies. They might include policies as diverse as the protection
of a ﬂower, the regulation of hunting or the reduction of CO2. Hence, as Nardo
et al. (2008, p. 22) put it: “What is badly deﬁned is likely to be badly mea-
sured.”
To overcome those obstacles, I develop a coherent methodological framework.
Based on an explicit deﬁnition, the framework allows to measure speciﬁc types of
environmental policies, while making a clear distinction between input, process
and output measures. To mitigate the multidimensionality problem I focus on
a speciﬁc type of environmental policy: pollutant policies; and on a particular
case: anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
3.2 What we should measure: input, process and output
indexes
A policy can be deﬁned as a set of government made decisions which have
been implemented and which aim to solve a particular problem. The particular
problem pollutant policies are dealing with is the reduction of anthropogenic
emissions of the pollutant in question. Based on this general deﬁnition, one can
deﬁne a CO2 policy as a set of government made decisions which have been
implemented and which aim to reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions.
Deﬁned as such one can look at pollutant policies in three complementary
ways by measuring the input, process or output side of the phenomenon. As
economists we work every day with variables constructed on this trinity. Take
our measures quantifying the phenomenon “production”: to analyze the input
side we use measures like the quantity of labor or capital. To analyze the pro-
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cess dimension we develop measures which quantify how those inputs are put
together. Technology indexes and eﬃciency measures are examples of such pro-
cess indicators. And we quantify the output dimension using indicators like
GDP. Imagine for a second the mess applied research would face if we would
have only one measure of production mixing the above mentioned. So why not
apply the same structure to develop measures quantifying the phenomenon pol-
lutant policy?
Failing to properly separate input, process and output indicators, as advo-
cated by many (e.g. Nardo et al. (2008)), poses a risk. Take for instance the
proposed index by Botta and Kozluk (2014), which is supposed to reﬂect the
price of pollution and other environmentally harmful behavior. As such, their
approach suggests that this price - supposedly formed as a result of environ-
mental laws which have somehow been implemented, and can thus be seen as
a combined input and process index - is faced by all agents within an economy
and thereby alters their behavior. This is certainly appealing. But given for
instance the possibility that in two countries, the same de-jure tax might be
subject to completely diﬀerent tax bases, tax-evasion strategies, sizes of shadow
economies etc., this might not be true. Therefore, mixing several dimensions
in one single index, could promise a false accuracy and lead to biased results
if applied in an empirical analysis. By properly separating input and process
indexes, one can however avoid this problem, and would dispose of two variables
which can be jointly used in an analysis, and which capture both dimensions
separately.
Given the deﬁnition of pollutant policies and the need to carefully separate
input, process and output measures, I propose to proceed as follows (see next
section for implementation issues): To develop an input index we have to quan-
tify all diﬀerent decisions taken by government entities which aim to reduce the
pollutant. The more decisions have been taken and the more important they
were, the higher the input dimension policy stringency. To develop a process
index of the phenomenon one has to capture how those inputs are implemented.
The stronger the implementation (the less exceptions, the more inspections etc.)
the higher the process dimension policy stringency. To develop an output index
we have to quantify by how much the particular problem has been solved by
the policies. The better it has been solved, the higher the output dimension
stringency.
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3.3 What we will measure here: input and performance
indexes
Apart from space constraints, the implementation of the methodological frame-
work is conditional on data availability. Even in the widely-studied cases of CO2
emissions, reliable and comparable country-speciﬁc data is diﬃcult to obtain.
This has led to two restrictions with respect to the ideal case.
On the one hand, I do not report any process index results. This is due
to the absence of the relevant information at the level of a speciﬁc pollutant.
On the other hand, developing a proper output index of CO2 policies is out of
the scope of the present chapter because it would mean, apart from measuring
performance (e.g. CO2 emissions per capita), estimating which part of that
performance is speciﬁcally attributable to government policies (and not, say,
to climate or industrial structure). Hence, I limit my objective to measuring a
performance index, which includes the inﬂuence of other factors, and is a ﬁrst
step towards a real output index of pollutant policies.
With these important caveats in mind, the next two sections describe the
construction of a general greenhouse gas policy input index, a CO2 policy input
index and a CO2 performance index. The same methodology is used on two
other pollutants: CH4, a second direct greenhouse gas, and SO2, an acidifying
(cooling) gas. Results for SO2 can be found in appendix A, while results for
CH4 are presented in appendix B.
4 Implementation of a pollutant policy input in-
dex
A CO2 policy stringency input measure is a metric that captures the decisions
taken to reduce CO2 quantitatively. The proposed indicator captures the huge
variety of CO2 policy inputs. As such the indicator has to be seen as a so-called
“de jure” indicator (or in the terminology of Kaufmann and Kraay (2008) a
“rule based indicator”) which captures statutory laws “on the book”. In that
sense, the indicator follows partially the work of Knill et al. (2012).
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4.1 Approach and data sources
I use two diﬀerent databases to construct two input indicators a “narrow” and
a “broad” one.
Taking the deﬁnition of pollutant policies literally one can classify a policy
as a CO2 policy only if the law explicitly refers to the goal of reducing CO2.
The ECOLEX database (FAO et al., 2013) allows the extraction of such CO2
policies. After selecting all laws in ECOLEX which contain the words CO2 (or
any derivative like carbon dioxide in any language) I had to drop some. There
are laws which contain the right keywords but which cannot be classiﬁed as
CO2 policies. For example, laws on the minimum quantity of CO2 in bottled
water have been dropped. Across the 55 countries covered I identiﬁed a total of
379 narrow CO2 measures which are (or have been) enacted, those measures are
country speciﬁc. Out of those 379 measures, 35 apply on a sub-national level.
Besides those sub-national measures, there are some which have been enacted
by the European Union. Those supra-national measures have been attributed
to the EU member countries2. Based on the ECOLEX data an input index is
developed which is labeled “Narrow CO2 Input Index”.
Interpreting the deﬁnition in a broader sense, one can classify a policy as
a CO2 policy if the law implicitly refers to the goal of reducing CO2. Taxes
on fuels (although not necessarily containing a paragraph specifying the goal of
CO2 reduction) can in this sense be classiﬁed as CO2 policies. The Database
for instruments of environmental policy and natural resource management pub-
lished by the OECD and EEA (2012) allows to select such policies. This is a
major advantage. Across the 52 covered countries, I identiﬁed a total of 1109
country-speciﬁc greenhouse gas measures which are (or have been) enacted. Out
of those 1109 measures, 435 measures apply on a sub-national level. I completed
the database by ﬁnding several hundreds of missing dates of enactment entries
in the national legislation of the concerned countries. The major advantage of
this database (the possibility to include laws which can be classiﬁed in a broad
sense as pollutant policies) comes at a cost. The database does not allow to
make a clear distinction between pollutants. Hence the resulting input index
2If a country has already been a member of the EU at the time the EU adopted the
measure then the national date of enactment of the measure corresponds to the one of the
EU. If a country hasn’t been a member at the time the EU adopted the measure, then the
national date of enactment of the measure corresponds to the date where the country joined
the EU (provided that the measure was still in place at that time).
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has to be seen as a general greenhouse gas input index which is labeled “Broad
GHG Input Index”.
4.2 Codiﬁcation, weighting and normalization of the input
indicator
Given that it is diﬃcult to quantify juridical information, I proceed as others
did in constructing “de jure” indicators3. In order to capture this information
quantitatively I generate dummy variables. Each dummy reﬂects the answer to
the question “Does measure j exist in country i in year t?”. A dummy variable
takes the value of 1 if a measure exists in a certain country and in a given year
and the value of 0 otherwise. This procedure has been applied twice using the
two diﬀerent databases.
I follow the “usual” equal weighting approach to construct the two input
indexes. At the same time I also account for the fact that some measures are
only applied on a sub-national level. The dummies are summed up by country
and by year. This has been done separately for both databases leading to the
following two input indicators:
Narrow Input Indexi,t =
∑
j
wj,i,tEcolexDummyj,i,t (1)
Broad Input Indexi,t =
∑
j
wj,i,tOECD/EEA Dummyj,i,t (2)
where j indexes the instruments, i the countries and t the time. The weight
wj,i,t takes the value of 1 if the measure j is applied on a national scale. If the
measure j is only applied in a part of the country i, then wj,i,t =
npart
i,t
ni,t
, where
ni,t is the population of country i at time t and nparti,t is the population of the
area of country i in which the measures is applied at time t. Proceeding in this
way gives each instrument which is applied on a national scale exactly the same
weight in the ﬁnal index. As a further step an informed weighting approach
could improve the indexes. If theoretical work will be able to rank diﬀerent
categories of instruments, one could use those ranks to reﬁne the weighting of
the dummies. Using such an informed weighting approach, the index could
be calculated as follows: Ii,t =
∑
c γc
∑
j wj,i,tDummyj,i,t,c, where i indexes
3See for instance the work on the Global Integrity Index (Global Integrity, 2011) or on
the Doing Business indicator (World Bank, 2012).
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the countries, t the time, c the diﬀerent categories, j the instruments within a
given category, γc indicates the weights for each of the categories and wj,i,t the
weight which accounts for federal measures as deﬁned before. The indexes have
subsequently been normalized to range between zero and one.
5 Implementation of a pollutant performance
index
According to the deﬁnition of pollutant policies, CO2 policies aim to solve the
particular problem of reducing anthropogenic CO2. A CO2 performance indi-
cator captures this particular problem. It is therefore also the ﬁrst step in the
construction of an output index of pollutant policies: if you want to know by
how much the policies solved the problem you ﬁrst need to quantify the problem.
5.1 Approach and data sources
To implement the indexes I use the World Input Output Tables database (Tim-
mer et al., 2015), an extension of the National Accounting Matrix including
Environmental Accounts project of Eurostat (2009)4 . This dataset combines
the conventional national accounting framework with socioeconomic as well as
environmental satellite accounts. For a total of 40 major countries, and 35 sec-
tors, input-output tables, complemented with sectoral labor and capital input
data as well as sectoral emission data are available for the time span between
1995 and 20095.
Using this database, I develop, for each sector, a CO2 performance indica-
tor which is constructed on two dimensions: CO2 intensity and CO2 eﬃciency.
Then I aggregate those sectoral indexes to obtain an index covering the whole
economy. Conceptually, the proposed performance indicator follows and ex-
tends the work of the Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy (YCELP)
4Although the project which led to the elaboration of this dataset has been completed in
2012, prospects are good that the dataset will be extended in geographical and time cover-
age. The Statistical Division of the UN has launched the System of Environmental-Economic
Accounts (SEEA) (see United Nations, 2012), which - once completed - would correspond to
an extension of WIOT. Conditional on the successful implementation of SEEA, the proposed
indicators could be extended, in time and in country coverage.
5Those 40 countries accounted for over 70% of global anthropogenic CO2 emissions during
the 00’s.
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which develops an Environmental Performance Indicator (EPI)6 (Emerson et al.,
2012). There are three main diﬀerences between the climate change part of the
EPI and the proposed CO2-performance indicator: Firstly, instead of trying to
quantify overall climate change performance, the CO2-performance indicator fo-
cuses only on the performance of CO2. Secondly, alongside CO2 intensity, CO2
eﬃciency is integrated as an additional dimension of CO2 performance. And
thirdly, the proposed CO2-performance indicator is constructed on a sectoral
scale.
5.2 The construction of sectoral CO2 performance indexes
Capturing sectoral CO2 intensity In accordance with the work of the
YCELP I capture the sectoral CO2 intensity dimension with two diﬀerent rel-
ative measures: Sectoral CO2 emissions per unit of sectoral GDP and sectoral
CO2 emissions per sectoral workers. Those two are common metrics used to
asses the intensity in the use of carbon dioxide emissions in an economy (Emer-
son et al., 2012).
Capturing sectoral CO2 eﬃciency I capture the sectoral CO2 eﬃciency
dimension by estimating CO2 eﬃciency scores. CO2 eﬃciency is deﬁned as the
ratio of minimal feasible to observed use of CO2, conditional on observed output
levels and conventional inputs. CO2-eﬃciency scores are therefore estimates de-
scribing how far a sectoral production process is away from the contemporary
best practice. There are two diﬀerent approaches in the literature on environ-
mental eﬃciency. The ﬁrst one treats emissions as inputs in the production
function while the second one considers emissions as bad outputs of the pro-
duction process. Both approaches can be implemented using either Stochastic
Frontier Analysis (SFA) or Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Treating emis-
sions as inputs has however several theoretical shortcomings. For a review on
both approaches refer to Mandal and Madheswaran (2010). I follow the second
approach using DEA and treat emissions as a bad output.
6This indicator intends to track national environmental results on a quantitative basis.
The EPI is divided into several parts, one of them measuring “climate change and energy”
performance. To quantify the climate change and energy part of this index four sub-indicators
are used by the YCELP: CO2 emissions per capita, CO2 emissions per dollar, CO2 emissions
per kWh and the percentage of renewable energy in total energy production. All those sub-
indicators are constructed using aggregated data (i.e. not sectoral data). Those sub-indicators
are then aggregated using weights determined by YCELP experts.
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The following presentation of the methodology used to estimate CO2 eﬃ-
ciency scores follows closely the paper of Färe (2012). First some notation,
assume that a decision making unit7 produces L bad outputs (b1, ..., bL) ∈ RL+,
M good outputs (y1, ..., yM ) ∈ RM+ , while using N inputs (x1, ..., xN ) ∈ RN+ .
The technology set is given by T = {(x, y, b) : x can produce (y,b)}. Färe
(2012) imposes structure on the technology set by assuming that the set is
closed with bounded output sets. Inputs are assumed to be strongly dis-
posable. Good outputs (y) and bad outputs (b) are assumed null-joint: if
(x, y, b) ∈ T, b = 0 ⇒ y = 0. Bad and good outputs are assumed being to-
gether weakly disposable: if (x, y, b) ∈ T, and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ⇒ (x, αy, αb) ∈ T .
Finally, Färe (2012) assumes that good outputs are strongly disposable: if
(x, y, b) ∈ T, and y′ ≤ y ⇒ (x, y′, b) ∈ T .
Assuming that there are I observations for a given year, (xi, yi, bi) for
i = 1, .., I, Färe (2012) models T in a DEA setting as follows: The pollution
generating technology is given by:
T = {(x, y, b) : ∑Ii=1 ziyim ≥ ym, m = 1, ...,M (3)∑I
i=1 zibil = bl, l = 1, ..., L∑I
i=1 zixin ≤ xn, n = 1, ..., N
zi ≥ 0 , i = 1, ...I}
The intensity variables zi in (3) are constrained to be non-negative, imposing
thereby constant returns to scale. In addition the following constraints are
imposed:
∑I
i=1 yim > 0, m = 1, ...,M (4)∑M
m=1 yim > 0, i = 1, ..., I (5)∑I
i=1 xin > 0, n = 1, ..., N (6)∑N
n=1 xin > 0, i = 1, ..., I (7)∑I
i=1 bil > 0, l = 1, ..., L (8)∑L
l=1 bil > 0, i = 1, ..., I (9)
(10)
7A decision making unit (DMU) may refer to an individual worker, a subsection of a ﬁrm,
a ﬁrm but also - as in this chapter - to a sector.
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Constraints (4)-(7), introduced by Kemeny (1956) generalize the Von Neu-
mann (1945) assumptions (for a discussion see (Färe, 2012)). Constraints (4),
(5), (7) and (8) constrain good and bad outputs to be null-joint.
To obtain CO2 eﬃciency scores (EEs) the following linear programming
problem will be solved for each observation. Note that for a given DMU the
target values (y∗m, b∗l , x∗n) are set equal to the observed values:
EE = min β (11)
Subject to:
∑I
i=1 ziyim ≥ y∗m, m = 1, ...,M (12)∑I
i=1 zibil = βb
∗
l , l = 1, ..., L (13)∑I
i=1 zixin ≤ x∗n, n = 1, ..., N (14)
zi ≥ 0, i = 1, ...I (15)
Note that the intensity variables zi are jointly constrained by (12) and (14)
which allows the computation of the βs. This linear programming model is
separately estimated for each year and each sector. I use a sequential fron-
tier approach assuming that all current and past observations are feasible8. I
thereby follow Mukherjee (2008) and Mandal and Madheswaran (2010). Con-
structed as such, I obtain one β for each country, each sector and each year.
By construction, β takes values between zero and one. A β equal to one indi-
cates full eﬃciency while a β equal to zero indicates full ineﬃciency of the DMU.
I estimate two diﬀerent models using this framework: one based on a proﬁt
function and the other based on a revenue function. In both models there is
one bad output: CO2. The proﬁt function model uses value added as the good
output, hours worked and the size of the capital stock are used as classical
inputs. The model which is based on a revenue function uses gross output as
good output, hours worked, the size of the capital stock and intermediate inputs
are used as classical inputs. Those two models yield the two subindicators
EEt and EE∗t used to quantify the eﬃciency dimension of the sectoral CO2
performance index.
8So, to estimate the βs of the ﬁrst year only data from the ﬁrst year has been used. To
estimate the βs of the second year, data from the ﬁrst and the second year has been used, etc.
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Table 1: Sectoral CO2 performance sub-indicators
Indicator Description Mean weight Dimension
sectoral CO2 emissions
sectoral GDP
9 Sectoral CO2 per
sectoral GDP 0.446
CO2 intensity
sectoral CO2 emissions
sectoral work force
10 Sectoral CO2 per
sectoral workforce 0.226
EEt
CO2 eﬃciency
score (proﬁt func-
tion)
0.592
CO2 eﬃciency
EE∗t
CO2 eﬃciency
score (revenue
function)
0.589
Computing the sectoral CO2 performance indicators by weighting the
four sub-indicators The four sub-indicators listed in Table (1) - each of them
standardized between zero and one - quantify the sectoral CO2 performance.
They are weighted and aggregated to obtain the sectoral CO2 performance
indicator SPIi,s,t, where i indexes the countries, s the sectors and t the time.
To weight the sub-indicators I use Principal Component Analysis (PCA). And
I take the ﬁrst principal component as sectoral performance index. PCA has
become one of the major approaches in the construction of composite indicators.
It is now also used in social sciences in a variety of ﬁelds ranging from the
computation of socio-economic well-being indexes (for an overview on weighting
of such indexes see for instance Decancq and Lugo (2013)), technology and
science indexes (see for instance NISTEP (1995)) and sustainability indexes (see
for instance Singh et al. (2012)) to name only a few. PCA is generally preferred
to equal weighting approaches because it doesn’t impose the strong assumption
that all sub-indicators are “worth” the same in the composite indicator. Even
if PCA based weighting does not (necessarily) reveal the theoretical importance
of the diﬀerent sub-indicators, it is able to account for overlapping information
9Note that this variable has been re-scaled. Each observed value is subtracted from the
observed maximum (max) of the variable, then the minimum (min) of the variable is added:
(max-observation)+min. With this transformation higher values now indicate a better per-
formance. Subsequently values have been standardized between zero and one.
10See: footnote 9.
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between the (correlated) sub-indicators (Nardo et al., 2008), thereby avoiding
the problem of “double accounting” (Decancq and Lugo (2013), p. 20). The
(rounded) means over all sectors of the weights per sub-indicator obtained using
PCA are listed in Table (1). Note that the weights of CO2 per capita and
CO2 per dollar are both positive. This is because those variables have been
transformed as described in the footnotes in Table (1).
5.3 Computing the economy-wide CO2 performance index
by aggregating the sectoral performance indicators
The aggregation of the sectoral performance indicators is the last step in the
construction of the economy-wide CO2 performance indicator. I use a linear
weighting approach to construct this ﬁnal economy-wide CO2 performance in-
dex:
CO2PerformanceIndexi,t =
S∑
s=1
(ESi,s,t=0 + SSi,s,t)
2 SPIi,s,t (16)
Where SSi,s,t is country i’s share of sector s in total GDP at time t, ESi,s,t=0
is country i’s share of sector s in total country emissions at time t = 0 and
SPIi,s,t is country i’s sectoral CO2-performance index of sector s at time t.
I choose this weighting approach because it gives the ﬁnal index several
desired properties. First it respects the fact that the CO2 performance of a
country can be improved in two ways. Either by improving the within sector
CO2-performance which is captured by the SPI’s. Or by reducing the share of
relatively polluting sectors, a property which is respected by integrating sectoral
GDP shares as a part of the weight. Second it attributes a bigger weight to a
sectoral performance index the more polluting a sector is, hence the integration
of the sectoral emissions share as a part of the weight. And third it allows
to keep track of the history of the CO2 performance of a country by using
always the time 0 sectoral emission share.11 The country CO2 performance
11Other sectoral data based indexes, as for instance trade barrier indexes, encounter often
the same problem in the aggregation phase. As an example: suppose a country improves
the CO2-performance within a given sector (and obtains a score of 1 for this sectoral CO2
performance indicator), and in turn sectoral emissions approach zero (as an extreme case).
If one now simply weights the sectoral CO2-performance indicator (which is supposed to be
one) by the corresponding contemporary sectoral emission share (which is here supposed to
be zero), then the ﬁnal eﬀect on the country index would be zero. Hence the improvement
in the CO2-performance would not be reﬂected in the ﬁnal indicator. This would be clearly
undesirable.
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index has subsequently been normalized to range between zero and one, where
one indicates the best performance and zero the worst.
6 Results
To obtain an overview, Figure (1) displays the evolution of the narrow CO2
input index, the broad GHG input index and the CO2 performance index by
country. Note that due to the diﬀerent data-sources, not all indexes are avail-
able for all countries. And note as well that each of the displayed indexes has
been bounded to range between zero and one. In general one can observe that
the CO2 input indexes increase over time. This indicates an increase in the
stringency of CO2 policies over time in the sample. The magnitude of this
increase varies however considerably among the diﬀerent countries. The CO2
performance index doesn’t show such a clear pattern.
To empirically assess whether the constructed indexes measure what they
are supposed to measure, one should ideally compare them to a sound bench-
mark. Given the absence of such a measure (i.e. given the reason why this
chapter has been written) I pursue two complementary evaluation strategies.
First I compare the constructed input (performance) indexes to existing input
(performance) indexes as well as to the WEF survey index which is a measure
of perceived environmental policy stringency. Second I compare the constructed
CO2 input index to the constructed performance index and verify whether the
expected relationship holds, after all a higher stringency should go hand in hand
with a better performance12. Table (2) reports the pairwise correlations of the
country-means13 of the indexes.
First look at the input indexes. The ﬁrst set of benchmark indexes are the
two input indexes measuring air policy stringency constructed by Knill et al.
(2012). Both air policy indexes show a strongly positive and highly signiﬁcant
correlation with the narrow CO2 input index. The higher CO2 input policy
stringency, the higher air policy input stringency, a result which has been ex-
pected. While the correlations of both air policy index with the broad GHG
input index are positive, they are not signiﬁcant. The latter is probably due
12Note that as I did not construct a general GHG performance index, this second step will
only be carried out for gas speciﬁc indexes.
13I use country means and not each observation available to avoid that the pairwise cor-
relations capture trends. In the single observation case (not displayed) the correlations are
stronger and more signiﬁcant but the same overall tendencies hold.
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Table 2: Pairwise correlations of the means of the variables
Narrow CO2 II Broad GHG II Air Policy II 1 Air Policy II 2 WEF CO2 PI EPI Lead
Narrow CO2 II 1
Broad GHG II -.0913 1
Air Policy II 1 .633∗∗ .166 1
Air Policy II 2 .687∗∗∗ .231 .905∗∗∗ 1
WEF .422∗∗ .484∗∗∗ -.139 .0466 1
CO2 PI .540∗∗∗ .197 -.00243 .165 .469∗∗ 1
EPI .267 .493∗∗∗ .144 .273 .660∗∗∗ .403∗ 1
Lead -.291 -.490∗∗ -.0938 -.235 -.544∗∗∗ -.380∗ -.553∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
II stands for Input Index, PI for Performance Index. The Narrow CO2 Input Index, the Broad GHG Input Index and the
CO2 Performance Index have been constructed by the above outlined methodology. The Air Policy Input Index 1 and 2 are
taken from Knill et al. (2012). The WEF survey index is taken from Browne et al. (2012). The Environmental Performance
Index (EPI) is taken from Emerson et al. (2012) and the lead content of gasoline (Lead) index is taken from Grether et al.
(2012a).
to relatively few overlapping data points between the two indexes. As an ad-
ditional benchmark the WEF survey index, measuring perceived environmental
policy stringency, is used (Browne et al., 2012). I expect that the opinion of the
survey respondents on environmental policy stringency should be positively cor-
related with the CO2 input index and with the broad GHG input index. This is
the case, the correlation is positive and strongly signiﬁcant for both the narrow
CO2 index and the broad GHG input index. The benchmark comparisons seem
to indicate that both input indexes do actually measure what they should.
The CO2 performance index is compared to two widely used performance
indexes. The Environmental Performance Index of Yale (Emerson et al., 2012)
is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the constructed CO2 performance
index. A better overall environmental performance parallels a better CO2 per-
formance. As an additional benchmark a second performance index - the index
of the lead content of gasoline - is used. A negative and signiﬁcant correlation is
observed. Again this result is anticipated, a better CO2 performance goes hand
in hand with lower lead contents in gasoline. Overall the benchmark compar-
isons seem to indicate that the CO2 performance indicator measures what it is
supposed to.
Finally let’s look at the relation between the narrow CO2 input index and
the CO2 performance index. A priori, I expect that a more stringent CO2 input
policy should coincide with a better CO2 performance. Looking simply at the
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correlation this seems to be the case: a positive and strongly signiﬁcant corre-
lation exists between the two indicators. Figure (2) plots the mean value of the
two indexes by country, including a linear ﬁt and the corresponding conﬁdence
interval for the mean value of the performance index given the diﬀerent input
index values. One can observe a rather clear tendency: the higher the mean
value of the CO2 input index, the higher the mean CO2 performance by coun-
try. Figure (3) shows the diﬀerence between the last and the ﬁrst year of the
performance index on the y-axis and of the input index on the x-axis. Again
a simple linear ﬁt and the corresponding conﬁdence interval is displayed. The
results go in the expected direction, but are not strong14. Overall, and with-
out making any causal statement, it seems that higher CO2 input stringency is
positively associated with a better CO2 performance, a result which is expected.
Two remarks have to be made in order to illustrate both the limits and
the importance of these results. First, policy unrelated factors might inﬂuence
the CO2 performance of a country. Most of the countries which show a strong
increase in the CO2 performance but only a slight increase in the policy strin-
gency are countries from the former Soviet Union. Their position in Figure (3)
might be explained by the dismantling and relocation of the heavy industry in
those countries after 1991. Hence, taking performance indicators as proxies of
environmental policy stringency might be quite dangerous. Second, Figure (3)
underlines the importance of having clearly separated input, process and output
indexes. This can be illustrated by the example of countries showing relatively
big improvements of their input indexes which go hand in hand with a decline
in their performance indexes. As an example take Greece. It is possible that
the relatively high corruption in Greece (see for instance Transparency Inter-
national (2012)) might indicate a low implementation stringency. If this is the
case, this could explain Greece’s position in Figure (3). Ideally, a researcher
should have all three types of indicators available and use them according to his
speciﬁc research question.
14In appendix A and B, the same analysis has been done for SO2 and CH4. Note that, for
SO2, the results go even more in the expected direction.
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7 Conclusion
In this chapter I identify what I think to be the main obstacle currently limiting
the development of indicators measuring environmental policy stringency: the
absence of an explicitly stated methodological framework. Previous attempts
violate one of the most fundamental rules found in the literature on index con-
struction by not deﬁning the concept they intend to quantify. What is badly de-
ﬁned is likely to be badly measured. The solution I propose allows to separately
quantify the input, process and output dimension of various speciﬁc - hence well
deﬁnable - types of environmental policies. I applied the general methodology to
measure the stringency of pollutant policies, implementing a broad GHG policy
input index, a CO2 input index and a corresponding CO2 performance index.
Additional results for SO2 and CH4 input and performance indicators can be
found in appendix A and B. Comparisons with available benchmark indicators
suggest that the obtained indexes measure what they are supposed to.
The implemented indexes can and will be extended trough time and space.
Improvements, especially concerning the equal weighting approach of the input
indicators, should be readily implementable as soon as priors are becoming
available in the literature. In a next step it will be possible to assess to what
extent policy eﬀorts actually solved the problem they intend to solve.15 Using
the developed input and performance indexes as well as a proxy for policy
implementation stringency, it will be possible to estimate by how much policy
eﬀorts improved the CO2 performance of a country over time. Or, in other
words, it will be possible to calculate a real output index of CO2 policy.
15Note that Chapter 4 provides a ﬁrst application - using the broad GHG input index -
which investigates this important question empirically.
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Appendix A: SO2 indexes
The SO2 input policy stringency index and the SO2 performance index rely on
the same methodology as outlined in the above chapter at the example of CO2
input policy stringency and CO2 performance. In case of SO2, two important
comments have to be made:
1) For the construction of the narrow SO2 input index, a total of 240 SO2
policies have been identiﬁed using ECOLEX. Out of those 240 policies, 14
are only applied on a sub-national level.
2) For the construction of the SO2 performance indicator I used the same ap-
proach as in the CO2 case described in the main part of the chapter. The
database used doesn’t report sulphur dioxide but sulphur oxide (SOX),
hence the constructed performance index has to be interpreted as a SOX
performance index. The variables used to construct the sectoral perfor-
mance indicator and the mean of the pca weights used to construct it are
summarized in Table (A.1):
Table A.1: Sectoral SOX performance sub-indicators
Indicator Description Mean weight Dimension
sectoral SOX emissions
sectoral GDP
16 Sectoral SOX per
sectoral GDP 0.443
SOX intensity
sectoral SOX emissions
sectoral work force
17 Sectoral SOX per
sectoral workforce 0.411
EEt
SOX eﬃciency
score (proﬁt func-
tion)
0.545
SOX eﬃciency
EE∗t
SOX eﬃciency
score (revenue
function)
0.551
16Note that this variable has been re-scaled. Each observed value is subtracted from the
observed maximum (max) of the variable, then the minimum (min) of the variable is added:
(max-observation)+min. With this transformation higher values now indicate a better per-
formance. Subsequently values have been standardized between zero and one.
17See: footnote 16.
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SO2 results
To obtain an overview, Figure (A.1) displays the evolution of the narrow SO2
input index and the SOX performance index by country. Note that due to the
diﬀerent data-sources, not all indexes are available for all countries.
To empirically assess whether the constructed indexes measure what they
are supposed to I pursue the same strategy as in the main part of the chapter.
First I compare the input (performance) index to existing input (performance)
indexes and second I compare the input index to the performance index and
verify that the expected relation holds. Table (A.2) reports the pairwise corre-
lations of the country-means18 of the indexes.
The ﬁrst set of benchmark indexes are the two input indexes measuring Air
Policy Stringency constructed by Knill et al. (2012). Both air policy indexes
show a strongly positive and highly signiﬁcant correlation with the narrow SO2
input index. The higher SO2 input policy stringency the higher air policy in-
put stringency, a result which has been expected. As a second benchmark the
WEF survey index19 is used (Browne et al., 2012). I expect that the opinion of
the survey respondents on environmental policy stringency should be positively
correlated with the SO2 input index. This is the case, the correlation is positive
and signiﬁcant. Looking at the performance index, we observe again a positive
and signiﬁcant correlation with the EPI, the overall environmental performance
index of Yale. As a second benchmark for the performance index the lead
content of gasoline index has been taken. Here we observe a negative and sig-
niﬁcant correlation. Indicating that a better SOX performance is paralleled by
a lower lead content in gasoline concentration, a result which has been expected.
Looking at the relationship between input and performance index, the strong
and highly signiﬁcant correlation is in accordance with the expectations: a
higher SO2 input stringency goes hand in hand with a higher SOX performance.
Figure (A.2) plots the mean value of the two indexes by country, including a
linear ﬁt and the corresponding conﬁdence interval for the mean value of the
performance index given the diﬀerent input index values. One can observe a
18I use country means and not each observation available to avoid that the pairwise cor-
relations capture trends. In the single observation case (not displayed) the correlations are
stronger and more signiﬁcant but the same overall tendencies hold.
19Even if the WEF survey index is not an input index, I use this index as a benchmark
due to it’s wide usage in the literature.
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clear tendency: the higher the mean value of the SO2 input index, the higher
the mean SOX performance by country. Figure (A.3) shows the diﬀerence be-
tween the last and the ﬁrst year of the performance index on the y-axis and of
the input index on the x-axis. Again a simple linear ﬁt and the corresponding
conﬁdence interval is displayed. The result goes in the expected direction and
is even stronger than in the CO2 case displayed in the main part of the chapter.
As in the CO2 case discussed in the chapter, results seem to indicate that
the indexes measure what they are supposed to.
Table A.2: Pairwise correlations of the means of the variables
Narrow SO2 II Air Policy II 1 Air Policy II 2 WEF SOX PI EPI lead
Narrow SO2 II 1
Air Policy II 1 .691∗∗ 1
Air Policy II 2 .661∗∗ .905∗∗∗ 1
WEF .411∗∗ -.139 .0466 1
SOX PI .605∗∗∗ .108 .274 .478∗∗ 1
EPI .298∗ .144 .273 .660∗∗∗ .419∗∗ 1
lead -.320 -.0938 -.235 -.544∗∗∗ -.530∗∗ -.553∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
II stands for Input Index, PI for Performance Index. The Narrow SO2 Input Index and the SO2 Per-
formance Index have been constructed by the above outlined methodology. The Air Policy Input Index
1 and 2 are taken from Knill et al. (2012). The WEF survey index is taken from Browne et al. (2012).
The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is taken from Emerson et al. (2012) and the lead content
of gasoline (Lead) index is taken from Grether et al. (2012a).
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Figure A.1: The SO2 input indexes and the SOX performance index by country
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Appendix B: CH4 Indexes
The CH4 input policy stringency index and the CH4 performance index rely on
the same methodology as outlined in the above chapter at the example of CO2
input policy stringency and CO2 performance. In case of CH4 two important
comments have to be made:
1) For the construction of the CH4 input index, a total of only 53 CH4 policies
have been identiﬁed using ECOLEX. Out of those 53 policies, 6 are applied
on a sub-national level. This really limited number of CH4 policies and
therefore the small variation in the CH4 input index limit the use of the
narrow methane input index considerably.
2) For the construction of the CH4 performance indicator I used the same
approach as in the CO2 case described in the chapter. The variables used
to construct the sectoral performance indicator and the weights used to
construct it are summarized in Table (B.1):
Table B.1: Sectoral CH4 performance sub-indicators
Indicator Description Mean weight Dimension
sectoral CH4 emissions
sectoral GDP
20 Sectoral CH4 per
sectoral GDP 0.453
CH4 intensity
sectoral CH4 emissions
sectoral work force
21 Sectoral CH4 per
sectoral workforce 0.449
EEt
CH4 eﬃciency score
(proﬁt function) 0.529
CH4 eﬃciency
EE∗t
CH4 eﬃciency score
(revenue function) 0.538
20Note that this variable has been re-scaled. Each observed value is subtracted from the
observed maximum (max) of the variable, then the minimum (min) of the variable is added:
(max-observation)+min. With this transformation higher values now indicate a better per-
formance. Subsequently values have been standardized between zero and one.
21See: footnote 20.
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CH4 results
Figure B.1 displays the evolution of the CH4 input and performance indicator
by country. Given the absence of a lot of methane speciﬁc laws, the input index
displays a very limited variability over time and space.
Table B.1 displays the pairwise correlation of the means of the variables.
The narrow CH4 index is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with the Air
Policy indexes of Knill et al. (2012). There is no signiﬁcant correlation between
the CH4 input indicator and the WEF index. The small number of explicit
CH4 laws seems to limit the input indicator approach considerably. Looking
at the performance indicator, there is a positive and signiﬁcant correlation be-
tween the CH4 performance indicator and the EPI of Yale. And a negative and
signiﬁcant correlation between the performance index and the lead content of
gasoline. Both results suggest that the performance index is measuring what he
is supposed to.
For the sake of completeness I included Figure B.2 and B.3 despite the fact
that comparisons between the performance and input index make only limited
sense, given the small numbers of explicit CH4 laws. The correlation between
the two is positive but not signiﬁcant and Figure B.2 displays a relationship
which goes in the expected direction. Figure B.3 however displays a result
which is not in accordance with the expectation.
Overall, the CH4 performance indicator seem to work as intended. However,
the small number of explicit CH4 laws clearly exempliﬁes one of the limits of
the proposed input index approach.
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Figure B.1: The CH4 input indexes and the CH4 performance index by country
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
0
.5
1
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Albania Australia Austria Belgium Brazil
Bulgaria Canada China Cyprus Czech Republic
Denmark Estonia Finland France Germany
Greece Hungary India Indonesia Ireland
Italy Japan Korea Latvia Lithuania
Luxembourg Malta Mexico Netherlands New Zealand
Poland Portugal Romania Russia Slovak Republic
Slovenia Spain Sweden Taiwan Turkey
United Kingdom United States
Narrow CH4 Input Index
 CH4 Performance Index 
C
H
4 I
nd
ex
es
Year
Chapter Three: Measuring environmental policy stringency 85
F
igure
B
.2:
M
ean
ofthe
N
arrow
C
H
4
input
index
and
ofthe
C
H
4
perform
ance
index
by
country
A
ustralia
A
ustria
B
elgium
C
anada
D
enm
ark
E
stonia
France
G
erm
any
H
ungary
Ireland
Italy
K
oreaLatvia
M
alta
M
exico
R
ussia
S
lovak R
epublic
S
pain
Turkey
.4 .6 .8 1
CH4 Performance Index
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
.5
C
H
4  Input Index
linear fit
95%
 C
I
86 Chapter Three: Measuring environmental policy stringency
F
igure
B
.3:
C
hange
ofthe
N
arrow
C
H
4
input
index
and
ofthe
C
H
4
perform
ance
index
from
the
ﬁrst
to
the
last
year
in
the
sam
ple
A
ustralia
A
ustria
B
elgium
C
anada
D
enm
ark
E
stonia
France
G
erm
any
H
ungary
Ireland
Italy
K
orea
Latvia
M
alta
M
exico
R
ussia
S
lovak R
epublic
S
pain
Turkey
−.2
−.1 0 .1 .2
CH4 Performance Index Change
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
C
H
4  Input Index C
hange
linear fit
95%
 C
I
Chapter Three: Measuring environmental policy stringency 87
Table B.2: Pairwise correlations of the means of the variables
Narrow CH4 II Air Policy II 1 Air Policy II 2 WEF CH4 PI EPI lead
Narrow CH4 II 1
Air Policy II 1 .710∗∗ 1
Air Policy II 2 .769∗∗ .905∗∗∗ 1
WEF .0778 -.139 .0466 1
CH4 PI .255 -.00817 .139 .430∗∗ 1
EPI .0264 .144 .273 .660∗∗∗ .409∗ 1
lead -.161 -.0938 -.235 -.544∗∗∗ -.355∗ -.553∗∗∗ 1
∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001
II stands for Input Index, PI for Performance Index. The Narrow SO2 Input Index and the SO2 Per-
formance Index have been constructed by the above outlined methodology. The Air Policy Input Index
1 and 2 are taken from Knill et al. (2012). The WEF survey index is taken from Browne et al. (2012).
The Environmental Performance Index (EPI) is taken from Emerson et al. (2012) and the lead content of
gasoline (Lead) index is taken from Grether et al. (2012a).
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Chapter 4
CO2 Emissions and
Greenhouse Gas Policy
Stringency ∗
1 Introduction
An accelerated warming of the climate system increases the likelihood of “severe,
pervasive and irreversible” impacts. Those risks can be mitigated by limiting the
rate and magnitude of climate change (IPCC, 2014a). To do so, anthropogenic
greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions have to be reduced as they are “extremely
likely” to be the dominant cause of the observed global warming (IPCC, 2013).
This calls for a tightening of GHG policy regimes and raises a set of questions
regarding their eﬀects. Does an increase in the stringency of a country’s GHG
policy regime reduce anthropogenic GHG emissions? What are the opportunity
costs of a policy induced CO2 emission reduction? And if CO2 can be reduced,
do stricter GHG policies increase the GHG eﬃciency of sectors or alter the
composition of dirty and clean sectors of an economy? The latter question
is important when taking a global perspective, as the impact on global emis-
sions depends on how a reduction in country emissions has been achieved. This
chapter attempts to answer those questions by empirically investigating the re-
lationship between GHG policy stringency and anthropogenic carbon dioxide
∗This paper is co-authored by Marcel Probst, University of Lausanne, Faculty of Business
and Economics.
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emissions.
The literature on environmental policy evaluation contains assessments fo-
cusing on a single country or a speciﬁc industry (e.g., Cole et al. (2005) or
Gamper-Rabindran and Finger (2013)), qualitative assessments of environmen-
tal policies (e.g., Aldy et al. (2003), or Taylor et al. (2012)), quantitative assess-
ments of single policy measures (e.g., Anderson and Maria (2011)), as well as
model-based ex-ante assessments of environmental policies (e.g., Manne et al.
(1995), Tol (1999), Barker et al. (2007) or Clarke et al. (2009)). But, to the best
of our knowledge, few papers empirically evaluate the impact of environmental
policy stringency on anthropogenic GHG emissions using either panel or coun-
try cross-sectional data. In the following review, we exclusively focus on those
contributions.
Most of them originate from the literature analyzing the links between eco-
nomic development and pollution, as well as the links between trade and pollu-
tion. Panayotou (1997) ﬁnds a signiﬁcantly negative relation between ambient
SO2 levels and a general policy index reﬂecting the degree of enforcement of
contracts in diﬀerent political systems. De Bruyn (1997) provides evidence that
per capita GDP and environmental policy stringency (proxied by abatement
targets from the Convention on Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution) are
positively correlated. He points out that this could partly explain why pollu-
tion seems to curb downwards at high income levels. Esty and Porter (2005)
wrote the ﬁrst paper which puts the assessment of environmental policy im-
pacts at the center of attention. They use a variety of environmental perfor-
mance indicators (including SO2 concentrations) and the environmental regu-
latory regime index (ERRI) as the policy variable. The latter is based on the
World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Report Survey. Results indi-
cate a signiﬁcantly negative relation of SO2 concentrations and environmental
policy stringency. However, they state that their results must be seen as pre-
liminary and that causal linkages remain unproven due to data and econometric
limitations. Huang and Barker (2012) and Huang et al. (2012) investigate the
impact of clean development mechanism (CDM) projects on CO2 emissions.
They provide evidence in support of a CO2 emission reduction associated with
CDM project developments. A result which can be interpreted as evidence for
a negative relationship between pollution and environmental policy stringency.
Gani (2012) shows that the general World Bank indicators of political stabil-
ity, rule of law, and control of corruption are negatively correlated with CO2
emissions per capita. Aichele and Felbermayr (2013) ﬁnd that the ratiﬁcation
of binding Kyoto commitments (which could be interpreted as a proxy for in-
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creased stringency), signiﬁcantly lowers domestic CO2 emissions in committed
countries. Using cross-sectional data for OECD countries, Calbick and Gunton
(2014) show that environmental governance, proxied by the WEF’s Global Com-
petitiveness Report Executive Opinion Survey, is negatively correlated with per
capita GHG emissions, and explains about 7% of its cross-sectional variation.
These ﬁndings provide some evidence that more stringent environmental pol-
icy is negatively associated with anthropogenic GHG emissions. However, three
limitations of the current empirical literature can be identiﬁed. Firstly - as noted
by Esty and Porter (2005) - it is diﬃcult to obtain good measures of environ-
mental policy stringency. Due to this relative scarcity of sound data, previous
contributions use either general government indicators, survey based indexes or
policy speciﬁc dummies. Moreover, as Sauter (2014) points out, the concepts
of environmental policy and environmental policy stringency are rather broad.
They potentially encompass a diverse array of measures like the regulation of
hunting or the protection of a particular species. Hence, to evaluate the impact
of policy stringency on GHG emissions, it is crucial to use an index quantifying
GHG policy stringency rather than general environmental policy stringency or
- even worse - general government indicators. Secondly, GHG policy stringency
and CO2 emissions, as well as the channels through which those variables inﬂu-
ence one another, have not yet been subject to simultaneous analysis. Thirdly,
no attention has been put to empirically disentangle the overall eﬀect of GHG
policy stringency. Besides reducing absolute production levels, a country’s CO2
emissions may be reduced through a CO2 eﬃciency improvement of some or all
of its sectors, or by altering the relative production shares of dirty and clean
sectors. Since the contribution of Grossman and Krueger (1991), the literature
labels those eﬀects as scale, technique and composition eﬀect, respectively.
Focusing on anthropogenic CO2, we address those limitations by using the
newly proposed indicator by Sauter (2014) which allows to quantify country
GHG policy stringency. In order to deal with potential endogeneity issues, and
in the absence of suitable instruments, we use a spatial structural VAR model
proposed by Di Giacinto (2010). Finally, we pursue a two-fold estimation strat-
egy. To estimate the size of the overall eﬀect of GHG policy stringency on CO2
emissions, we use aggregated country data. The country-wide analysis allows us
as well to assess over which channels GHG policy stringency operates, and thus
to estimate the policy induced scale eﬀect. It also allows to measure opportunity
costs of a CO2 emission reduction in terms of GDP. In order to disentangle the
overall country eﬀect, we rely on industry speciﬁc country data. We assess if in-
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creased GHG policy stringency alters the sectoral composition within countries
and increases CO2 eﬃciency of sectors. Hence, we do not perform a classical
decomposition but empirically estimate GHG policy induced scale, technique
and composition eﬀects. We subsequently perform extended robustness tests to
asses the validity of our results.
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the
data used in the estimation, section 3 outlines our methodological approach,
preliminary test results are reported in section 4, results are displayed in section
5, and section 6 reports robustness tests which are followed by a discussion in
section 7.
2 Data
The economy-wide and the sector-level datasets are described in subsections
(2.1) and (2.2), respectively. A general overview and summary statistics of the
variables is provided in Table (1). The table also contains a column listing pa-
pers supporting the variable use. Together, those variables cover the economic,
socio-demographic and climatic factors the literature on anthropogenic country
GHG emissions ﬁnds to be relevant. For a recent summary of this literature,
refer to Calbick and Gunton (2014).
2.1 Economy-wide Dataset
The economy-wide dataset covers yearly observations for 46 developed and de-
veloping countries (see Table (A1) in the Appendix) accounting for 71% of the
world’s CO2 emissions over the time range 1990-2010. Anthropogenic CO2 emis-
sions, GHG policy stringency, GDP, technology and energy prices are considered
endogenous. In addition, we include a set of exogenous variables: corruption,
cooling degree days and heating degree days, the latter two capture climatic
conditions.
Anthropogenic CO2 emissions in kilo tons and real GDP are taken from the
World Bank. The variable quantifying GHG policy stringency is the “Broad
GHG input index” taken from Sauter (2014). The index is a count variable
of all laws which aim to reduce GHG emissions. It can therefore be seen as a
de-jure indicator which captures statutory laws on the books. By using such
a variable, we avoid the conceptual problems faced by previous studies using
general environmental policy stringency proxies or general government indica-
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tors. Furthermore, this index is - to our best knowledge - the only GHG policy
stringency measure covering our sample. The evolution of the index by country
is summarized in Figure (A1) in the Appendix. This index also has some lim-
itations. It does not incorporate changes of policy implementation stringency
over time. To cope with this issue, we include corruption as a proxy for general
policy implementation stringency. Also, due to the equal weighting approach,
the introduction of each new nation-wide law is considered to correspond to an
equal sized increase in GHG policy stringency. However, in the absence of theo-
retical work allowing to weight diﬀerent policy measures in terms of GHG policy
stringency, any weight approach remains an arbitrary choice. We also consid-
ered the use of two alternative measures. Firstly, the most widely used indicator
of environmental policy stringency provided by the Browne et al. (2012). This
index is survey based and thus measures only perceived environmental policy
stringency and is only available from 2004 onward.1 Secondly, the recently de-
veloped index of environmental policy stringency proposed by Botta and Kozluk
(2014). This index has, however, a considerably smaller coverage in terms of
world CO2 emissions, excludes developing countries and does not solely focus on
GHG policies. The country speciﬁc level of technology is approximated by the
count of ﬁled patents. A patent is taken as an observation the year the patent is
ﬁled in a national patent authority. We use the IEA indicator of energy end use
prices including taxes as our energy price variable. Approximately 20 % of the
countries from our dataset are not included in the IEA database. The missing
data are computed with the World Bank’s two-years interval country speciﬁc
data on pump gasoline prices. We then linearly interpolate the country speciﬁc
World Bank data on the world crude oil price index from the IMF Primary
Commodity Prices dataset to ﬁll the two year gaps. After verifying that the
within country correlation between the interpolated World Bank pump gasoline
price data and the IEA data is suﬃciently high, we use the interpolated data
on pump gasoline prices as proxy for energy prices for the countries which are
not in the IEA dataset.
In addition to the endogenous variables, three exogenous variables are in-
cluded in our model: The variable corruption is used as a proxy for country
diﬀerences in the implementation stringency of policies. Climatic conditions
that directly inﬂuence the CO2 emissions are approximated by cooling degree
days (CDD) and heating degree days (HDD). The former quantiﬁes the cooling
1Nevertheless, we use this index to assess the robustness of our results and obtain quali-
tatively similar results.
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suﬃcient to neutralize the deviation of surface temperature from a standard
comfort level. The latter quantiﬁes the heating suﬃcient to neutralize the de-
viation of surface temperature from a standard comfort level.
2.2 Sector-level Dataset
The sector level dataset covers yearly observations for the time range 1995-2009
for 34 sectors and 35 countries (see Table (A1) in the Appendix). The countries
in the sector-level dataset account for roughly 57% of world CO2 emission over
the covered period. We keep the same variables as in the economy wide speci-
ﬁcation but use sectoral data where it is available and appropriate.
Sectoral anthropogenic CO2 and sectoral value added are taken from the
World Input Output Database. Given that the GHG policy stringency index
measures overall country GHG policy stringency, all sectors may, to a greater
or lesser extent, be aﬀected. We thus use the country wide policy stringency
variable as described in section (2.1). The energy price level is also identical to
the one in the country-wide speciﬁcation. For the sector-level estimation, we use
the per cent of sector-speciﬁc high-skilled working hours as compared to total
sector-speciﬁc working hours as our measure of sectoral technology. A relative
increase in working hours of highly skilled is considered to be equivalent to an
improvement in the sector-speciﬁc technology.
All exogenous variables are identical to the ones described in section (2.1).
The climatic and socio-demographic factors inﬂuencing country CO2 emissions
stay the same independently of the level of analysis (economy-wide or sectoral).
Note that as part of the robustness analysis, we aggregate the sector level dataset
in order to dispose of a second economy-wide dataset.
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3 Methodology
In order to analyze the direct and indirect eﬀect of policy stringency on CO2
emissions, we use a spatial VAR. This is because GHG policy stringency, the
technology level, energy prices, GDP and CO2 emissions are interdependent
variables. Estimating each individual eﬀect on CO2 emissions within such an
endogenous system would require a series of instrumental variables. Those are
either diﬃcult to deﬁne, or come with a high cost in terms of data loss. A VAR,
however, is suitable to take into account the dynamic structure of our data gen-
erating process and allows the use the full dataset. In addition, by embedding
all individual linkages into one global estimation, it allows for a subsequent sim-
ulation analysis via impulse response functions.
Hence within our VAR, anthropogenic CO2 emissions, GHG policy stringency
and the transmission channels are treated both as endogenous and predeter-
mined variables. In addition, to take into account changes in the external de-
mand for input factors or intermediate goods, we allow the variables to aﬀect
one another across national borders by including a spatial lag.
Following Di Giacinto (2010), our empirical model with the number of tem-
poral lags P looks as follows:
Γ0Yt =
P∑
p=1
Γ1pYt−p +
P∑
p=0
Γ2pXt−p + Ψi + Λt + Ut (1)
with Yt = [It, Tt, Et,Ωt, Ht]′, the vector of the endogenous variables: GHG
policy stringency index, technology, energy prices, GDP and CO2 emissions,
respectively. It = [ι1t, ι2t, ..., ιNt]′, Tt = [τ1t, τ2t, ..., τNt]′, Et = [	1t, 	2t, ..., 	Nt]′,
Ωt = [ω1t, ω2t, ..., ωNt]′ and Ht = [η1t, η2t, ..., ηNt]′ where It, Tt, Et,Ωt and Ht
are vectors of the panel units 1, ..., N (countries or sectors). Ψi and Λt include
a set of dummies to account for panel speciﬁc ﬁxed eﬀect and period-speciﬁc
common shocks, respectively. Ut is a vector of structural error terms where
∑
Ut
is diagonal, and contains a heterogeneous set of variances. Γ1p and Γ2p assume
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the following form:
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p = 1, ...P
where Arkp =
∑S
s=0 Γ˜rkpsWs and Γ˜rkps = diag{[γrk1ps, γrk2ps, ..., γrkNps]}, with γrk the
coeﬃcient for endogenous variable k = 1, ...,K and sub-equation r = 1, ....,K.
Also, s = 1, ..., S, with s the spatial lag, and the function diag{} indicating that
the oﬀ-diagonal elements are zero. W is a NxN matrix that selects and weighs
the neighboring variables. We use an aspatial approach as our baseline model
where we set S = 0. W0 then selects the within unit values of each country or
sector. Subsequently, we set S = 1 in a robustness analysis, where W1 selects
and summarizes the neighboring values. We choose to weigh each neighboring
value equally, such that a weight wij = 1Nj with Nj the number of neighbors.
The deﬁnition of a neighbor is treated in section 6. Γ0 is constructed similarly.
As in a standard VAR, exclusion restrictions are imposed such that it becomes
lower triangular.2
In a homogeneous speciﬁcation, the following constraints are imposed: γrkips =
γrkjps = γrkps IN . We use this constraint in our country-speciﬁc analysis. In or-
der to analyse the composition eﬀect on the one hand, and to see how dif-
ferent sectors or countries react to policy stringency on the other, we can
relax this restriction by allowing for heterogeneous eﬀects among some sub-
groups of countries or sectors. A group-heterogeneous model where we assume
a set of coeﬃcients to be homogeneous within a group z is deﬁned as follows:
Γ˜rkps = diag{[γrk1ps, ..., γrkzps, ..., γrkZps]} where z = 1, 2, .., Z < N .
In order to identify our model, we impose a series of exclusion restrictions
which set some contemporaneous eﬀects in Γ0 to zero. The ordering of the vari-
ables determine these exclusion restrictions. GHG policy stringency is taken
ﬁrst in the ordering. None of our endogenous variables are assumed to impact
GHG policy stringency contemporaneously. This is more so the case when con-
sidering that the elaboration of a policy may take some time. Technology is also
relatively exogenous, in that it is most likely not aﬀected through contemporane-
2Moreover, on the diagonal, we have Arkp = IN −
∑S
s=1 Γ˜
rk
psWs.
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ous changes in the remaining endogenous variables. This is because technology
is approximated through ﬁled patents, which implies that they have been suﬃ-
ciently developed in order to qualify for the ﬁling process. In the sector-speciﬁc
estimation, we argue that the relative number of high-skilled workers may be
the result of previously determined capital and R&D investments. It is thus put
second in the ordering. Energy prices is put third, as it may directly impact on
GDP levels as well as CO2 emissions. GDP is the fourth variable, because it
is likely to be contemporaneously impacted through all the previous variables
and exerts a direct inﬂuence on GHG emissions. CO2 emissions, however, are
directly impacted by policy stringency, the technological level, energy prices as
well as GDP. We thus perform the analysis using the ordering of the variables
as described in (1). Note that the results prove to be robust against a series of
alternative orderings (see discussion in section 6).
In order to analyze the pass-through eﬀect on a variable given an exogenous
change of another variable, we estimate impulse response functions. These im-
pulse response functions portray the reaction function of a given variable as a
consequence of a one unit orthogonal shock on another endogenous variable.
It allows us, in addition to the direct eﬀect of GHG policy stringengy, to see
the accumulated overall eﬀect of such a policy stringency change, which also
includes the eﬀect on CO2 via the transmission channels. The corresponding
conﬁdence intervals are computed using a bootstrap procedure with 100 itera-
tions.
3.1 Country-speciﬁc Analysis: Methodological Approach
The country-speciﬁc analysis allows to measure the overall country-speciﬁc eﬀect
of the stringency of GHG policy. To illustrate the group-heterogeneous aspatial
version of (1), the sub-equation with the CO2 emissions as the endogenous
variable writes as follows:
Δηit =
P∑
p=0
γηιzpΔιi,t−p +
P∑
p=0
γητzpΔτi,t−p +
P∑
p=0
γηzpΔ	i,t−p +
P∑
p=0
γηωzp Δωi,t−p (2)
+
P∑
p=1
γηηzpΔηi,t−p +
P∑
p=0
X ′i,t−pΓ˜ηxp + ψ
η
i + λ
η
t + u
η
t
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where the indexes i and z denote the country and the group speciﬁc coeﬃcient
values, respectively. The Δ’s indicate that the variables are ﬁrst-diﬀerenced.
A similar equation is formulated for all remaining endogenous variables and
the system of equation is estimated simultaneously through a full information
maximum likelihood.
3.2 Sector-level Analysis: Methodological Approach
We use a sectoral analysis to disentangle the overall eﬀect of environmental
policy stringency on CO2 emissions. This approach allows to assess to what
extent the country-wide change in CO2 emissions is due to sectoral CO2 eﬃ-
ciency changes, and to what extent it stems from changes in value added of
dirty and clean sectors. In the sectoral analysis, the index i in (2) denotes a
country-sector. The policy stringency index as well as energy prices remain the
same as in the country-speciﬁc analysis and are assumed to be identical across
all sectors within a country. In addition, neighboring eﬀects are added to (2)
to account for possible externalities for a given sector. Value added, technology
as well as CO2 emissions are measured at the sector-country level. The matrix
of controls X remains the same as in the country-wide speciﬁcation. Groups z
are deﬁned over 4 diﬀerent levels of CO2 emission intensity per country. Each
group contains approximatively 290 country-sector units.
4 Integration Properties and Lag Length Selec-
tion
A Harris and Tzavalis (1999) panel unit root test (HT test) is used to test for
non-stationarity of each of the variables. This test is based on pooled ADF
statistics and is consistent with a panel dimension N → ∞ and a ﬁxed time
dimension T .3 The test is carried out with demeaned cross-sections to account
for panel ﬁxed eﬀects, and a common time trend. Results are reported in Table
(B1) in the Appendix. For most of the variables in our economy-wide dataset,
the null hypothesis of all panels containing a unit root cannot be rejected. We
conclude that the GHG policy stringency index as well as the log of technology,
GDP, CO2, corruption, cooling day degrees and heating day degrees have a unit
root and proceed by ﬁrst diﬀerencing those variables. Even though the test
rejects the null for energy prices, we still proceed by ﬁrst diﬀerencing this vari-
3Simulation results of Harris and Tzavalis (1999) indicate that the test has good size and
power properties for N greater than 25, a condition which is satisﬁed in our sample.
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able. This is because the nature of the test is such that it remains silent about
the proportion of panels that do contain unit roots. In addition, treating all
endogenous variables identically facilitates the interpretation of the IRFs. Re-
running a Harris and Tzavalis (1999) test on the diﬀerentiated variables conﬁrms
the stationarity of the variables with unit roots. We apply the same transfor-
mations of the counterparts of those variables in the sector-wide dataset, even
though there the HT test rejects the null hypothesis in all variables. This is
again justiﬁed by the limited information that such tests reveal, and because
the country-wide tests hinge towards non-stationarity. Note that we include,
for every sub-equation, a panel-speciﬁc dummy variable after ﬁrst diﬀerencing,
which controls for diﬀerent average growth rates of all our endogenous variables.
In order to select the panel VAR speciﬁcations which achieves the best per-
formance in terms of log likelihood score, a number of alternative temporal lag
structures are estimated for each model and the preferred speciﬁcation is selected
on the basis of the evidence provided by the AIC and BIC criteria. Results are
reported in Table (B2) in the Appendix. Note that due to the limited time
series lengths, the more parsimonious suggestion of AIC and BIC is taken. For
all speciﬁcations (with one only exception), AIC and BIC criteria both indicate
the use of a speciﬁcation with one temporal lag, for all sub-equations.
5 Results
5.1 Countrywide Semi-elasticity of CO2 to GHG Policy
Stringency
All coeﬃcients of our country-wide baseline speciﬁcation are displayed in Table
(2). We observe a signiﬁcantly negative direct contemporaneous semi-elasticity
of CO2 with respect to GHG policy stringency of 16.6%. This direct eﬀect on
CO2 reﬂects, for example, the impact of new or stricter command and control
instruments. Given that an increase in stringency is in general preceded by a
political debate, such an increase may be anticipated in advance. It is hence
little surprising that the eﬀect can be observed contemporaneously.4 In addition,
the direct eﬀect of both GDP and technology on CO2 are signiﬁcantly positive.
Previous contributions ﬁnd mixed results on the CO2-technology relation (for a
summary, see Lantz and Feng (2006)). We use a general proxy for technology
4We also run an alternative estimation with a forward lag for the GHG policy stringency
index to allow for a larger forward looking horizon. See discussion in section 6.
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and do not speciﬁcally consider green technology. The qualitative results on
technology may be justiﬁed by the possibility that new technologies might not be
less emission intensive than older ones, which would explain why technological
development impacts positively on CO2 emissions.
Table 2: Country Speciﬁcation with 1 Lag
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.166*** 0.039 -0.044** 0.015 0.045 -0.159*** -0.086 -0.188* - -0.019(0.004) (0.511) (0.012) (0.370) (0.352) (0.001) (0.444) (0.093) - (0.576)
ln(Technology) 0.027** 0.013 0.012*** 0.007* -0.015 0.010 - 0.020 - 0.003(0.014) (0.235) (0.004) (0.077) (0.160) (0.353) - (0.561) - (0.272)
ln(Energy prices) -0.019 0.033 -0.014 0.007 - 0.034 - -0.091 - 0.004(0.386) (0.133) (0.103) (0.390) - (0.312) - (0.102) - (0.373)
ln(GDP) 0.617*** -0.036 - 0.386*** - 0.050 - 0.069 - -0.008(0.000) (0.517) - (0.000) - (0.291) - (0.531) - (0.466)
ln(CO2) - -0.129*** - 0.008 - -0.060*** - 0.173*** - 0.003- (0.000) - (0.381) - (0.009) - (0.000) - (0.642)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.001(0.795) (0.787) (0.206) (0.531) (0.722) (0.592) (0.950) (0.453) (0.695) (0.788)
ln(CDD) -0.001 -0.003 0.003*** 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003** -0.001(0.856) (0.304) (0.004) (0.798) (0.106) (0.365) (0.228) (0.261) (0.014) (0.355)
ln(HDD) 0.088*** -0.062*** 0.001 0.008 0.054*** -0.020 0.087* -0.094* 0.001 -0.007**(0.000) (0.005) (0.950) (0.373) (0.002) (0.260) (0.061) (0.053) (0.688) (0.044)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920 920 920 920
AIC -4278.15 -5858.61 -4176.63 -2954.85 -6097.26
BIC -3907.56 -5492.77 -3815.55 -2598.52 -5745.68
R2 0.22 0.57 0.10 0.13 0.18
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
Furthermore, we identify the main channels which amplify or curb the ob-
served direct eﬀect of stringency on emissions. As main channel is deﬁned a
variable that is both signiﬁcantly aﬀected by the policy stringency and which
signiﬁcantly aﬀects CO2 emissions.
We observe a signiﬁcant negative contemporaneous reaction of GDP to GHG
policy stringency and a positive reaction of CO2 to GDP. GDP can therefore
be considered a channel which ampliﬁes the negative eﬀect of policy stringency
on CO2 emissions. This result shows that policy stringency operates partly
over a scale eﬀect. In addition, we ﬁnd evidence for an amplifying technology
channel, although less strong than GDP, as policy stringency impacts negatively
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on technological development and technological development positively aﬀects
CO2 emissions. Thus, a higher GHG policy stringency might slow down overall
technological advancement by inhibiting the development of emission intensive
technologies, which in turn would explain the decrease in CO2 emissions.
Figure 1: Impulse Response Functions: Country-wide Speciﬁcation with 1 Lag, 10%
Conﬁdence Interval
(a) Response of CO2 to a Unit
Shock of GHG Pol. String.
(b) Response of GDP to a Unit
Shock of GHG Pol. String.
(c) Response of CO2 to a Unit
Shock of GDP
We further compute IRFs to capture the overall eﬀect of an exogenous shock
of policy stringency on CO2.5 A shock corresponds to a one unit increase in
the policy stringency - i.e., passing from zero stringency to the highest observed
stringency. Figure (1a) displays the IRF of a positive stringency shock on CO2.
Increasing GHG policy stringency by one unit reduces country CO2 emissions
on average by 15 % in the long run.
In addition, Figure (1b) displays the cumulative pass-through eﬀect of a
positive policy stringency shock on GDP and Figure (1c) the cumulative pass-
through eﬀect of a positive GDP shock on CO2. Both Figures illustrate the
presence of a scale eﬀect: On the one hand, the eﬀect of a positive stringency
shock on GDP is signiﬁcantly negative. And on the other hand, the eﬀect of a
positive GDP shock on CO2 is signiﬁcantly positive.
5Figure (C1) in Appendix C displays the complete set of IRFs from the CO2 equation as
well all IRFs with GHG policy stringency shocks.
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Opportunity Costs of Policy Induced CO2 Emission Reductions
Figure (1a) and (1b) allow to compare the overall reaction of CO2 and GDP
to a unit shock in GHG policy stringency. Thus, they reveal information about
the ex-post average opportunity cost of a tightening of GHG policy stringency.
Results suggest that a policy induced CO2 emissions reduction of 1%, cost on
average 0.35% of GDP in the long run. Those opportunity costs are rather high,
especially when compared to the numerous ex-ante estimations of the costs of
greenhouse gas emission reductions (e.g., Barker et al. (2007), Clarke et al.
(2009) or Tavoni and Tol (2010)). Most of those ex-ante modeling approaches
assume, however, a cost-eﬀective implementation of greenhouse gas mitigation
policies. But, as Leahy and Tol (2012) state: “There is no reason to assume that
climate policy would be designed as recommended in an economics textbook. As
a result, emission abatement may be considerably more expensive than typically
assumed”. Some papers assess the cost of speciﬁc greenhouse gas policies ex-
post and suggest that some existing GHG policies do cost considerably more
compared to least cost solutions (e.g., Jenkins (2010) or Leahy and Tol (2012)).
Our results conﬁrm this.
We subsequently assess whether there is a diﬀerence in the opportunity costs
of GHG policies for developing and developed countries. As a developed coun-
try, we deﬁne those countries whose GDP per capita at the beginning of our
measurement period, in 1990, is among the 50% highest. The developing coun-
tries are deﬁned to be the remaining ones. For developing countries, Figure
(2a) and (2c) reveal that a policy induced CO2 emission reduction of 1%, costs
on average 0.13% of GDP. The opportunity costs are almost 4 times higher
for developed countries, as a GHG policy induced 1% CO2 emission reduction
costs on average 0.5% of GDP for those countries as displayed in Figure (2b)
and (2d). A result which conﬁrms the frequently advanced argument of rela-
tively cheap abatement opportunities in developing countries. Moreover, the
diﬀerence in opportunity costs is mostly driven by the signiﬁcantly stronger
negative reaction of CO2 emissions to a policy shock in developing compared to
developed countries. A ﬁnding which is consistent with the “low-hanging fruit”
argument invoked during the preparation phase of the Kyoto Protocols’ Clean
Development Mechanism (see for instance Narain and Van’t Veld (2008)).
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Figure 2: IRFs for a GHG Policy Stringency Shock, Developed vs. developing Coun-
tries, 10% Conﬁdence Interval
(a) Response of CO2:
Developing Coun-
try
(b) Response of CO2:
Developed Coun-
try
(c) Response of GDP:
Developing Coun-
try
(d) Response of GDP:
Developed Coun-
try
5.2 Disentangling the Overall Eﬀect: Composition and
Technique Eﬀect
There are three potential ways to achieve a country-wide reduction in CO2
emissions: by reducing the overall scale of production, by increasing the CO2
eﬃciency within all or some of the sectors, or by increasing the share of the
clean sectors. Our economy-wide results suggest that increased policy stringency
reduces the overall scale of production, but remains silent about the two other
potential eﬀects. Working with sectoral data and deﬁning group-heterogeneity
allows us to separate potential policy induced technique and composition eﬀects.
To do so, we deﬁne the groups z based on country-speciﬁc emission intensity,
which is deﬁned by sectoral CO2 emissions per sectoral value added. The ﬁrst
group contains the cleanest sectors and is labeled “very clean”. This group
includes sectors whose emission intensities at the beginning of our time period
in 1995 are among the lowest 25% in a country. Similarly, the second group
(labeled “clean”), third group (labeled “dirty”) and fourth group (labeled “very
dirty”) contain sectors with CO2 emission intensities between the 25th and 50th
percentile, between the 50th and 75th percentile, and amongst the top 25%,
respectively. Because this categorization of sectors is performed using a within-
country criterium, the labelling of a given sector may diﬀer across countries.
Coeﬃcients from all sub-equations are displayed in Table (C1) and (C1) in the
Appendix.
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Composition Eﬀect
If GHG policy stringency operates over a composition eﬀect, we expect to ob-
serve a signiﬁcantly diﬀerent reaction of sectoral value added to GHG policy
stringency across the sectoral groups z: The dirty sectors’ value added should
decrease signiﬁcantly more than the clean sectors’ value added. This is con-
ﬁrmed by the results. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant negative cumulative eﬀect over both
time lags of GHG policy stringency on sectoral value added for the very dirty
sector group (see Table (3)). The cumulative eﬀects over both lags for the dirty,
clean and very clean sector groups are not signiﬁcant.
Table 3: Composition Eﬀect: Sector Speciﬁcation
Variable and Statistics
Value Added Equation
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.043** 0.036* -0.010 0.044* -0.035 0.038 -0.099*** -0.025(0.041) (0.094) (0.682) (0.082) (0.262) (0.249) (0.007) (0.504)
ln(Technology) 0.004 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.007 -0.005(0.186) (0.175) (0.172) (0.764) (0.626) (0.512) (0.226) (0.443)
ln(Energy prices) -0.041*** -0.000 -0.037*** -0.009 -0.022** -0.011 0.030** -0.013(0.000) (0.955) (0.000) (0.371) (0.038) (0.330) (0.028) (0.393)
ln(Value Added) - 0.149*** - 0.071*** - 0.094*** - 0.028- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.103)
ln(CO2) - 0.003 - 0.008** - 0.013** - 0.036***- (0.333) - (0.023) - (0.020) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003(0.352) (0.172) (0.352) (0.172) (0.352) (0.172) (0.352) (0.172)
ln(CDD) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001(0.163) (0.151) (0.163) (0.151) (0.163) (0.151) (0.163) (0.151)
ln(HDD) -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004(0.515) (0.387) (0.515) (0.387) (0.515) (0.387) (0.515) (0.387)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
Pseudo R2 0.04
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, **
p<0.05, *** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
Furthermore, Table (3) and Table (C1) (Appendix) show that no main chan-
nel can be identiﬁed as contributing to a diﬀerentiated reaction of value added to
GHG policy stringency depending on the cleanness of the sectors. However, an
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interesting result concerns the potential energy price channel. Although GHG
policy stringency has no signiﬁcant cumulative impact on energy prices6, value
added reacts as expected signiﬁcantly negatively to higher energy prices for the
very clean, the clean and the dirty sector group. Higher energy prices, however,
increase the value added of the very dirty sector group, a ﬁnding which can be
related to the presence of energy producing sectors in this group.
The pass-through eﬀects - which are for each group mostly driven by the
direct eﬀect of stringency on sectoral value added - conﬁrm the existence of
a policy induced composition eﬀect. The IRFs relevant for this discussion are
displayed in Figure (3). The complete set of IRFs from the CO2 equation as well
all IRFs with GHG policy stringency shocks are shown in Figures (C2), (C3),
(C4) and (C5) in the Appendix. The long run pass-through eﬀect of a unit
shock of GHG policy stringency on value added for the very clean, the clean
and the dirty group are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. But the one for
the very dirty group is signiﬁcantly negative and diﬀerent from the very clean
and clean sector groups.
Figure 3: IRF’s for a GHG Policy Stringency Shock on Sectoral Value Added, 10%
Conﬁdence Interval
(a) Very clean sec-
tors
(b) Clean sectors (c) Dirty sectors (d) Very dirty sec-
tors
Results provide therefore evidence pointing towards the existence of a policy
induced composition eﬀect: a stricter GHG policy regime does alter the com-
position of clean and dirty sectors. It does so by reducing the value added of
very dirty sectors, while not signiﬁcantly aﬀecting the value added of the other
groups.
6See section 7 for a discussion of this result
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Technique Eﬀect
If increased GHG policy stringency raises CO2 eﬃciency of sectors, we expect
to ﬁnd a negative eﬀect of stringency on the sectoral CO2 coeﬃcients. As Table
(4) suggests, a policy induced technique eﬀect is present for all sectors. Those
direct eﬀects of stricter policies - potentially operating over stricter command
and control instruments - lower CO2 intensity in all sector groups and can thus
be interpreted as classical technique eﬀects, i.e., all other things - including sec-
toral value added - equal, an increase in stringency lowers sectoral CO2. This
eﬀect presents a lower bound of the technique eﬀect, as we also hold constant
the technology and energy channel, two channels which potentially contribute
to the technique eﬀect.
Table 4: Technique Eﬀect: Sector Speciﬁcation
Variable and Statistics
CO2 Equation
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.271*** 0.023 -0.197*** 0.030 -0.082* 0.017 -0.176*** -0.017(0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.543) (0.088) (0.736) (0.000) (0.722)
ln(Technology) 0.001 0.008 0.011* 0.014** 0.010* -0.002 0.004 -0.005(0.842) (0.271) (0.079) (0.023) (0.090) (0.703) (0.419) (0.366)
ln(Energy prices) -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.012(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.600) (0.503)
ln(Value Added) 0.102*** 0.036** 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.042***(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.079*** - -0.097*** - -0.080*** - -0.051***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.003)
ln(Corruption) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005***(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(HDD) 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008(0.205) (0.349) (0.205) (0.349) (0.205) (0.349) (0.205) (0.349)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
Pseudo R2 0.09
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Moreover, we can identify some tendency: the cleaner a sector group, the
stronger the negative eﬀect of GHG policy stringency on CO2 emissions (with
the exception of the dirty sector group). Note that this result does not imply
that absolute average abatement due to the technique eﬀect is highest in the
clean sector groups. On the contrary, given that average group CO2 emissions
are considerably higher in the very dirty sector group, absolute abatement due
to the direct eﬀect is highest in this group despite the fact that cleaner sectors
display a stronger negative reaction. The latter result can be explained by two
complementary arguments. It may be very costly and technically diﬃcult to
increase CO2 eﬃciency in heavily CO2 intensive sectors such as energy producing
sectors. If technical diﬃculties and costs are high enough, ﬁrms in dirty sectors
may prefer to relocate production instead of complying with regulation. Our
results from the composition eﬀect analysis supports this argument. On the
other hand, ﬁrms in cleaner sectors may not need to change central parts of their
production technology but can substitute inputs (such as non-renewable energy)
more readily to comply with regulations. Additionally, a second - policy related
- argument can be made. The regulation of GHGs started well before 1995
targeting initially CO2 intensive sectors, only later in time regulation included
also rather clean sectors. Thus, as our sectoral sample starts only in 1995, it is
possible that we do not capture initial policy induced technique eﬀects in very
dirty sectors.
5.3 The Sectoral Overall Eﬀect: A Combination of Com-
position and Technique Eﬀect
Given that an increase in GHG policy stringency alters the composition of
sectors and increases the CO2 eﬃciency of all sectors, it is interesting to analyze
the overall eﬀect of policy stringency on sectoral CO2 emissions. Figure (4)
displays the pass-through eﬀects capturing the joint impact of direct and indirect
eﬀects of GHG policy stringency on emissions. For the very clean group, the
pass-through eﬀect is roughly -2.1% and signiﬁcant. The one for the second
group is about -1.4% and signiﬁcant. The one for the third group is roughly
-0.5 % but not signiﬁcant. At last, the pass-through eﬀect for very dirty sectors
is approximately -1.9% and also signiﬁcant.
Given that CO2 reacts positively to value added for all groups, the compo-
sition eﬀect acts as an important channel in the very dirty sector group, which
ampliﬁes the impact from the technique eﬀect on CO2 emissions considerably.
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Figure 4: IRF’s for a GHG Policy Stringency Shock on CO2, 10% Conﬁdence Inter-
vals
(a) Very clean sec-
tors
(b) Clean sectors (c) Dirty sectors (d) Very dirty sec-
tors
6 Robustness
We conduct an extensive robustness check including diﬀerent speciﬁcations, us-
ing a diﬀerent dataset, a diﬀerent environmental policy stringency index, as well
as using a spatial variant of the DiGiacinto model.
6.1 Countrywide Robustness Results: Alternative Data,
Forward Lag and Spatial Speciﬁcation
In a ﬁrst step, we assess the robustness of our results to diﬀerent data. Firstly,
we use the baseline dataset and replace the GHG policy stringency variable by
the one provided by the WEF (see Browne et al. (2012)). Our main results - the
negative impact of GHG policy stringency on CO2 and GDP - stay qualitatively
the same (cf. Table (D1) in Appendix D). Secondly, we aggregate our sector-
speciﬁc dataset to produce an alternative economy-wide dataset and re-estimate
the baseline model. Again, our two main results are robust (c.f. Table (D2) in
Appendix D.).
In a second step, we estimate a spatial version of the baseline model. By
doing so, we additionally control for externalties such as changes in the de-
mand from trading partners. We rely upon aggregated trade data from the UN
Comtrade Database (2015) to construct the W matrix. This matrix essentially
deﬁnes which countries are considered as neighbors. For each country, we deﬁne
as a neighbor one of the 5 countries which have the highest import share with
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respect to the country under consideration. An import share is deﬁned as being
total imports by a foreign country over total value added of the country under
consideration. The results are robust when controlling for such externalities
(c.f. Table (D3) in Appendix D.).
Finally, a VAR estimation may typically be criticized for its dependence
on the variable ordering. Hence, we estimate speciﬁcations with our baseline
lag length using diﬀerent orderings of the endogenous variables. Besides the
ordering described in equation (1), we test all ﬁve alternative orderings one
obtains by varying the positions of gdp, technology and energy prices. All results
remain robust both qualitatively and quantitatively (c.f. Tables (E1)-(E5) in
Appendix E). Lastly, we introduce a forward lag for GHG policy stringency
to allow for a larger potential forward looking horizon. Results indicate that
no signiﬁcant changes happen to all variables at the lead of a GHG policy
stringency change, and that results for the lags are qualitatively identical, and
quantitatively similar as in the baseline model (c.f. Table (E6) in Appendix E).
6.2 Sectoral Robustness Results: Diﬀerent Group Deﬁni-
tions and Spatial Speciﬁcation
Not only the country-wide but also the sectoral results are robust to any speci-
ﬁcation. First, we estimate a spatial version of the sectoral baseline model. By
doing so, we additionally control for externalities such as changes in the demand
for input goods of trade partners. We use trade ﬂow data from the input output
matrix provided by the World Input-Output Database (2012) to deﬁne the W
matrix. For each sector in a given country, we deﬁne as a neighbor one of the
20 sectors from any other country which have the highest import share with
respect to the sector under consideration. Note that sectors within the same
country are not considered neighbors. This is because we use country-wide pol-
icy stringency measures and energy price levels. An import share is deﬁned as
being total imports by a sector in a foreign country over total value added of
the sector under consideration. Coeﬃcients of all sub-equations are displayed
in Table (D4) in Appendix D. We ﬁnd again strong evidence for the existence of
a policy induced composition eﬀect, as value added of very dirty sectors reacts
signiﬁcantly negatively to stringency while the one from the other groups does
not show a signiﬁcant reaction. Evidence suggests as well that more stringent
GHG policy regimes increase CO2 eﬃciency in all sector groups.
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In addition, we test the use of a diﬀerent grouping structure with two and
three groups instead of four. Again, the main results stay qualitatively the
same: as a reaction to a policy shock, value added of rather dirty sectors de-
creases signiﬁcantly while the value added of rather clean sectors does not react
signiﬁcantly diﬀerently from zero. In addition, we also ﬁnd consistent evidence
for the existence of a technique eﬀect, and this eﬀect is stronger the cleaner
the sector group (c.f. Tables (E7) and (E8) in Appendix E). Finally, using the
same grouping structure, we test speciﬁcations with the 5 alternative orderings
as we did for the country-wide speciﬁcation, results remain robust (c.f. Tables
(E9)-(E13) in Appendix E).
7 Discussion
By using a relatively large panel dataset including countries responsible for
roughly 71 % of the world’s CO2 emissions over the sample period, a new GHG
policy stringency indicator and a structural spatial panel VAR approach, we are
able to avoid several limitations of earlier contributions attempting to measure
policy induced CO2 emission reductions. Our results from the country-wide
analysis show that increasing the stringency of a country’s GHG policy regime
does reduce its CO2 emissions, which is good news from a national environ-
mental policy perspective. In addition, a country with no GHG regulations
could achieve a 15% reduction of its’ CO2 emissions by adopting the stringency
level of the most stringent country in the sample. Our results also reveal the
existence of a policy induced scale eﬀect, as national GHG policy stringency
impacts negatively on a country’s GDP. Opportunity costs of policy induced
CO2 reductions in terms of GDP are relatively high, but 4 times lower for de-
veloping countries compared to developed countries. Being robust to alternative
speciﬁcations, a diﬀerent environmental policy stringency variable, as well as to
a diﬀerent dataset, those results conﬁrm and extend the fragmented evidence of
earlier contributions (cf. Esty and Porter (2005)).
A sectoral analysis then allows to disentangle the overall eﬀect of GHG pol-
icy stringency and shows the existence of a policy induced composition and
technique eﬀect. Increasing the stringency of a GHG policy regime alters the
composition of dirty and clean sectors in an economy. It does so by decreasing
the size of the dirtiest 25% of sectors while not signiﬁcantly impacting on the
production scale of cleaner sectors. Moreover, increasing GHG policy stringency
improves CO2 eﬃciency in sectors. This technique eﬀect is present for all sector
groups. Those results are also robust to diﬀerent speciﬁcations and when con-
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trolling for externalities, such as changes in a trade partners’ demand for input
goods. From a global perspective, the existence of a policy induced technique
eﬀect is desirable, as reducing CO2 intensities of dirty sectors is beneﬁcial for
the climate. A more nuanced statement has to be made when it comes to the
policy induced composition eﬀect. If the composition eﬀect is mainly due to
absolute reduction of the production in highly CO2 intensive sectors, it would
be beneﬁcial for the global climate system. If, however, production relocation
accounts for the main bulk of the composition eﬀect, then it is unclear to which
extent this eﬀect of a stricter policy regime decreases global GHG emissions,
if at all. Additional research is needed to analyze how exactly the composi-
tion eﬀect is achieved. Should further research conﬁrm that the policy induced
composition eﬀect is mainly due to production relocation, a global - instead of
national - policy response is indispensable. The latter argument would addition-
ally reinforce the frequently advanced call for a global policy response due to
the inherent global public good nature of the problem at hand (see for instance:
IPCC (2001)).
An interesting additional result concerns the energy price channel, one out of
several channels over which GHG policies could potentially operate. Country-
wide results show that GDP and CO2 both react negatively to a change in
energy prices. Sector-level results suggest that the same holds for all except the
dirtiest sector group in the sample. GHG policy stringency, on the other hand,
does not seem to raise energy prices. A possible explanation is that international
competitiveness concerns dominate policy makers’ decisions and lead them to
not or only sparely design policies operating over increased energy prices.
In short, our results indicate that by increasing the stringency of GHG policy
regimes, policy eﬀorts can reduce national CO2 emissions up to a certain extent.
Prospects are therefore encouraging that one can limit the rate and magnitude
of climate change and thereby reduce climate change induced risks as advocated
by IPCC (2014a). However, the presence of a policy induced composition eﬀect
might limit the extent to which global emissions are reduced by national policies.
This would be especially true if emission outsourcing is found to be the main
driver of this composition eﬀect. On the other hand, it seems as if policy makers
have so far been reluctant to design policies operating over increased energy
prices. A ﬁnding which suggests that by using this channel more extensively,
there might still be scope for further CO2 emission reductions in the future.
Such policies would, however, have to be carefully designed and should take
into account the heterogeneous response of sector value added and CO2.
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Appendix A: Policy Stringency Index, Country
Coverage and Sector Coverage
Figure A1: GHG Policy Stringency Index
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Table A1: Countries and Sectors
Country-wide Speciﬁcation Sector Speciﬁcation
Countries Countries Sectorcode Sector description
Albania Australia 15t16 Food, beverages and tobacco
Australia Austria 17t18 Textiles and textile
Austria Belgium 19 Leather, leather and footwear
Belgium Brazil 20 Wood and Cork
Bosnia and Herzegovina Bulgaria 21t22 Pulp, paper, printing and publishing
Brazil Canada 23 Coke, reﬁned petroleum and nuclear fuel
Bulgaria China 24 Chemicals and chemical
Canada Cyprus 25 Rubber and plastics
Chile Czech Republic 26 Other non-metallic minerals
China Denmark 27t28 Basic metals and fabricated metals
Croatia Estonia 29 Machinery, NEC
Cyprus Finland 30t33 Electrical and optical equipment
Czech Republic France 34t35 Transport equipment
Denmark Germany 36t37 Manufactruing NEC, Recycling
Estonia Hungary 50 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of fuel
Finland India 51 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles
France Ireland 52 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of household goods
Germany Italy 60 Other Inland transport
Hungary Japan 61 Other Water transport
Iceland Korea 62 Other Air transport
India Latvia 63 Other Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
Ireland Lithuania 64 Post and telecommunications
Israel Luxembourg 70 Real estate activities
Italy Malta 71t74 Renting of m&eq and other business activities
Japan Mexico AtB Agriculture, hunting, forestry and ﬁshing
Korea, Rep. Netherlands C Mining and quarrying
Latvia Poland E Electricity, gas and water supply
Lithuania Portugal F Construction
Luxembourg Romania H Hotels and restaurants
Macedonia, FYR Slovak Republic J Financial intermediation
Malta Slovenia L Public admin and defence, compulsory social security
Mexico Spain M Education
Netherlands Sweden N Health and social work
New Zealand United Kingdom O Other community, social and personal services
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
United Kingdom
United States
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Appendix B: Preliminary Test Results
Table B1: Harris Tzavalis Test Statistics:
Variable P-value
ln(CO2) 0.4842
ln(Sectoral CO2) 0.000
ln(GDP) 0.9868
ln(Sectoral GDP) 0.0000
ln(Technology) 0.9955
ln(Sectoral Technology) 0.0000
ln(Energy price) 0.0000
GHG Pol. String. 0.9871
ln(Corruption) 0.3528
ln(CDD) 0.000
ln(HDD) 0.000
H0: All panels contain a unit root
Table B2: Lag Length Selection: AIC BIC by Equation
Country-wide Analysis
Nb. of Lags
CO2 Equ. GDP Equ. Energy Price Equ. Technology Equ. GHG Pol. String. Equ.
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
1 Lag -4278.15 -3907.56* -5858.61* -5492.77* -4176.63* -3815.55* -2954.85* -2598.52* -6097.26* -5745.68*
2 Lags -4192.1 -3788.16 -5611.34 -5212.09 -3936.09 -3541.54 -2978.8 -2588.95 -5787.15 -5401.99
3 Lags -4286.53* -3850.39 -5343.87 -4912.36 -4148.87 -3722 -2887.38 -2465.15 -5686.48 -5268.89
1 Lead/1 Lag -4211.12 -3807.17 -5609.64 -5210.39 -3936.76 -3542.21 -2980.65 -2590.79 -5757.65 -5372.49
Sector Analysis
Nb. of Lags
CO2 Equ. GDP Equ. Energy Price Equ. Technology Equ. GHG Pol. String. Equ.
AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC AIC BIC
1 Lag -52183.79* -42923.08* -66561.19* -57330.96* -79661.74* -70462* -49621.22* -40451.97* -117878.4* -108739.63*
2 Lags -50976.3 -38943.62 -61282.9 -52876.31 -76255.6 -68122 -48792.7 -39763.11 -112967.19 -107242.95
1 Lead/1 Lag -48671.26 -39334.33 -61779.3 -52472.52 -73764.3 -64487.7 -47236 -39219.23 -110506.37 -101290.12
* Indicates the preferred speciﬁcation by AIC or BIC
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Appendix C: Main Results - IRFs and Coeﬃ-
cients
Figure C1: Impulse Response Functions: Homogeneous Country-wide Speciﬁcation
with 1 Lag
(a) CO2 - GHG
Pol. String.
(b) CO2 - Value
Added
(c) CO2 - Energy
Prices
(d) CO2 - Technol-
ogy
(e) Value Added
- GHG Strin-
gency
(f) Energy Prices
- GHG Strin-
gency
(g) Technology -
GHG Strin-
gency
(h) GHG Strin-
gency - GHG
Stringency
Note: The ﬁrst variable in the caption corresponds to the response variable, whereas the
second variable corresponds to the impulse variable. 10 % conﬁdence intervals.
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Table C1: Sector Speciﬁcation with 1 Lag (Continued on Next Page)
Variable and Statistics
CO2 Equation
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.271*** 0.023 -0.197*** 0.030 -0.082* 0.017 -0.176*** -0.017(0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.543) (0.088) (0.736) (0.000) (0.722)
ln(Technology) 0.001 0.008 0.011* 0.014** 0.010* -0.002 0.004 -0.005(0.842) (0.271) (0.079) (0.023) (0.090) (0.703) (0.419) (0.366)
ln(Energy prices) -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.012(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.600) (0.503)
ln(Value Added) 0.102*** 0.036** 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.042***(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.079*** - -0.097*** - -0.080*** - -0.051***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.003)
ln(Corruption) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005***(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
ln(HDD) 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008(0.205) (0.349) (0.205) (0.349) (0.205) (0.349) (0.205) (0.349)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
Value Added Equation
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.043** 0.036* -0.010 0.044* -0.035 0.038 -0.099*** -0.025(0.041) (0.094) (0.682) (0.082) (0.262) (0.249) (0.007) (0.504)
ln(Technology) 0.004 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.007 -0.005(0.186) (0.175) (0.172) (0.764) (0.626) (0.512) (0.226) (0.443)
ln(Energy prices) -0.041*** -0.000 -0.037*** -0.009 -0.022** -0.011 0.030** -0.013(0.000) (0.955) (0.000) (0.371) (0.038) (0.330) (0.028) (0.393)
ln(Value Added) - 0.149*** - 0.071*** - 0.094*** - 0.028- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.103)
ln(CO2) - 0.003 - 0.008** - 0.013** - 0.036***- (0.333) - (0.023) - (0.020) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003(0.352) (0.172) (0.352) (0.172) (0.352) (0.172) (0.352) (0.172)
ln(CDD) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001(0.163) (0.151) (0.163) (0.151) (0.163) (0.151) (0.163) (0.151)
ln(HDD) -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004(0.515) (0.387) (0.515) (0.387) (0.515) (0.387) (0.515) (0.387)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
Pseudo R2 0.04
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price Equation
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.035* -0.063*** 0.035** -0.061*** 0.034* -0.061*** 0.040** -0.051***(0.057) (0.001) (0.043) (0.001) (0.064) (0.001) (0.025) (0.005)
ln(Technology) 0.007** 0.024*** 0.007** 0.024*** 0.007** 0.025*** 0.007** 0.025***(0.023) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.026) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.058*** - 0.057*** - 0.056*** - 0.055***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Value Added) - 0.002 - 0.003 - 0.011** - 0.003- (0.705) - (0.673) - (0.027) - (0.185)
ln(CO2) - -0.004* - 0.001 - -0.001 - -0.004- (0.090) - (0.833) - (0.769) - (0.331)
ln(Corruption) -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027***(0.275) (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) (0.275) (0.000) (0.275) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006***(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008(0.000) (0.110) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000) (0.110) (0.000) (0.110)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
Pseudo R2 0.17
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table C1: Sector Speciﬁcation with 1 Lag (Continued)
Variable and Statistics
Technology Equation
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.126*** 0.047 0.163*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.033 0.126*** 0.043(0.009) (0.372) (0.000) (0.815) (0.001) (0.522) (0.005) (0.384)
ln(Technology) - -0.082*** - -0.086*** - -0.086*** - -0.090***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) - -0.016 - -0.013 - -0.018 - -0.012- (0.220) - (0.283) - (0.174) - (0.329)
ln(Value Added) - -0.026** - -0.060*** - -0.032** - -0.003- (0.030) - (0.000) - (0.012) - (0.657)
ln(CO2) - 0.010* - -0.004 - -0.022*** - 0.006- (0.093) - (0.517) - (0.006) - (0.329)
ln(Corruption) -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) -0.035*** 0.030*** -0.035*** 0.030*** -0.035*** 0.030*** -0.035*** 0.030***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
Pseudo R2 0.08
Variable and Statistics
GHG Policy Stringency Equation
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.060*** - -0.060*** - -0.058*** - -0.042***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.007)
ln(Technology) - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Value Added) - 0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.956) - (0.968) - (0.746) - (0.938)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000- (0.787) - (0.793) - (0.730) - (0.995)
ln(Corruption) 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.271) (0.000) (0.271) (0.000) (0.271) (0.000) (0.271)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.410) (0.000) (0.410) (0.000) (0.410) (0.000) (0.410)
ln(HDD) 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001*(0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.054) (0.000) (0.054)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
Pseudo R2 0.25
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Figure C2: Impulse Response Functions Very Clean Sector
(a) CO2 - Value
Added
(b) CO2 - Energy
Prices
(c) CO2 - Technol-
ogy
(d) CO2 - GHG
Stringency
(e) Value Added
- GHG Strin-
gency
(f) Energy Prices
- GHG Strin-
gency
(g) Technology -
GHG Strin-
gency
(h) GHG Strin-
gency - GHG
Stringency
Note: The ﬁrst variable in the caption corresponds to the response variable, whereas the
second variable corresponds to the impulse variable. 10% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure C3: Impulse Response Functions Clean Sector
(a) CO2 - Value
Added
(b) CO2 - Energy
Prices
(c) CO2 - Technol-
ogy
(d) CO2 - GHG
Stringency
(e) Value Added
- GHG Strin-
gency
(f) Energy Prices
- GHG Strin-
gency
(g) Technology -
GHG Strin-
gency
(h) GHG Strin-
gency - GHG
Stringency
Note: The ﬁrst variable in the caption corresponds to the response variable, whereas the
second variable corresponds to the impulse variable. 10% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure C4: Impulse Response Functions Dirty Sector
(a) CO2 - Value
Added
(b) CO2 - Energy
Prices
(c) CO2 - Technol-
ogy
(d) CO2 - GHG
Stringency
(e) Value Added
- GHG Strin-
gency
(f) Energy Prices
- GHG Strin-
gency
(g) Technology -
GHG Strin-
gency
(h) GHG Strin-
gency - GHG
Stringency
Note: The ﬁrst variable in the caption corresponds to the response variable, whereas the
second variable corresponds to the impulse variable. 10% conﬁdence intervals.
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Figure C5: Impulse Response Functions Very Dirty Sector
(a) CO2 - Value
Added
(b) CO2 - Energy
Prices
(c) CO2 - Technol-
ogy
(d) CO2 - GHG
Stringency
(e) Value Added
- GHG Strin-
gency
(f) Energy Prices
- GHG Strin-
gency
(g) Technology -
GHG Strin-
gency
(h) GHG Strin-
gency - GHG
Stringency
Note: The ﬁrst variable in the caption corresponds to the response variable, whereas the
second variable corresponds to the impulse variable. 10% conﬁdence intervals.
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Appendix D: Main Robustness Results: Diﬀerent
Data, Spatial Speciﬁcation
Table D1: Country Speciﬁcation with 1 Lag, WEF Environmental Policy Stringency
Index
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology WEF Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
WEF Pol. String. -0.102*** -0.144*** 0.023*** -0.068*** 0.189*** -0.727*** 0.033*** 0.802*** - -0.004(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.224)
ln(Technology) 0.021*** -0.019*** -0.008*** -0.006*** 0.020*** -0.031*** - -0.474*** - -0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.860)
ln(Energy prices) 0.060*** 0.004 -0.045*** -0.035*** - -0.345*** - 0.184*** - -0.000(0.000) (0.477) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.393)
ln(GDP) 0.626*** -0.406*** - 0.304*** - -0.558*** - 0.668*** - -0.000(0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.640)
ln(CO2) - -0.174*** - -0.038*** - 0.023*** - 0.216*** - -0.000- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.658)
ln(Corruption) 0.030 0.043* 0.014 -0.008 0.007 -0.007 0.149 -0.191*** 0.000 0.000(0.186) (0.067) (0.193) (0.396) (0.852) (0.823) (0.000) (0.000) (0.380) (0.759)
ln(CDD) 0.005* 0.005*** 0.013*** 0.008*** -0.002*** 0.016*** -0.025*** -0.009*** 0.000 0.000(0.066) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.405) (0.989)
ln(HDD) 0.072*** 0.105*** -0.002*** 0.064* 0.036*** -0.282*** 0.311*** 0.192*** 0.000 0.000(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.335) (0.834)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 322 322 322 322 322
Pseudo R2 0.386 0.675 0.053 0.132 0.497
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, p-values
in parenthesis
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Table D2: Country Speciﬁcation with 1 Lag, aggregated Sector Dataset
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.109** -0.015 -0.046** 0.040** 0.037 -0.066 0.272*** 0.167 - -0.064(0.042) (0.796) (0.015) (0.049) (0.501) (0.248) (0.000) (0.131) - (0.154)
ln(Technology) -0.004 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.006 0.024*** - -0.112*** - -0.002(0.668) (0.679) (0.369) (0.268) (0.480) (0.009) - (0.000) - (0.357)
ln(Energy prices) -0.019 -0.003 -0.015 -0.004 - 0.049 - -0.017 - 0.009(0.474) (0.921) (0.177) (0.752) - (0.305) - (0.708) - (0.119)
ln(GDP) 0.453*** 0.172* - 0.404*** - -0.083 - -0.493** - -0.028(0.000) (0.066) - (0.000) - (0.375) - (0.037) - (0.296)
ln(CO2) - -0.106** - 0.011 - -0.014 - 0.184 - -0.021**- (0.027) - (0.254) - (0.603) - (0.269) - (0.011)
ln(Corruption) 0.001 -0.014 0.003 0.011** -0.003 0.027** -0.027 -0.013 0.004 -0.001(0.954) (0.198) (0.515) (0.031) (0.815) (0.029) (0.135) (0.453) (0.143) (0.821)
ln(CDD) 0.009** 0.003 0.002 0.003** -0.002 0.006* 0.019 -0.007 -0.001 0.001(0.013) (0.369) (0.210) (0.037) (0.627) (0.065) (0.537) (0.261) (0.500) (0.654)
ln(HDD) 0.010 -0.067*** -0.010 0.027*** 0.067** 0.004 -0.055** -0.094* 0.002 0.002(0.684) (0.005) (0.314) (0.007) (0.020) (0.899) (0.020) (0.053) (0.704) (0.662)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 490 490 490 490 490
Pseudo R2 0.26 0.60 0.17 0.07 0.26
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
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Table D3: Country Speciﬁcation with 1 Lag, spatial
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDPL0 L1 N0 N1 L0 L1 N0 N1
GHG Pol. String. -0.223*** 0.114* 0.040 -0.541** -0.044** 0.018 0.047 -0.140*(0.000) (0.057) (0.855) (0.013) (0.019) (0.337) (0.583) (0.100)
ln(Technology) -0.000 -0.002 0.019 -0.012 -0.002 -0.004 0.005 0.004(0.989) (0.814) (0.227) (0.392) (0.382) (0.148) (0.369) (0.481)
ln(Energy prices) -0.007 0.018 -0.035 -0.059 -0.015* 0.008 -0.011 0.006(0.748) (0.440) (0.580) (0.335) (0.094) (0.379) (0.586) (0.767)
ln(GDP) 0.567*** -0.118** 0.041 0.317*** - 0.375*** 0.155*** -0.068*(0.000) (0.016) (0.736) (0.003) - (0.000) (0.000) (0.091)
ln(CO2) - -0.129*** 0.178*** -0.027 - 0.013 - 0.023- (0.000) (0.001) (0.669) - (0.130) - (0.304)
ln(Corruption) -0.006 -0.002 - - 0.004 0.002 - -(0.555) (0.853) - - (0.355) (0.579) - -
ln(CDD) -0.002 -0.006** - - 0.003*** -0.001 - -(0.465) (0.031) - - (0.005) (0.646) - -
ln(HDD) 0.098*** -0.110*** - - -0.001 0.009 - -(0.000) (0.000) - - (0.903) (0.361) - -
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920
R2 0.21 0.59
Variable and Statistics Energy Price TechnologyL0 L1 N0 N1 L0 L1 N0 N1
GHG Pol. String. 0.085* -0.123** -0.197 -0.289** -0.057 0.021 0.763* -0.626(0.080) (0.011) (0.152) (0.046) (0.670) (0.877) (0.096) (0.157)
ln(Technology) 0.006 0.006 0.000 0.009 - 0.182*** -0.032 -0.029(0.467) (0.407) (0.971) (0.440) - (0.000) (0.347) (0.348)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.025 0.103** -0.066 - -0.078 - -0.328**- (0.447) (0.011) (0.122) - (0.239) - (0.011)
ln(GDP) - 0.064 - 0.020 - -0.008 - 0.166- (0.181) - (0.791) - (0.943) - (0.423)
ln(CO2) - -0.044* - -0.062 - 0.039 - 0.155- (0.058) - (0.167) - (0.496) - (0.228)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 -0.014 - - 0.015 -0.001 - -(0.767) (0.198) - - (0.299) (0.959) - -
ln(CDD) -0.004 0.003 - - -0.008 -0.010 - -(0.147) (0.369) - - (0.234) (0.168) - -
ln(HDD) 0.050*** -0.067*** - - 0.012 -0.025 - -(0.003) (0.005) - - (0.794) (0.607) - -
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920
R2 0.11 0.29
Variable and Statistics GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 N0 N1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.026 0.027 0.240***- (0.441) (0.661) (0.001)
ln(Technology) - -0.001 - -0.003- (0.724) - (0.313)
ln(Energy prices) - -0.003 - 0.033*- (0.684) - (0.052)
ln(GDP) - 0.009 - -0.064*- (0.470) - (0.061)
ln(CO2) - 0.002 - 0.000- (0.799) - (0.986)
ln(Corruption) 0.000 -0.001 - -(0.984) (0.723) - -
ln(CDD) -0.003** -0.001 - -(0.027) (0.296) - -
ln(HDD) 0.002 -0.006 - -(0.768) (0.436) - -
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 920
R2 0.18
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag, N0: contempo-
raneous eﬀect from one spatial lag, N1: eﬀect from one time and one spatial lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
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-0.004
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0.009
0.009
0.012**
-0.004
0.002
0.009
-0.001
0.010
-0.020
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-
-
ln(H
D
D
)
-0.020*
-0.040***
-
-
-0.020*
-0.040***
-
-
-0.020*
-0.040***
-
-
-0.020*
-0.040***
-
-
(0.063)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.063)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.063)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.063)
(0.000)
-
-
T
im
e
FE/C
ountry
FE
yes/yes
Pseudo
R
2
0.093
O
bs.
16660
Variables
and
Statistics
Value
A
dded
Equation
Very
clean
C
lean
D
irty
Very
dirty
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
G
H
G
Pol.
String.
-0.047**
0.022
0.015
0.162**
-0.014
0.041*
-0.003
-0.091
-0.043
0.052
-0.263***
-0.157*
-0.082**
-0.019
-0.062
-0.004
(0.017)
(0.281)
(0.805)
(0.013)
(0.550)
(0.092)
(0.960)
(0.208)
(0.175)
(0.119)
(0.003)
(0.090)
(0.031)
(0.615)
(0.569)
(0.970)
ln(Technology)
0.005
0.004
0.006
0.025***
0.006
-0.001
-0.002
0.009
0.005
-0.000
-0.007
-0.029***
0.010
-0.001
0.010
-0.046***
(0.143)
(0.222)
(0.366)
(0.000)
(0.128)
(0.858)
(0.763)
(0.192)
(0.304)
(0.977)
(0.496)
(0.002)
(0.128)
(0.896)
(0.412)
(0.000)
ln(Energy
prices)
-0.035***
0.005
-0.030
-0.015
-0.042***
-0.009
-0.004
-0.020
-0.033**
-0.016
0.053**
-0.011
-0.001
-0.035*
0.071**
0.070**
(0.000)
(0.583)
(0.110)
(0.455)
(0.000)
(0.380)
(0.832)
(0.348)
(0.019)
(0.296)
(0.034)
(0.679)
(0.960)
(0.082)
(0.029)
(0.044)
ln(Value
A
dded)
-
0.150***
-0.015*
-0.010
-
0.075***
-0.012
0.005
-
0.090***
0.032***
0.011
-
0.020
0.023
0.027*
-
(0.000)
(0.087)
(0.250)
-
(0.000)
(0.231)
(0.640)
-
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.257)
-
(0.261)
(0.112)
(0.078)
ln(C
O
2)
-
0.005
-
0.005
-
0.009**
-
-0.010
-
0.013**
-
0.004
-
0.039***
-
0.015
-
(0.174)
-
(0.528)
-
(0.014)
-
(0.166)
-
(0.015)
-
(0.763)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.389)
ln(C
orruption)
0.005*
0.000
-
-
0.005*
0.000
-
-
0.005*
0.000
-
-
0.005*
0.000
-
-
(0.063)
(0.882)
-
-
(0.063)
(0.882)
-
-
(0.063)
(0.882)
-
-
(0.063)
(0.882)
-
-
ln(C
D
D
)
0.001
0.001
-
-
0.001
0.001
-
-
0.001
0.001
-
-
0.001
0.001
-
-
(0.213)
(0.216)
-
-
(0.213)
(0.216)
-
-
(0.213)
(0.216)
-
-
(0.213)
(0.216)
-
-
ln(H
D
D
)
-0.006
-0.002
-
-
-0.006
-0.002
-
-
-0.006
-0.002
-
-
-0.006
-0.002
-
-
(0.267)
(0.760)
-
-
(0.267)
(0.760)
-
-
(0.267)
(0.760)
-
-
(0.267)
(0.760)
-
-
T
im
e
FE/C
ountry
FE
yes/yes
Pseudo
R
2
0.038
O
bs.
16660
C
olum
n
titles
indicate
the
sector
groups.
L0:
contem
poraneous
eﬀect,L1:
eﬀect
from
one
tim
e
lag,N
0:
contem
poraneous
eﬀect
from
one
spatiallag,N
1:
eﬀect
from
one
tim
e
and
one
spatiallag.
*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01,p-values
in
parenthesis
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T
able
D
4:
Sector
Speciﬁcation
w
ith
1
Lag,spatial(C
ontinued)
Variables
and
Statistics
Energy
Price
Very
clean
C
lean
D
irty
Very
dirty
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
G
H
G
Pol.
String.
0.026
-0.055***
-0.091
-0.161***
0.027
-0.055***
0.035
-0.071
0.026
-0.058***
0.017
-0.021
0.044**
-0.060***
-0.191***
0.067
(0.156)
(0.003)
(0.110)
(0.007)
(0.125)
(0.002)
(0.509)
(0.200)
(0.151)
(0.002)
(0.762)
(0.723)
(0.018)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.282)
ln(Technology)
0.008***
0.024***
0.003
-0.004
0.008***
0.025***
0.001
-0.001
0.008**
0.026***
-0.003
-0.006
0.008**
0.025***
0.001
0.004
(0.009)
(0.000)
(0.681)
(0.498)
(0.006)
(0.000)
(0.890)
(0.805)
(0.015)
(0.000)
(0.641)
(0.329)
(0.014)
(0.000)
(0.928)
(0.569)
ln(Energy
prices)
-
0.049***
-0.003
-0.018
-
0.047***
-0.007
-0.015
-
0.038***
0.002
0.005
-
0.061***
0.019
-0.034*
-
(0.000)
(0.839)
(0.348)
-
(0.000)
(0.626)
(0.407)
-
(0.006)
(0.913)
(0.800)
-
(0.000)
(0.248)
(0.089)
ln(Value
A
dded)
-
0.002
-
0.002
-
0.003
-
0.012
-
0.010**
-
0.003
-
0.003
-
0.006
-
(0.688)
-
(0.834)
-
(0.652)
-
(0.134)
-
(0.032)
-
(0.473)
-
(0.208)
-
(0.462)
ln(C
O
2)
-
-0.004*
-
-0.032***
-
0.001
-
-0.005
-
-0.001
-
-0.023***
-
-0.002
-
0.018**
-
(0.079)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.684)
-
(0.382)
-
(0.896)
-
(0.005)
-
(0.644)
-
(0.043)
ln(C
orruption)
-0.004*
0.028***
-
-
-0.004*
0.028***
-
-
-0.004*
0.028***
-
-
-0.004*
0.028***
-
-
(0.054)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.054)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.054)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.054)
(0.000)
-
-
ln(C
D
D
)
-0.002**
0.006***
-
-
-0.002**
0.006***
-
-
-0.002**
0.006***
-
-
-0.002**
0.006***
-
-
(0.010)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.010)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.010)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.010)
(0.000)
-
-
ln(H
D
D
)
0.066***
0.012**
-
-
0.066***
0.012**
-
-
0.066***
0.012**
-
-
0.066***
0.012**
-
-
(0.000)
(0.016)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.016)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.016)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.016)
-
-
T
im
e
FE/C
ountry
FE
yes/yes
Pseudo
R
2
0.179
O
bs.
16660
Variables
and
Statistics
Technology
Very
clean
C
lean
D
irty
Very
dirty
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
G
H
G
Pol.
String.
0.128***
0.158***
0.000
0.000
0.128***
0.158***
-0.000
-0.000
0.128***
0.158***
-0.000
0.000
0.128***
0.158***
-0.000
0.000
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.937)
(0.966)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.765)
(0.988)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.911)
(0.975)
(0.000)
(0.000)
(0.777)
(0.957)
ln(Technology)
-
-0.135***
-0.000
0.000
-
-0.135***
0.000
0.000
-
-0.135***
-0.000
0.000
-
-0.135***
-0.000
-0.000
-
(0.000)
(0.929)
(0.984)
-
(0.000)
(0.979)
(0.935)
-
(0.000)
(0.995)
(0.998)
-
(0.000)
(0.902)
(0.895)
ln(Energy
prices)
-
0.134***
-
-0.000
-
0.134***
-
0.000
-
0.134***
-
-0.000
-
0.134***
-
-0.000
-
(0.000)
-
(0.913)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.991)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.858)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.978)
ln(Value
A
dded)
-
-0.000
-
0.000
-
-0.000
-
0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
(0.883)
-
(0.942)
-
(0.869)
-
(0.984)
-
(0.862)
-
(0.983)
-
(0.918)
-
(0.818)
ln(C
O
2)
-
0.000
0.000
-
-0.000
-0.000
-
-0.000
-0.000
-
0.000
-0.000
-
(0.971)
(0.982)
-
(0.956)
(0.907)
-
(0.860)
(0.985)
-
(0.922)
(0.805)
ln(C
orruption)
-0.059***
0.022***
-
-
-0.059***
0.022***
-
-
-0.059***
0.022***
-
-
-0.059***
0.022***
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
ln(C
D
D
)
0.022***
0.014***
-
-
0.022***
0.014***
-
-
0.022***
0.014***
-
-
0.022***
0.014***
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
ln(H
D
D
)
-0.124***
0.136***
-
-
-0.124***
0.136***
-
-
-0.124***
0.136***
-
-
-0.124***
0.136***
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
T
im
e
FE/C
ountry
FE
yes/yes
Pseudo
R
2
0.092
O
bs.
16660
C
olum
n
titles
indicate
the
sector
groups.
L0:
contem
poraneous
eﬀect,L1:
eﬀect
from
one
tim
e
lag,N
0:
contem
poraneous
eﬀect
from
one
spatiallag,N
1:
eﬀect
from
one
tim
e
and
one
spatiallag.
*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01,p-values
in
parenthesis
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T
able
D
4:
Sector
Speciﬁcation
w
ith
1
Lag,spatial(C
ontinued)
Variables
and
Statistics
G
H
G
Policy
Stringency
Equation
Very
clean
C
lean
D
irty
Very
dirty
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
L0
L1
N
L0
N
L1
G
H
G
Pol.
String.
-
-0.061***
0.000
0.000
-
-0.061***
-0.000
-0.000
-
-0.061***
0.000
-0.000
-
-0.061***
-0.000
0.000
-
(0.000)
(0.985)
(0.953)
-
(0.000)
(0.954)
(0.963)
-
(0.000)
(0.996)
(0.974)
-
(0.000)
(0.956)
(0.982)
ln(Technology)
-
-0.003***
-
0.000
-
-0.003***
-
-0.000
-
-0.003***
-
-0.000
-
-0.003***
-
-0.000
-
(0.000)
-
(0.995)
-
(0.000)
-
(1.000)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.994)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.978)
ln(Energy
prices)
-
0.011***
-
-0.000
-
0.011***
-
0.000
-
0.011***
-
-0.000
-
0.011***
-
0.000
-
(0.000)
-
(0.961)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.968)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.991)
-
(0.000)
-
(0.995)
ln(Value
A
dded)
-
-0.000
-
0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
0.000
-
(0.933)
-
(0.950)
-
(0.952)
-
(0.994)
-
(0.908)
-
(0.997)
-
(0.924)
-
(0.957)
ln(C
O
2)
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
0.000
-
0.000
-
-0.000
-
-0.000
-
0.000
-
(0.823)
-
(0.980)
-
(0.953)
-
(0.910)
-
(1.000)
-
(0.960)
-
(0.961)
-
(0.908)
ln(C
orruption)
-0.010***
-0.014***
-
-
-0.010***
-0.014***
-
-
-0.010***
-0.014***
-
-
-0.010***
-0.014***
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
ln(C
D
D
)
-0.002**
-0.001*
-
-
-0.002**
-0.001*
-
-
-0.002**
-0.001*
-
-
-0.002**
-0.001*
-
-
(0.041)
(0.098)
-
-
(0.041)
(0.098)
-
-
(0.041)
(0.098)
-
-
(0.041)
(0.098)
-
-
ln(H
D
D
)
-0.016***
-0.009***
-
-
-0.016***
-0.009***
-
-
-0.016***
-0.009***
-
-
-0.016***
-0.009***
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
(0.000)
(0.000)
-
-
T
im
e
FE/C
ountry
FE
yes/yes
Pseudo
R
2
0.218
O
bs.
16660
C
olum
n
titles
indicate
the
sector
groups.
L0:
contem
poraneous
eﬀect,L1:
eﬀect
from
one
tim
e
lag,N
0:
contem
poraneous
eﬀect
from
one
spatiallag,N
1:
eﬀect
from
one
tim
e
and
one
spatiallag.
*
p
<
0.1,**
p
<
0.05,***
p
<
0.01,p-values
in
parenthesis
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Appendix E: Secondary Robustness Results: For-
ward Lag, Diﬀerent Grouping and Diﬀerent Or-
dering Structure
Table E1: Country Speciﬁcation, alternative ordering 1: technology, gdp, energy
price
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
ln(GHG Pol. String.) -0.166*** 0.039 -0.044** 0.015 0.045 -0.159*** -0.086 -0.188* - -0.019(0.004) (0.511) (0.012) (0.370) (0.352) (0.001) (0.444) (0.093) - (0.576)
ln(Technology) 0.027** 0.013 0.012*** 0.007* -0.015 0.010 - 0.020 - 0.003(0.014) (0.235) (0.004) (0.077) (0.160) (0.353) - (0.561) - (0.272)
ln(GDP) -0.019 0.033 -0.014 0.007 - 0.034 - -0.091 - 0.004(0.386) (0.133) (0.103) (0.390) - (0.312) - (0.102) - (0.373)
ln(Energy Price) 0.617*** -0.036 - 0.386*** - 0.050 - 0.069 - -0.008(0.000) (0.517) - (0.000) - (0.291) - (0.531) - (0.466)
ln(CO2) - -0.129*** - 0.008 - -0.060*** - 0.173*** - 0.003- (0.000) - (0.381) - (0.009) - (0.000) - (0.642)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.001(0.795) (0.787) (0.206) (0.531) (0.722) (0.592) (0.950) (0.453) (0.695) (0.788)
ln(CDD) -0.001 -0.003 0.003*** 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003** -0.001(0.856) (0.304) (0.004) (0.798) (0.106) (0.365) (0.228) (0.261) (0.014) (0.355)
ln(HDD) 0.088*** -0.062*** 0.001 0.008 0.054*** -0.020 0.087* -0.094* 0.001 -0.007**(0.000) (0.005) (0.950) (0.373) (0.002) (0.260) (0.061) (0.053) (0.688) (0.044)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920 920 920 920
AIC -4278.15 -5858.61 -4176.63 -2954.85 -6097.26
BIC -3907.56 -5492.77 -3815.55 -2598.52 -5745.68
R2 0.22 0.57 0.10 0.13 0.18
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
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Table E2: Country Speciﬁcation, alternative ordering 2: energy price, technology,
gdp
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
ln(GHG Pol. String.) -0.166*** 0.039 -0.044** 0.015 0.045 -0.159*** -0.086 -0.188* - -0.019(0.004) (0.511) (0.012) (0.370) (0.352) (0.001) (0.444) (0.093) - (0.576)
ln(Energy Price) 0.027** 0.013 0.012*** 0.007* -0.015 0.010 - 0.020 - 0.003(0.014) (0.235) (0.004) (0.077) (0.160) (0.353) - (0.561) - (0.272)
ln(Technology) -0.019 0.033 -0.014 0.007 - 0.034 - -0.091 - 0.004(0.386) (0.133) (0.103) (0.390) - (0.312) - (0.102) - (0.373)
ln(GDP) 0.617*** -0.036 - 0.386*** - 0.050 - 0.069 - -0.008(0.000) (0.517) - (0.000) - (0.291) - (0.531) - (0.466)
ln(CO2) - -0.129*** - 0.008 - -0.060*** - 0.173*** - 0.003- (0.000) - (0.381) - (0.009) - (0.000) - (0.642)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.001(0.795) (0.787) (0.206) (0.531) (0.722) (0.592) (0.950) (0.453) (0.695) (0.788)
ln(CDD) -0.001 -0.003 0.003*** 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003** -0.001(0.856) (0.304) (0.004) (0.798) (0.106) (0.365) (0.228) (0.261) (0.014) (0.355)
ln(HDD) 0.088*** -0.062*** 0.001 0.008 0.054*** -0.020 0.087* -0.094* 0.001 -0.007**(0.000) (0.005) (0.950) (0.373) (0.002) (0.260) (0.061) (0.053) (0.688) (0.044)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920 920 920 920
AIC -4278.15 -5858.61 -4176.63 -2954.85 -6097.26
BIC -3907.56 -5492.77 -3815.55 -2598.52 -5745.68
R2 0.22 0.57 0.10 0.13 0.18
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
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Table E3: Country Speciﬁcation, alternative ordering 3: gdp, technology, energy
price
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
ln(GHG Pol. String.) -0.166*** 0.039 -0.044** 0.015 0.045 -0.159*** -0.086 -0.188* - -0.019(0.004) (0.511) (0.012) (0.370) (0.352) (0.001) (0.444) (0.093) - (0.576)
ln(GDP) 0.027** 0.013 0.012*** 0.007* -0.015 0.010 - 0.020 - 0.003(0.014) (0.235) (0.004) (0.077) (0.160) (0.353) - (0.561) - (0.272)
ln(Technology) -0.019 0.033 -0.014 0.007 - 0.034 - -0.091 - 0.004(0.386) (0.133) (0.103) (0.390) - (0.312) - (0.102) - (0.373)
ln(Energy Price) 0.617*** -0.036 - 0.386*** - 0.050 - 0.069 - -0.008(0.000) (0.517) - (0.000) - (0.291) - (0.531) - (0.466)
ln(CO2) - -0.129*** - 0.008 - -0.060*** - 0.173*** - 0.003- (0.000) - (0.381) - (0.009) - (0.000) - (0.642)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.001(0.795) (0.787) (0.206) (0.531) (0.722) (0.592) (0.950) (0.453) (0.695) (0.788)
ln(CDD) -0.001 -0.003 0.003*** 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003** -0.001(0.856) (0.304) (0.004) (0.798) (0.106) (0.365) (0.228) (0.261) (0.014) (0.355)
ln(HDD) 0.088*** -0.062*** 0.001 0.008 0.054*** -0.020 0.087* -0.094* 0.001 -0.007**(0.000) (0.005) (0.950) (0.373) (0.002) (0.260) (0.061) (0.053) (0.688) (0.044)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920 920 920 920
AIC -4278.15 -5858.61 -4176.63 -2954.85 -6097.26
BIC -3907.56 -5492.77 -3815.55 -2598.52 -5745.68
R2 0.22 0.57 0.10 0.13 0.18
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
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Table E4: Country Speciﬁcation, alternative ordering 4: energy price, gdp, technol-
ogy
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
ln(GHG Pol. String.) -0.166*** 0.039 -0.044** 0.015 0.045 -0.159*** -0.086 -0.188* - -0.019(0.004) (0.511) (0.012) (0.370) (0.352) (0.001) (0.444) (0.093) - (0.576)
ln(Energy Price) 0.027** 0.013 0.012*** 0.007* -0.015 0.010 - 0.020 - 0.003(0.014) (0.235) (0.004) (0.077) (0.160) (0.353) - (0.561) - (0.272)
ln(GDP) -0.019 0.033 -0.014 0.007 - 0.034 - -0.091 - 0.004(0.386) (0.133) (0.103) (0.390) - (0.312) - (0.102) - (0.373)
ln(Technology) 0.617*** -0.036 - 0.386*** - 0.050 - 0.069 - -0.008(0.000) (0.517) - (0.000) - (0.291) - (0.531) - (0.466)
ln(CO2) - -0.129*** - 0.008 - -0.060*** - 0.173*** - 0.003- (0.000) - (0.381) - (0.009) - (0.000) - (0.642)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.001(0.795) (0.787) (0.206) (0.531) (0.722) (0.592) (0.950) (0.453) (0.695) (0.788)
ln(CDD) -0.001 -0.003 0.003*** 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003** -0.001(0.856) (0.304) (0.004) (0.798) (0.106) (0.365) (0.228) (0.261) (0.014) (0.355)
ln(HDD) 0.088*** -0.062*** 0.001 0.008 0.054*** -0.020 0.087* -0.094* 0.001 -0.007**(0.000) (0.005) (0.950) (0.373) (0.002) (0.260) (0.061) (0.053) (0.688) (0.044)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920 920 920 920
AIC -4278.15 -5858.61 -4176.63 -2954.85 -6097.26
BIC -3907.56 -5492.77 -3815.55 -2598.52 -5745.68
R2 0.22 0.57 0.10 0.13 0.18
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
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Table E5: Country Speciﬁcation, alternative ordering 5: gdp, energy price, technol-
ogy
Variable and Statistics CO2 GDP Energy Price Technology GHG Pol. String.L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
ln(GHG Pol. String.) -0.166*** 0.039 -0.044** 0.015 0.045 -0.159*** -0.086 -0.188* - -0.019(0.004) (0.511) (0.012) (0.370) (0.352) (0.001) (0.444) (0.093) - (0.576)
ln(GDP) 0.027** 0.013 0.012*** 0.007* -0.015 0.010 - 0.020 - 0.003(0.014) (0.235) (0.004) (0.077) (0.160) (0.353) - (0.561) - (0.272)
ln(Energy Price) -0.019 0.033 -0.014 0.007 - 0.034 - -0.091 - 0.004(0.386) (0.133) (0.103) (0.390) - (0.312) - (0.102) - (0.373)
ln(Technology) 0.617*** -0.036 - 0.386*** - 0.050 - 0.069 - -0.008(0.000) (0.517) - (0.000) - (0.291) - (0.531) - (0.466)
ln(CO2) - -0.129*** - 0.008 - -0.060*** - 0.173*** - 0.003- (0.000) - (0.381) - (0.009) - (0.000) - (0.642)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 0.003 0.006 0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.001 -0.013 0.001 -0.001(0.795) (0.787) (0.206) (0.531) (0.722) (0.592) (0.950) (0.453) (0.695) (0.788)
ln(CDD) -0.001 -0.003 0.003*** 0.000 -0.004 0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.003** -0.001(0.856) (0.304) (0.004) (0.798) (0.106) (0.365) (0.228) (0.261) (0.014) (0.355)
ln(HDD) 0.088*** -0.062*** 0.001 0.008 0.054*** -0.020 0.087* -0.094* 0.001 -0.007**(0.000) (0.005) (0.950) (0.373) (0.002) (0.260) (0.061) (0.053) (0.688) (0.044)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 920 920 920 920 920
AIC -4278.15 -5858.61 -4176.63 -2954.85 -6097.26
BIC -3907.56 -5492.77 -3815.55 -2598.52 -5745.68
R2 0.22 0.57 0.10 0.13 0.18
Column titles indicate the sub-equations. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01,
p-values in parenthesis
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Table E6: Country Speciﬁcation, forward lag
Dep. Var Indep. Var Time Lag Coeﬀ. P-Value Dep. Var Indep. Var Time Lag Coeﬀ. P-Value
CO2
GHG Pol. String.
-1 -0.092* (0.080)
GDP
GHG Pol. String.
-1 0.015 (0.377)
0 -0.170*** (0.004) 0 -0.044** (0.018)
1 0.068 (0.259) 1 0.020 (0.278)
Technology
0 0.018 (0.105)
Technology
0 0.011*** (0.007)
1 0.006 (0.563) 1 0.012*** (0.004)
2 0.007 (0.555) 2 0.008* (0.059)
Energy Price
0 -0.034 (0.124)
Energy Price
0 -0.006 (0.472)
1 0.048** (0.026) 1 0.008 (0.315)
2 -0.007 (0.757) 2 0.009 (0.278)
GDP
0 0.646*** (0.000) GDP 1 0.371*** (0.000)1 0.066 (0.353) 2 -0.026 (0.362)
2 0.001 (0.990) CO2 1 0.001 (0.922)
CO2 1 -0.167*** (0.000) 2 -0.011 (0.266)2 0.018 (0.579)
Corruption
0 -0.006 (0.353)
Corruption
0 -0.001 (0.242) 1 -0.005 (0.459)
1 -0.002 (0.114) 2 -0.005 (0.788)
2 0.006*** (0.007)
CDD
0 0.100** (0.035)
CDD
0 -0.004 (0.327) 1 -0.058 (0.258)
1 -0.005 (0.146) 2 0.011* (0.070)
2 -0.002* (0.061)
HDD
0 -0.012 (0.500)
HDD
0 0.000 (0.966) 1 0.379 (0.577)
1 -0.101 (0.269) 2 -0.007 (0.891)
2 0.002 (0.641) Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes R2 0.579
R2 0.266 Obs. 920
Obs. 920 Dep. Var Indep. Var Time Lag Coeﬀ. P-Value
Dep. Var Indep. Var Time Lag Coeﬀ. P-Value
Technology
GHG Pol. String.
-1 0.265*** (0.008)
Energy Price
GHG Pol. String.
-1 0.053 (0.245) 0 -0.103 (0.363)
0 0.047 (0.354) 1 -0.206* (0.086)
1 -0.155*** (0.002) Technology 1 0.006 (0.873)
Technology
0 -0.018 (0.102) 2 0.031 (0.364)
1 0.011 (0.332) Energy Price 1 -0.092 (0.106)2 0.008 (0.451) 2 -0.102* (0.072)
Energy Price 1 0.033 (0.355) GDP 1 -0.216 (0.169)2 -0.070* (0.051) 2 0.259** (0.042)
GDP 1 0.054 (0.432) CO2 1 0.215*** (0.000)2 0.077 (0.170) 2 -0.009 (0.841)
CO2 1 -0.058** (0.022) Corruption
0 0.004*** (0.002)
2 0.007 (0.784) 1 0.000 (0.922)
Corruption
0 -0.004 (0.181) 2 -0.002 (0.724)
1 0.005* (0.061)
CDD
0 -0.001 (0.947)
2 0.012 (0.296) 1 0.011 (0.239)
CDD
0 0.053** (0.004) 2 0.000 (0.826)
1 -0.017 (0.392)
HDD
0 0.001 (0.847)
2 0.007** (0.015) 1 -0.456*** (0.000)
HDD
0 0.004 (0.730) 2 -0.002 (0.842)
1 0.201 (0.474) Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
2 0.019 (0.329) R2 0.144
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Obs. 920
R2 0.113
Obs. 920
Dep. Var Indep. Var Time Lag Coeﬀ. P-Value
GHG. Pol. String.
GHG Pol. String. -1 0.007 (0.839)0 -0.042 (0.191)
Technology -1 -0.002 (0.578)0 -0.001 (0.806)
Energy Price -1 0.006 (0.111)0 -0.006 (0.110)
GDP -1 0.012 (0.389)0 -0.015 (0.203)
CO2 -1 -0.007 (0.270)0 0.013** (0.032)
Corruption
-1 -0.002 (0.438)
0 -0.008*** (0.008)
1 0.030*** (0.003)
CDD
-1 0.073*** (0.001)
0 -0.062*** (0.008)
1 -0.003 (0.338)
HDD
-1 -0.002 (0.825)
0 0.136 (0.595)
1 -0.044* (0.058)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
R2 0.155
Obs. 920
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E7: Sector Speciﬁcation, 2 groups
Variable and Statistics
CO2 GDP
Clean Dirty Clean Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.226*** 0.077** -0.138*** -0.063* -0.029* 0.049*** -0.044** 0.017(0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.069) (0.092) (0.006) (0.039) (0.463)
ln(Technology) -0.007 0.010* 0.001 0.003 0.005* -0.000 0.001 -0.009**(0.174) (0.063) (0.764) (0.535) (0.086) (0.934) (0.781) (0.015)
ln(Energy prices) -0.058*** -0.057*** -0.083*** -0.054*** -0.041*** -0.000 -0.015* -0.002(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.987) (0.066) (0.801)
ln(GDP) 0.102*** 0.046*** 0.067*** 0.030*** - 0.109*** - 0.065***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.083*** - -0.068*** - 0.007** - 0.013***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.012) - (0.002)
ln(Corruption) -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.019*** -0.018*** 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.257) (0.205) (0.257) (0.205)
ln(CDD) 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.006*** -0.004*** 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001(0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.004) (0.190) (0.134) (0.190) (0.134)
ln(HDD) 0.010 -0.008 0.010 -0.008 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004(0.257) (0.349) (0.257) (0.349) (0.454) (0.444) (0.454) (0.444)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 16660 16660
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.03
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price Technology
Clean Dirty Clean Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.058*** -0.057*** 0.036*** -0.059*** 0.234*** -0.274*** 0.234*** -0.271***(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Technology) 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.002 0.005* - 0.035*** - 0.035***(0.000) (0.000) (0.485) (0.055) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.056*** - 0.058*** - -0.031*** - -0.031***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - 0.002 - 0.004* - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.578) - (0.059) - (0.705) - (0.904)
ln(CO2) - -0.002 - -0.004* - 0.000 - 0.000- (0.384) - (0.094) - (0.646) - (0.934)
ln(Corruption) -0.001 0.026*** -0.001 0.026*** -0.040*** 0.013*** -0.040*** 0.013***(0.654) (0.000) (0.654) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** 0.015*** 0.025*** 0.015*** 0.025***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.071*** 0.009* 0.071*** 0.009* -0.043*** -0.046*** -0.043*** -0.046***(0.000) (0.066) (0.000) (0.066) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 16660 16660
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.04
Variable and Statistics
GHG Pol. String.
Clean Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.079*** - -0.049***- (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Technology) - -0.002*** - -0.002***- (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.009*** - 0.009***- (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.990) - (0.819)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - 0.000- (0.702) - (0.856)
ln(Corruption) 0.002*** -0.001*** 0.002*** -0.001***(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.009)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001***(0.000) (0.009) (0.000) (0.009)
ln(HDD) 0.004*** -0.001*** 0.004*** -0.001***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16660
Pseudo R2 0.25
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E8: Sector Speciﬁcation, 3 groups
Variable and Statistics
CO2 GDP
Clean Middle Dirty Clean Middle Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.250*** 0.017 -0.155*** -0.002 -0.131*** -0.028 -0.045** 0.053*** 0.005 0.010 -0.095*** 0.013(0.000) (0.688) (0.001) (0.964) (0.001) (0.487) (0.018) (0.007) (0.823) (0.679) (0.002) (0.669)
ln(Technology) -0.008 0.010 0.004 0.011* -0.004 0.000 0.004 0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.008 -0.012**(0.273) (0.148) (0.509) (0.087) (0.411) (0.931) (0.242) (0.433) (0.633) (0.539) (0.125) (0.011)
ln(Energy prices) -0.127*** -0.147*** -0.129*** -0.134*** -0.050*** -0.087*** -0.051*** -0.006 -0.047*** -0.005 0.044*** -0.026*(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.470) (0.000) (0.652) (0.001) (0.069)
ln(GDP) 0.100*** 0.047*** 0.106*** 0.034*** 0.052*** 0.031*** - 0.137*** - 0.083*** - 0.033**(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.025)
ln(CO2) - -0.088*** - -0.091*** - -0.057*** - 0.006** - 0.009** - 0.032***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.045) - (0.023) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) -0.015*** -0.026*** -0.015*** -0.026*** -0.015*** -0.026*** 0.005* 0.000 0.005* 0.000 0.005* 0.000(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.097) (0.968) (0.097) (0.968) (0.097) (0.968)
ln(CDD) 0.004*** -0.005*** 0.004*** -0.005*** 0.004*** -0.005*** 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.002* 0.001 0.002*(0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.169) (0.063) (0.169) (0.063) (0.169) (0.063)
ln(HDD) -0.023** -0.042*** -0.023** -0.042*** -0.023** -0.042*** -0.010* 0.001 -0.010* 0.001 -0.010* 0.001(0.029) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.029) (0.000) (0.078) (0.871) (0.078) (0.871) (0.078) (0.871)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 16660 16660
Pseudo R2 0.10 0.05
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price Technology
Clean Middle Dirty Clean Middle Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.035** -0.060*** 0.034** -0.058*** 0.038** -0.051*** 0.138*** 0.160*** 0.138*** 0.160*** 0.138*** 0.160***(0.023) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.012) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Technology) 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.008*** 0.009*** 0.007** 0.011*** - -0.111*** - -0.111*** - -0.111***(0.006) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.012) (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.056*** - 0.056*** - 0.053*** - 0.144*** - 0.144*** - 0.144***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - 0.000 - 0.007 - 0.004* - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.938) - (0.166) - (0.084) - (0.912) - (0.874) - (0.917)
ln(CO2) - -0.003 - 0.001 - -0.005 - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000- (0.118) - (0.775) - (0.209) - (0.973) - (0.956) - (0.954)
ln(Corruption) -0.003 0.027*** -0.003 0.027*** -0.003 0.027*** -0.059*** 0.025*** -0.059*** 0.025*** -0.059*** 0.025***(0.139) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.139) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.009*** 0.014*** 0.009***(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.065*** 0.012** 0.065*** 0.012** 0.065*** 0.012** -0.125*** 0.128*** -0.125*** 0.128*** -0.125*** 0.128***(0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.011) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes Yes/Yes
Obs. 16660 16660
Pseudo R2 0.17 0.08
Variable and Statistics
GHG Pol. String.
Clean Middle Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.060*** - -0.060*** - -0.060***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Technology) - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.011*** - 0.011*** - 0.011***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.827) - (0.948) - (0.857)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.724) - (0.895) - (0.976)
ln(Corruption) -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.010*** -0.014***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002*** -0.002***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.010*** -0.016*** -0.010***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16660
Pseudo R2 0.22
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E9: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 1: technology, gdp, energy price
(continued on next page)
Variable and Statistics
CO2
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.271*** 0.023 -0.197*** 0.030 -0.082* 0.017 -0.176*** -0.017(0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.543) (0.088) (0.736) (0.000) (0.722)
ln(Technology) 0.001 0.008 0.011* 0.014** 0.010* -0.002 0.004 -0.005(0.842) (0.271) (0.079) (0.023) (0.090) (0.703) (0.419) (0.366)
ln(GDP) 0.102*** 0.036** 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.042***(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Energy price) -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.012(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.600) (0.503)
ln(CO2) - -0.079*** - -0.097*** - -0.080*** - -0.051***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.003)
ln(Corruption) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017***(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(CDD) 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(HDD) 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
GDP
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.045** 0.033 -0.013 0.042* 0.034* -0.061*** -0.102*** -0.020(0.035) (0.131) (0.598) (0.093) (0.064) (0.001) (0.005) (0.596)
ln(Technology) 0.003 0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.007** 0.025*** 0.009 -0.003(0.402) (0.389) (0.380) (0.436) (0.027) (0.000) (0.131) (0.590)
ln(GDP) - 0.148*** - 0.069*** -0.002 0.010** - 0.029*- (0.000) - (0.000) (0.710) (0.036) - (0.081)
ln(Energy price) - 0.002 - -0.008 - 0.056*** - -0.013- (0.829) - (0.413) - (0.000) - (0.399)
ln(CO2) - 0.003 - 0.008** - -0.001 - 0.037***- (0.347) - (0.040) - (0.787) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003(0.451) (0.290) (0.451) (0.290) (0.451) (0.290) (0.451) (0.290)
ln(CDD) 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001(0.091) (0.268) (0.091) (0.268) (0.091) (0.268) (0.091) (0.268)
ln(HDD) -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003(0.147) (0.501) (0.147) (0.501) (0.147) (0.501) (0.147) (0.501)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.04
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.034* -0.063*** 0.035** -0.061*** -0.038 0.038 0.040** -0.052***(0.059) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (0.221) (0.241) (0.024) (0.005)
ln(Technology) 0.007** 0.024*** 0.007** 0.024*** 0.001 -0.004 0.007** 0.025***(0.024) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.800) (0.397) (0.027) (0.000)
ln(GDP) -0.006 0.002 0.001 0.003 - 0.093*** 0.002 0.003(0.315) (0.750) (0.859) (0.682) - (0.000) (0.404) (0.131)
ln(Energy price) - 0.057*** - 0.057*** - -0.011 - 0.055***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.346) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.004* - 0.001 - 0.012** - -0.004- (0.096) - (0.832) - (0.021) - (0.331)
ln(Corruption) -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027***(0.281) (0.000) (0.281) (0.000) (0.281) (0.000) (0.281) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006***(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008(0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.108)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.17
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E9: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 1: technology, gdp, energy price
(continued)
Variable and Statistics
Technology
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.126*** 0.047 0.163*** 0.012 0.159*** 0.033 0.126*** 0.043(0.009) (0.372) (0.000) (0.815) (0.001) (0.522) (0.005) (0.384)
ln(Technology) - -0.082*** - -0.086*** - -0.086*** - -0.090***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - -0.026** - -0.060*** - -0.032** - -0.003- (0.030) - (0.000) - (0.012) - (0.657)
ln(Energy price) - -0.016 - -0.013 - -0.018 - -0.012- (0.220) - (0.283) - (0.174) - (0.329)
ln(CO2) - 0.010* - -0.004 - -0.022*** - 0.006- (0.093) - (0.517) - (0.006) - (0.329)
ln(Corruption) -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) -0.035*** 0.030*** -0.035*** 0.030*** -0.035*** 0.030*** -0.035*** 0.030***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.08
Variable and Statistics
GHG Policy Stringency
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.060*** - -0.060*** - -0.058*** - -0.042***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.007)
ln(Technology) - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - 0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.956) - (0.968) - (0.746) - (0.938)
ln(Energy price) - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000- (0.787) - (0.793) - (0.730) - (0.995)
ln(Corruption) 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.412) (0.000) (0.412) (0.000) (0.412) (0.000) (0.412)
ln(HDD) 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001*(0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.25
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E10: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 2: energy price, technology, gdp
(continued on next page)
Variable and Statistics
CO2
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.271*** 0.023 -0.197*** 0.030 -0.082* 0.017 -0.176*** -0.017(0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.543) (0.088) (0.736) (0.000) (0.722)
ln(Energy price) -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.012(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.600) (0.503)
ln(Technology) 0.001 0.008 0.011* 0.014** 0.010* -0.002 0.004 -0.005(0.842) (0.271) (0.079) (0.023) (0.090) (0.703) (0.419) (0.366)
ln(GDP) 0.102*** 0.036** 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.042***(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.079*** - -0.097*** - -0.080*** - -0.051***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.003)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
ln(CDD) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(HDD) -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004 -0.003 0.004(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
GDP
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.043** 0.036* -0.010 0.044* -0.035 0.038 -0.099*** -0.025(0.041) (0.094) (0.682) (0.082) (0.262) (0.249) (0.007) (0.504)
ln(Energy price) -0.041*** -0.000 -0.037*** -0.009 -0.022** -0.011 0.030** -0.013(0.000) (0.955) (0.000) (0.371) (0.038) (0.330) (0.028) (0.393)
ln(Technology) 0.004 0.004 0.005 -0.001 0.002 -0.003 0.007 -0.005(0.186) (0.175) (0.172) (0.764) (0.626) (0.512) (0.226) (0.443)
ln(GDP) - 0.149*** - 0.071*** - 0.094*** - 0.028- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.103)
ln(CO2) - 0.003 - 0.008** - 0.013** - 0.036***- (0.333) - (0.023) - (0.020) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003(0.451) (0.290) (0.451) (0.290) (0.451) (0.290) (0.451) (0.290)
ln(CDD) 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001(0.091) (0.268) (0.091) (0.268) (0.091) (0.268) (0.091) (0.268)
ln(HDD) -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003(0.147) (0.501) (0.147) (0.501) (0.147) (0.501) (0.147) (0.501)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.04
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.038** -0.067*** 0.037** -0.065*** -0.038 0.038 0.043** -0.054***(0.040) (0.000) (0.045) (0.001) (0.221) (0.241) (0.017) (0.003)
ln(Energy price) - 0.059*** - 0.058*** 0.001 -0.004 - 0.057***- (0.000) - (0.000) (0.800) (0.397) - (0.000)
ln(Technology) - 0.021*** - 0.021*** - 0.093*** - 0.022***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - 0.002 - 0.011** - -0.011 - 0.003- (0.726) - (0.025) - (0.346) - (0.168)
ln(CO2) - -0.004* - -0.001 - 0.012** - -0.005- (0.085) - (0.775) - (0.021) - (0.298)
ln(Corruption) -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027***(0.359) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006***(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007(0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.129)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.17
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E10: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 2: energy price, technology, gdp
(continued)
Variable and Statistics
Technology
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.133*** 0.223*** 0.133*** 0.223*** 0.133*** 0.223*** 0.133*** 0.223***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Energy price) 0.085*** 0.002 0.085*** 0.002 0.085*** 0.002 0.085*** 0.002(0.000) (0.842) (0.000) (0.842) (0.000) (0.842) (0.000) (0.842)
ln(Technology) - -0.125*** - -0.125*** - -0.125*** - -0.125***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.914) - (0.832) - (0.854) - (0.925)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000- (0.983) - (0.916) - (0.864) - (0.956)
ln(Corruption) -0.030*** 0.029*** -0.030*** 0.029*** -0.030*** 0.029*** -0.030*** 0.029***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.011*** 0.025*** 0.011***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) -0.085*** 0.069*** -0.085*** 0.069*** -0.085*** 0.069*** -0.085*** 0.069***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.10
Variable and Statistics
GHG Policy Stringency
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.060*** - -0.060*** - -0.058*** - -0.042***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.007)
ln(Energy price) - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Technology) - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - 0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.956) - (0.968) - (0.746) - (0.938)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000- (0.787) - (0.793) - (0.730) - (0.995)
ln(Corruption) 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.413) (0.000) (0.413) (0.000) (0.413) (0.000) (0.413)
ln(HDD) 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001*(0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.25
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E11: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 3: gdp, technology, energy price
(continued on next page)
Variable and Statistics
CO2
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.271*** 0.023 -0.197*** 0.030 -0.082* 0.017 -0.176*** -0.017(0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.543) (0.088) (0.736) (0.000) (0.722)
ln(GDP) 0.102*** 0.036** 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.042***(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Technology) 0.001 0.008 0.011* 0.014** 0.010* -0.002 0.004 -0.005(0.842) (0.271) (0.079) (0.023) (0.090) (0.703) (0.419) (0.366)
ln(Energy price) -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.012(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.600) (0.503)
ln(CO2) - -0.079*** - -0.097*** - -0.080*** - -0.051***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.003)
ln(Corruption) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017***(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(CDD) 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(HDD) 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
GDP
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.044** 0.033 -0.012 0.041 -0.038 0.038 -0.100*** -0.015(0.038) (0.132) (0.619) (0.106) (0.222) (0.248) (0.005) (0.677)
ln(GDP) - 0.148*** - 0.069*** - 0.093*** - 0.030*- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.076)
ln(Technology) - 0.002 - -0.004 - -0.004 - -0.006- (0.564) - (0.293) - (0.321) - (0.289)
ln(Energy price) - 0.001 - -0.008 - -0.011 - -0.015- (0.895) - (0.385) - (0.336) - (0.326)
ln(CO2) - 0.003 - 0.008** - 0.012** - 0.036***- (0.337) - (0.038) - (0.020) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002(0.483) (0.294) (0.483) (0.294) (0.483) (0.294) (0.483) (0.294)
ln(CDD) 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001(0.098) (0.245) (0.098) (0.245) (0.098) (0.245) (0.098) (0.245)
ln(HDD) -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003(0.132) (0.497) (0.132) (0.497) (0.132) (0.497) (0.132) (0.497)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.04
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.034* -0.063*** 0.035** -0.061*** 0.034* -0.061*** 0.040** -0.052***(0.059) (0.001) (0.042) (0.001) (0.064) (0.001) (0.024) (0.005)
ln(GDP) -0.006 0.002 0.001 0.003 -0.002 0.010** 0.002 0.003(0.315) (0.750) (0.859) (0.682) (0.710) (0.036) (0.404) (0.131)
ln(Technology) 0.007** 0.024*** 0.007** 0.024*** 0.007** 0.025*** 0.007** 0.025***(0.024) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000) (0.027) (0.000)
ln(Energy price) - 0.057*** - 0.057*** - 0.056*** - 0.055***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.004* - 0.001 - -0.001 - -0.004- (0.096) - (0.832) - (0.787) - (0.331)
ln(Corruption) -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027***(0.281) (0.000) (0.281) (0.000) (0.281) (0.000) (0.281) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006***(0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008 0.071*** 0.008(0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.108) (0.000) (0.108)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.17
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E11: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 3: gdp, technology, energy price
(continued)
Variable and Statistics
Technology
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.122** 0.056 0.158*** 0.022 0.160*** 0.037 0.128*** 0.038(0.011) (0.291) (0.000) (0.656) (0.001) (0.476) (0.005) (0.441)
ln(GDP) -0.024** -0.026** -0.024** -0.063*** -0.013 -0.033*** -0.002 -0.003(0.032) (0.030) (0.036) (0.000) (0.276) (0.009) (0.806) (0.659)
ln(Technology) - -0.080*** - -0.086*** - -0.084*** - -0.088***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy price) - -0.016 - -0.012 - -0.019 - -0.013- (0.205) - (0.327) - (0.157) - (0.293)
ln(CO2) - 0.010* - -0.005 - -0.022*** - 0.006- (0.096) - (0.432) - (0.006) - (0.326)
ln(Corruption) -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012*** -0.017*** 0.012***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) -0.034*** 0.029*** -0.034*** 0.029*** -0.034*** 0.029*** -0.034*** 0.029***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.08
Variable and Statistics
GHG Policy Stringency
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.060*** - -0.060*** - -0.058*** - -0.042***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.007)
ln(GDP) - 0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.956) - (0.968) - (0.746) - (0.938)
ln(Technology) - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Energy price) - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000- (0.787) - (0.793) - (0.730) - (0.995)
ln(Corruption) 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272) (0.000) (0.272)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.410) (0.000) (0.410) (0.000) (0.410) (0.000) (0.410)
ln(HDD) 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001*(0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052) (0.000) (0.052)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.25
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E12: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 4: energy price, gdp, technology
(continued on next page)
Variable and Statistics
CO2
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.271*** 0.023 -0.197*** 0.030 -0.082* 0.017 -0.176*** -0.017(0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.543) (0.088) (0.736) (0.000) (0.722)
ln(Energy prices) -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.012(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.600) (0.503)
ln(GDP) 0.102*** 0.036** 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.042***(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Technology) 0.001 0.008 0.011* 0.014** 0.010* -0.002 0.004 -0.005(0.842) (0.271) (0.079) (0.023) (0.090) (0.703) (0.419) (0.366)
ln(CO2) - -0.079*** - -0.097*** - -0.080*** - -0.051***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.003)
ln(Corruption) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017***(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(CDD) 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(HDD) 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
GDP
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.042** 0.036* -0.009 0.041* -0.034 0.036 -0.097*** -0.022(0.047) (0.097) (0.719) (0.099) (0.267) (0.265) (0.008) (0.559)
ln(Energy prices) -0.040*** -0.002 -0.036*** -0.009 -0.021** -0.012 0.032** -0.015(0.000) (0.841) (0.000) (0.332) (0.048) (0.310) (0.016) (0.330)
ln(GDP) - 0.149*** - 0.072*** - 0.094*** - 0.028*- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.099)
ln(Technology) - 0.003 - -0.003 - -0.004 - -0.007- (0.370) - (0.475) - (0.378) - (0.230)
ln(CO2) - 0.004 - 0.009** - 0.013** - 0.035***- (0.312) - (0.022) - (0.018) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.002 0.003(0.397) (0.184) (0.397) (0.184) (0.397) (0.184) (0.397) (0.184)
ln(CDD) 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001(0.165) (0.133) (0.165) (0.133) (0.165) (0.133) (0.165) (0.133)
ln(HDD) -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004 -0.004 0.004(0.452) (0.390) (0.452) (0.390) (0.452) (0.390) (0.452) (0.390)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.04
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.038** -0.067*** 0.038** -0.065*** 0.037** -0.065*** 0.043** -0.054***(0.040) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.045) (0.001) (0.017) (0.003)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.059*** - 0.058*** - 0.058*** - 0.057***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - 0.002 - 0.002 - 0.011** - 0.003- (0.726) - (0.727) - (0.025) - (0.168)
ln(Technology) - 0.021*** - 0.021*** - 0.021*** - 0.022***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.004* - 0.001 - -0.001 - -0.005- (0.085) - (0.795) - (0.775) - (0.298)
ln(Corruption) -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027***(0.359) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000) (0.359) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006***(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007(0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.129) (0.000) (0.129)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.17
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E12: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 4: energy price, gdp, technology
(continued)
Variable and Statistics
Technology
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.117** 0.075 0.155*** 0.042 0.157*** 0.059 0.121*** 0.060(0.014) (0.151) (0.001) (0.397) (0.001) (0.243) (0.007) (0.216)
ln(Energy prices) 0.024* -0.022 0.029** -0.020 0.027** -0.025* 0.021* -0.017(0.060) (0.110) (0.019) (0.140) (0.036) (0.073) (0.089) (0.207)
ln(GDP) -0.020* -0.027** -0.022* -0.064*** -0.011 -0.035*** -0.002 -0.004(0.067) (0.023) (0.057) (0.000) (0.342) (0.005) (0.802) (0.545)
ln(Technology) - -0.086*** - -0.092*** - -0.090*** - -0.094***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - 0.009 - -0.006 - -0.023*** - 0.005- (0.121) - (0.344) - (0.004) - (0.354)
ln(Corruption) -0.022*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.015***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) -0.044*** 0.035*** -0.044*** 0.035*** -0.044*** 0.035*** -0.044*** 0.035***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
GHG Policy Stringency
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.060*** - -0.060*** - -0.058*** - -0.042***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.007)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(GDP) - 0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000- (0.956) - (0.968) - (0.746) - (0.938)
ln(Technology) - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0.000- (0.787) - (0.793) - (0.730) - (0.995)
ln(Corruption) 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.273) (0.000) (0.273) (0.000) (0.273) (0.000) (0.273)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.414) (0.000) (0.414) (0.000) (0.414) (0.000) (0.414)
ln(HDD) 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001*(0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.058)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.25
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E13: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 5: gdp, energy price, technology
(continued on next page)
Variable and Statistics
CO2
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.271*** 0.023 -0.197*** 0.030 -0.082* 0.017 -0.176*** -0.017(0.000) (0.653) (0.000) (0.543) (0.088) (0.736) (0.000) (0.722)
ln(GDP) 0.102*** 0.036** 0.110*** 0.068*** 0.079*** 0.002 0.064*** 0.042***(0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.810) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(Energy prices) -0.111*** -0.059*** -0.073*** -0.057*** -0.087*** -0.063*** -0.009 -0.012(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.600) (0.503)
ln(Technology) 0.001 0.008 0.011* 0.014** 0.010* -0.002 0.004 -0.005(0.842) (0.271) (0.079) (0.023) (0.090) (0.703) (0.419) (0.366)
ln(CO2) - -0.079*** - -0.097*** - -0.080*** - -0.051***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.003)
ln(Corruption) -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017*** -0.019*** -0.017***(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
ln(CDD) 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005*** 0.006*** -0.005***(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ln(HDD) 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008 0.011 -0.008(0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
GDP
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. -0.044** 0.033 -0.012 0.041 -0.038 0.038 -0.1*** -0.015(0.038) (0.132) (0.619) (0.106) (0.222) (0.248) (0.005) (0.677)
ln(GDP) - 0.148*** - 0.069*** - 0.093*** - 0.03*- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.076)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.001 - -0.008 - -0.011 - -0.015- (0.895) - (0.385) - (0.336) - (0.326)
ln(Technology) - 0.002 - -0.004 - -0.004 - -0.006- (0.564) - (0.293) - (0.321) - (0.289)
ln(CO2) - 0.003 - 0.008** - 0.012** - 0.036***- (0.337) - (0.038) - (0.020) - (0.000)
ln(Corruption) 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002(0.483) (0.294) (0.483) (0.294) (0.483) (0.294) (0.483) (0.294)
ln(CDD) 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001 0.001* 0.001(0.098) (0.245) (0.098) (0.245) (0.098) (0.245) (0.098) (0.245)
ln(HDD) -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003 -0.007 0.003(0.132) (0.497) (0.132) (0.497) (0.132) (0.497) (0.132) (0.497)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.04
Variable and Statistics
Energy Price
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.037** -0.067*** 0.038** -0.065*** 0.037** -0.065*** 0.043** -0.055***(0.042) (0.000) (0.028) (0.000) (0.045) (0.001) (0.016) (0.003)
ln(GDP) -0.006 0.002 0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.010** 0.002 0.004(0.304) (0.770) (0.868) (0.736) (0.701) (0.034) (0.413) (0.120)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.059*** - 0.059*** - 0.058*** - 0.057***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Technology) - 0.021*** - 0.021*** - 0.021*** - 0.022***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.004* - 0.001 - -0.001 - -0.005- (0.090) - (0.794) - (0.793) - (0.299)
ln(Corruption) -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027*** -0.002 0.027***(0.366) (0.000) (0.366) (0.000) (0.366) (0.000) (0.366) (0.000)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006*** -0.002*** 0.006***(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
ln(HDD) 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007 0.073*** 0.007(0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.127) (0.000) (0.127)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.17
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
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Table E13: Sector Speciﬁcation alternative ordering 5: gdp, energy price, technology
(continued)
Variable and Statistics
Technology
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. 0.117** 0.075 0.155*** 0.042 0.157*** 0.059 0.121*** 0.06(0.014) (0.151) (0.001) (0.397) (0.001) (0.243) (0.007) (0.216)
ln(GDP) -0.020* -0.027** -0.022* -0.064*** -0.011 -0.035*** -0.002 -0.004(0.067) (0.023) (0.057) (0.000) (0.342) (0.005) (0.802) (0.545)
ln(Energy prices) 0.024* -0.022 0.029** -0.020 0.027** -0.025* 0.021* -0.017(0.060) (0.110) (0.019) (0.140) (0.036) (0.073) (0.089) (0.207)
ln(Technology) - -0.086*** - -0.092*** - -0.090*** - -0.094***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - 0.009 - -0.006 - -0.023*** - 0.005- (0.121) - (0.344) - (0.004) - (0.354)
ln(Corruption) -0.022*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.015*** -0.022*** 0.015***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(CDD) 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.015***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ln(HDD) -0.044*** 0.035*** -0.044*** 0.035*** -0.044*** 0.035*** -0.044*** 0.035***(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.09
Variable and Statistics
GHG Policy Stringency
Very Clean Clean Dirty Very Dirty
L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1 L0 L1
GHG Pol. String. - -0.060*** - -0.060*** - -0.058*** - -0.042***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.007)
ln(GDP) - 0.000 - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0- (0.956) - (0.968) - (0.746) - (0.938)
ln(Energy prices) - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.010*** - 0.01***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(Technology) - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004*** - -0.004***- (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000) - (0.000)
ln(CO2) - -0.000 - -0.000 - 0.000 - 0- (0.787) - (0.793) - (0.730) - (0.995)
ln(Corruption) 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000 0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.273) (0.000) (0.273) (0.000) (0.273) (0.000) (0.273)
ln(CDD) -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000(0.000) (0.411) (0.000) (0.411) (0.000) (0.411) (0.000) (0.411)
ln(HDD) 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001* 0.003*** -0.001*(0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.058) (0.000) (0.058)
Time FE/Country FE Yes/Yes
Obs. 16,660
Pseudo R2 0.25
Column titles indicate the sector groups. L0: contemporaneous eﬀect, L1: eﬀect from one time lag. * p<0.1, ** p<0.05,
*** p<0.01, p-values in parenthesis
General Conclusion
1 Main Findings
This thesis investigates empirically three important aspects in the context of
combating climate change: regulatory responsibility, the measurement of ob-
served environmental policy stringency as well as the impact of the latter on
anthropogenic CO2 emissions. Although distinct, all three aspects are inher-
ently interrelated, and a proper understanding is crucial in order to eﬀectively
combat climate change. Three main ﬁndings can be identiﬁed.
First, while the descriptive analyses in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2 clearly in-
dicates the existence of a historical responsibility of the West, a convergence in
terms of per capita CO2 emissions of diﬀerent countries can be observed over
the last decades. This ﬁnding is conﬁrmed by the observed decrease of the con-
tribution of between country spatial emission inequality to overall inequality.
The latter holds for both major greenhouse gases, CO2 and CH4. At the same
time the contribution of speciﬁc zones within countries as well as speciﬁc sectors
to overall inequality increases fast. Those results suggest that while the regula-
tory responsibility of countries is converging (i.e. the responsibility in terms of
applied regulations), the one of speciﬁc sectors and zones is rapidly increasing.
Those results could profoundly reshape the structure of future negotiations on
global climate change mitigation strategies (cf. Section (2) of this general con-
clusion).
Second, Chapter 3 emphasizes the importance of an appropriate method-
ological framework allowing to quantify concepts like environmental policy strin-
gency. Being able to clearly distinguish which aspect of environmental policy
one attempts to measure, i.e. the input, process or output dimension, allows to
measure the concept in question more precisely. It is unclear, why this general
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structure, advocated by many in the index construction literature (e.g. Nardo
et al. (2008)), has been ignored so far. This is especially surprising, as many
variables frequently used in empirical Economics - including the ones we use to
quantify “production” - are based upon the same trinity.
Third, the empirical country-level analysis in Chapter 4 shows that, while an
increase in GHG policy stringency does reduce anthropogenic CO2 emissions, it
does so at a relatively high cost in terms of GDP. This policy induced CO2 emis-
sion reduction found at the country level, is composed of two distinct eﬀects on
the sectoral level with potentially opposing consequences for the global climate
system. On the one hand, the CO2 eﬃciency of all sector groups, independently
of their relative dirtiness, improves. On the other hand, the sectoral composition
of economies, in terms of relatively dirty and relatively clean sectors, is altered.
The size of the dirtiest 25% of sectors is being reduced, while we observe no
signiﬁcant impact on size of the cleaner sectors. The latter results could well be
bad news for the global climate system, especially if this reduction is achieved
by “‘pollution outsourcing”, i.e. outsourcing of relatively dirty production to
relatively unregulated countries.
2 Policy Implications
Two general policy implications can be identiﬁed in light of the results of this
thesis. The ﬁrst one concerns the general architecture of the global climate
change policy system. Negotiations which led to the Kyoto protocol framework
and the current negotiations for a post-Kyoto policy architecture have been -
and still are - shaped, by the implications of the historical responsibility of the
West (e.g. Barrett and Stavins (2003) or Mattoo and Subramanian (2012))
and by the fact that countries or group of countries are the main negotiating
units. The outcome of those negotiations was an agreement which is based on
country-wide GHG emission reductions, while excluding several sectors, some
developed countries, and all developing countries from the agreement. Numer-
ous voices advocate the inclusion of those omitted parts in a future agreement.
Others, like Barrett (2008), propose however a diﬀerent approach, and suggest
to split the problem up, and rely on global sector and gas speciﬁc agreements.
Barrett motivates his proposal by a theoretical argument, stating that bundling
all gases, sectors and countries together may risk to compromise enforcement,
as the latter will depend on the weakest links within the broad global system.
This thesis contains several results on regulatory responsibility and on actual
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eﬀects of current policies, which provide an additional - empirical - motivation
to support this alternative proposal. First, as per capita CO2 emissions are con-
verging, and between country CO2 and CH4 emission inequalities are declining,
regulatory responsibilities of countries are converging as well. Simultaneously,
the sharp increase in between sector emission inequalities suggests that the reg-
ulatory responsibility of some sectors is increasing fast. Moreover, while one
can observe this general increase for both major GHGs, the responsible sectors
diﬀer depending on the speciﬁc gas. Thus, a global gas and sector speciﬁc treaty
would be well suited to take those evolutions into account. Additionally, such
agreements could mitigate the fears of pollution outsourcing, as for a given sec-
tor, identical requirements would apply, no matter the country.
The second general policy implication concerns instruments of environmental
policy. Most ex-ante estimations of greenhouse gas emission reductions assume
a cost-eﬀective implementation of GHG policies, and suggest that is is possible
to achieve the emission reduction goals with relatively moderate costs (e.g.,
Stern et al. (2006), Barker et al. (2007), Clarke et al. (2009) or Tavoni and Tol
(2010)). But as Leahy and Tol (2012) state, there is no reason to assume that
actual policies are least cost solutions and thus that costs will be moderate. And
indeed, we ﬁnd rather high opportunity costs of policy induced CO2 emission
reductions. One has however to keep in mind, that our results are based on
data covering the recent past, and thus do not include potential future learning
eﬀects nor future economies of scope and scale in green technologies, which might
considerably lower these opportunity costs over the next decades. Nevertheless,
given our results, a stronger focus on least-cost policy solutions, like a CO2 tax,
could be an eﬀective way to lower costs and thereby foster the willingness of
diﬀerent countries to increase the stringency of their GHG policy regimes.
3 General limitations and further research
The four analyses clearly have multiple drawbacks. Besides the various speciﬁc
limitations mentioned in each Chapter, three general limitations of this thesis
can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst and probably most important limitation concerns
the analysis conducted in Chapter 1 and 2. While it is true that the production
based accounting approach determines the responsibility in terms of the applied
regulation, as most policies regulate emissions at their production source, the
responsibility analysis is far from complete. This because an increasing part
of total anthropogenic emissions is released during the production of products
which are consumed elsewhere (e.g. IPCC (2014b)). Therefore actual responsi-
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bility is being gradually decoupled from the regulatory responsibility which has
been analyzed in this thesis. In line with the extensive literature on CO2 and
SO2 emissions embodied in trade (e.g. Grether et al. (2012a) or Sato (2014)),
further research on consumption-based accounting has thus to be conducted.
The latter would also be useful in order to determine who would have to pay
for the advocated global gas and sector speciﬁc policy regime. Financial trans-
fers from countries with an elevated per capita emission consumption to those
with a rather low per capita emission consumption could be a fair solution to
implement the regime based on actual responsibility.
The second general limitation concerns the implementation of the proposed
methodological framework for measuring environmental policy stringency. Clearly,
the proposed indexes are only a very rough representation of actual stringency.
Besides reﬁning the input index by, for instance, weighing policy instruments
diﬀerently, further research should focus on the construction of a decent pro-
cess indicator, which is urgently needed. This need is for instance illustrated in
Chapter 4, where we had to use a crude proxy for implementation stringency,
which is clearly not an ideal solution.
Finally, while the rather broad macro perspective of the empirical analy-
sis in Chapter 4 allows to gain a general overview of the eﬀects of GHG policy
stringency on CO2 emissions, it is at the same time also an important weakness.
The estimates of policy induced emission reductions and associated opportunity
costs in terms of GDP have to be taken carefully. This, because they represent
only an average reaction of anthropogenic CO2 emissions and GDP to a change
in average GHG policy stringency, and do thus not allow to take a more dif-
ferentiated perspective. Moreover, while we can show that a policy induced
composition eﬀect exists, we are unable to determine whether outsourcing or
absolute reductions of the production in relatively dirty sectors is causing this
eﬀect. Further structural research should tackle this problem systematically. To
do so, additional detailed sectoral data, covering all countries of the planet, will
be needed, in order to assess this important question.
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